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trezor-firmware/python/src/trezorlib/_ed25519.py
matejcik 67b879ac07 python: restructure package
This deserves some explanation.

* tests were moved to separate python/tests subdir
* trezorlib was moved to python/src, so that it does not exist on
PYTHONPATH by default
(see https://blog.ionelmc.ro/2014/05/25/python-packaging/ for details)
* everything was updated to understand the new structure
* trezorctl was changed from a top-level executable script to a module
`trezorlib.cli.trezorctl` and is installed via the entry_points
mechanism.
This should make it work normally on Windows!

The package should be installable as normal through pip and pipenv, no
changes are needed on that side.

The source package from pypi will include unit tests. (Device tests were
completely moved out). Wheel will exclude them, because users don't need
them.
That shrinks the .whl from 520 kB to 270 - nice!

python: reorganize remaining unit tests
2019-08-12 12:57:25 +02:00

300 lines
7.4 KiB
Python

# ed25519.py - Optimized version of the reference implementation of Ed25519
# downloaded from https://github.com/pyca/ed25519
#
# Written in 2011? by Daniel J. Bernstein <djb@cr.yp.to>
# 2013 by Donald Stufft <donald@stufft.io>
# 2013 by Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>
# 2013 by Greg Price <price@mit.edu>
#
# To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
# and related and neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
# worldwide. This software is distributed without any warranty.
#
# You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along
# with this software. If not, see
# <http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/>.
"""
NB: This code is not safe for use with secret keys or secret data.
The only safe use of this code is for verifying signatures on public messages.
Functions for computing the public key of a secret key and for signing
a message are included, namely publickey_unsafe and signature_unsafe,
for testing purposes only.
The root of the problem is that Python's long-integer arithmetic is
not designed for use in cryptography. Specifically, it may take more
or less time to execute an operation depending on the values of the
inputs, and its memory access patterns may also depend on the inputs.
This opens it to timing and cache side-channel attacks which can
disclose data to an attacker. We rely on Python's long-integer
arithmetic, so we cannot handle secrets without risking their disclosure.
"""
import hashlib
from typing import List, NewType, Tuple
Point = NewType("Point", Tuple[int, int, int, int])
__version__ = "1.0.dev1"
b = 256
q = 2 ** 255 - 19
l = 2 ** 252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
COORD_MASK = ~(1 + 2 + 4 + (1 << b - 1))
COORD_HIGH_BIT = 1 << b - 2
def H(m: bytes) -> bytes:
return hashlib.sha512(m).digest()
def pow2(x: int, p: int) -> int:
"""== pow(x, 2**p, q)"""
while p > 0:
x = x * x % q
p -= 1
return x
def inv(z: int) -> int:
"""$= z^{-1} mod q$, for z != 0"""
# Adapted from curve25519_athlon.c in djb's Curve25519.
z2 = z * z % q # 2
z9 = pow2(z2, 2) * z % q # 9
z11 = z9 * z2 % q # 11
z2_5_0 = (z11 * z11) % q * z9 % q # 31 == 2^5 - 2^0
z2_10_0 = pow2(z2_5_0, 5) * z2_5_0 % q # 2^10 - 2^0
z2_20_0 = pow2(z2_10_0, 10) * z2_10_0 % q # ...
z2_40_0 = pow2(z2_20_0, 20) * z2_20_0 % q
z2_50_0 = pow2(z2_40_0, 10) * z2_10_0 % q
z2_100_0 = pow2(z2_50_0, 50) * z2_50_0 % q
z2_200_0 = pow2(z2_100_0, 100) * z2_100_0 % q
z2_250_0 = pow2(z2_200_0, 50) * z2_50_0 % q # 2^250 - 2^0
return pow2(z2_250_0, 5) * z11 % q # 2^255 - 2^5 + 11 = q - 2
d = -121665 * inv(121666) % q
I = pow(2, (q - 1) // 4, q)
def xrecover(y: int) -> int:
xx = (y * y - 1) * inv(d * y * y + 1)
x = pow(xx, (q + 3) // 8, q)
if (x * x - xx) % q != 0:
x = (x * I) % q
if x % 2 != 0:
x = q - x
return x
By = 4 * inv(5)
Bx = xrecover(By)
B = Point((Bx % q, By % q, 1, (Bx * By) % q))
ident = Point((0, 1, 1, 0))
def edwards_add(P: Point, Q: Point) -> Point:
# This is formula sequence 'addition-add-2008-hwcd-3' from
# http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-twisted-extended-1.html
(x1, y1, z1, t1) = P
(x2, y2, z2, t2) = Q
a = (y1 - x1) * (y2 - x2) % q
b = (y1 + x1) * (y2 + x2) % q
c = t1 * 2 * d * t2 % q
dd = z1 * 2 * z2 % q
e = b - a
f = dd - c
g = dd + c
h = b + a
x3 = e * f
y3 = g * h
t3 = e * h
z3 = f * g
return Point((x3 % q, y3 % q, z3 % q, t3 % q))
def edwards_double(P: Point) -> Point:
# This is formula sequence 'dbl-2008-hwcd' from
# http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-twisted-extended-1.html
(x1, y1, z1, _) = P
a = x1 * x1 % q
b = y1 * y1 % q
c = 2 * z1 * z1 % q
# dd = -a
e = ((x1 + y1) * (x1 + y1) - a - b) % q
g = -a + b # dd + b
f = g - c
h = -a - b # dd - b
x3 = e * f
y3 = g * h
t3 = e * h
z3 = f * g
return Point((x3 % q, y3 % q, z3 % q, t3 % q))
def scalarmult(P: Point, e: int) -> Point:
if e == 0:
return ident
Q = scalarmult(P, e // 2)
Q = edwards_double(Q)
if e & 1:
Q = edwards_add(Q, P)
return Q
# Bpow[i] == scalarmult(B, 2**i)
Bpow = [] # type: List[Point]
def make_Bpow() -> None:
P = B
for _ in range(253):
Bpow.append(P)
P = edwards_double(P)
make_Bpow()
def scalarmult_B(e: int) -> Point:
"""
Implements scalarmult(B, e) more efficiently.
"""
# scalarmult(B, l) is the identity
e = e % l
P = ident
for i in range(253):
if e & 1:
P = edwards_add(P, Bpow[i])
e = e // 2
assert e == 0, e
return P
def encodeint(y: int) -> bytes:
return y.to_bytes(b // 8, "little")
def encodepoint(P: Point) -> bytes:
(x, y, z, _) = P
zi = inv(z)
x = (x * zi) % q
y = (y * zi) % q
xbit = (x & 1) << (b - 1)
y_result = y & ~xbit # clear x bit
y_result |= xbit # set corret x bit value
return encodeint(y_result)
def decodeint(s: bytes) -> int:
return int.from_bytes(s, "little")
def decodepoint(s: bytes) -> Point:
y = decodeint(s) & ~(1 << b - 1) # y without the highest bit
x = xrecover(y)
if x & 1 != bit(s, b - 1):
x = q - x
P = Point((x, y, 1, (x * y) % q))
if not isoncurve(P):
raise ValueError("decoding point that is not on curve")
return P
def decodecoord(s: bytes) -> int:
a = decodeint(s[: b // 8])
# clear mask bits
a &= COORD_MASK
# set high bit
a |= COORD_HIGH_BIT
return a
def bit(h: bytes, i: int) -> int:
return (h[i // 8] >> (i % 8)) & 1
def publickey_unsafe(sk: bytes) -> bytes:
"""
Not safe to use with secret keys or secret data.
See module docstring. This function should be used for testing only.
"""
h = H(sk)
a = decodecoord(h)
A = scalarmult_B(a)
return encodepoint(A)
def Hint(m: bytes) -> int:
return decodeint(H(m))
def signature_unsafe(m: bytes, sk: bytes, pk: bytes) -> bytes:
"""
Not safe to use with secret keys or secret data.
See module docstring. This function should be used for testing only.
"""
h = H(sk)
a = decodecoord(h)
r = Hint(h[b // 8 : b // 4] + m)
R = scalarmult_B(r)
S = (r + Hint(encodepoint(R) + pk + m) * a) % l
return encodepoint(R) + encodeint(S)
def isoncurve(P: Point) -> bool:
(x, y, z, t) = P
return (
z % q != 0
and x * y % q == z * t % q
and (y * y - x * x - z * z - d * t * t) % q == 0
)
class SignatureMismatch(Exception):
pass
def checkvalid(s: bytes, m: bytes, pk: bytes) -> None:
"""
Not safe to use when any argument is secret.
See module docstring. This function should be used only for
verifying public signatures of public messages.
"""
if len(s) != b // 4:
raise ValueError("signature length is wrong")
if len(pk) != b // 8:
raise ValueError("public-key length is wrong")
R = decodepoint(s[: b // 8])
A = decodepoint(pk)
S = decodeint(s[b // 8 : b // 4])
h = Hint(encodepoint(R) + pk + m)
(x1, y1, z1, _) = P = scalarmult_B(S)
(x2, y2, z2, _) = Q = edwards_add(R, scalarmult(A, h))
if (
not isoncurve(P)
or not isoncurve(Q)
or (x1 * z2 - x2 * z1) % q != 0
or (y1 * z2 - y2 * z1) % q != 0
):
raise SignatureMismatch("signature does not pass verification")