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trezor-firmware/tests/device_tests/bitcoin/test_signtx_invalid_path.py

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# This file is part of the Trezor project.
#
# Copyright (C) 2012-2019 SatoshiLabs and contributors
#
# This library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License version 3
# as published by the Free Software Foundation.
#
# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the License along with this library.
# If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.html>.
import pytest
from trezorlib import btc, device, messages
from trezorlib.debuglink import TrezorClientDebugLink as Client
from trezorlib.exceptions import TrezorFailure
from trezorlib.tools import H_, parse_path
from .signtx import (
forge_prevtx,
request_finished,
request_input,
request_meta,
request_output,
)
B = messages.ButtonRequestType
# address at seed "all all all..." path m/44h/0h/0h/0/0
INPUT_ADDRESS = "1JAd7XCBzGudGpJQSDSfpmJhiygtLQWaGL"
PREV_HASH, PREV_TX = forge_prevtx([(INPUT_ADDRESS, 390_000)])
PREV_TXES = {PREV_HASH: PREV_TX}
# Litecoin does not have strong replay protection using SIGHASH_FORKID,
# spending from Bitcoin path should fail.
@pytest.mark.altcoin
def test_invalid_path_fail(client: Client):
inp1 = messages.TxInputType(
address_n=parse_path("m/44h/0h/0h/0/0"),
amount=390_000,
prev_hash=PREV_HASH,
prev_index=0,
)
# address is converted from 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1 by changing the version
out1 = messages.TxOutputType(
address="LfWz9wLHmqU9HoDkMg9NqbRosrHvEixeVZ",
amount=390_000 - 10_000,
script_type=messages.OutputScriptType.PAYTOADDRESS,
)
with pytest.raises(TrezorFailure) as exc:
btc.sign_tx(client, "Litecoin", [inp1], [out1], prev_txes=PREV_TXES)
assert exc.value.code == messages.FailureType.DataError
assert exc.value.message.endswith("Forbidden key path")
# Litecoin does not have strong replay protection using SIGHASH_FORKID, but
# spending from Bitcoin path should pass with safety checks set to prompt.
@pytest.mark.altcoin
def test_invalid_path_prompt(client: Client):
inp1 = messages.TxInputType(
address_n=parse_path("m/44h/0h/0h/0/0"),
amount=390_000,
prev_hash=PREV_HASH,
prev_index=0,
)
# address is converted from 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1 by changing the version
out1 = messages.TxOutputType(
address="LfWz9wLHmqU9HoDkMg9NqbRosrHvEixeVZ",
amount=390_000 - 10_000,
script_type=messages.OutputScriptType.PAYTOADDRESS,
)
device.apply_settings(
client, safety_checks=messages.SafetyCheckLevel.PromptTemporarily
)
btc.sign_tx(client, "Litecoin", [inp1], [out1], prev_txes=PREV_TXES)
# Bcash does have strong replay protection using SIGHASH_FORKID,
# spending from Bitcoin path should work.
@pytest.mark.altcoin
def test_invalid_path_pass_forkid(client: Client):
inp1 = messages.TxInputType(
address_n=parse_path("m/44h/0h/0h/0/0"),
amount=390_000,
prev_hash=PREV_HASH,
prev_index=0,
)
# address is converted from 1MJ2tj2ThBE62zXbBYA5ZaN3fdve5CPAz1 to cashaddr format
out1 = messages.TxOutputType(
address="bitcoincash:qr0fk25d5zygyn50u5w7h6jkvctas52n0qxff9ja6r",
amount=390_000 - 10_000,
script_type=messages.OutputScriptType.PAYTOADDRESS,
)
btc.sign_tx(client, "Bcash", [inp1], [out1], prev_txes=PREV_TXES)
def test_attack_path_segwit(client: Client):
# Scenario: The attacker falsely claims that the transaction uses Testnet paths to
# avoid the path warning dialog, but in step6_sign_segwit_inputs() uses Bitcoin paths
# to get a valid signature.
# Generate keys
address_a = btc.get_address(
client,
"Testnet",
parse_path("m/84h/1h/0h/0/0"),
script_type=messages.InputScriptType.SPENDWITNESS,
)
address_b = btc.get_address(
client,
"Testnet",
parse_path("m/84h/1h/1h/0/1"),
script_type=messages.InputScriptType.SPENDWITNESS,
)
prev_hash, prev_tx = forge_prevtx(
[(address_a, 9_426), (address_b, 7_086)], network="testnet"
)
device.apply_settings(
client, safety_checks=messages.SafetyCheckLevel.PromptTemporarily
)
inp1 = messages.TxInputType(
# The actual input that the attacker wants to get signed.
address_n=parse_path("m/84h/0h/0h/0/0"),
amount=9_426,
prev_hash=prev_hash,
prev_index=0,
script_type=messages.InputScriptType.SPENDWITNESS,
)
inp2 = messages.TxInputType(
# The actual input that the attacker wants to get signed.
# We need this one to be from a different account, so that the match checker
# allows the transaction to pass.
address_n=parse_path("m/84h/0h/1h/0/1"),
amount=7_086,
prev_hash=prev_hash,
prev_index=1,
script_type=messages.InputScriptType.SPENDWITNESS,
)
out1 = messages.TxOutputType(
# Attacker's Mainnet address encoded as Testnet.
address="tb1q694ccp5qcc0udmfwgp692u2s2hjpq5h407urtu",
script_type=messages.OutputScriptType.PAYTOADDRESS,
amount=9_426 + 7_086 - 500,
)
attack_count = 6
def attack_processor(msg):
nonlocal attack_count
# Make the inputs look like they are coming from Testnet paths until we reach the
# signing phase.
if attack_count > 0 and msg.tx.inputs and msg.tx.inputs[0] in (inp1, inp2):
attack_count -= 1
msg.tx.inputs[0].address_n[1] = H_(1)
return msg
with client:
client.set_filter(messages.TxAck, attack_processor)
client.set_expected_responses(
[
# Step: process inputs
request_input(0),
# Attacker bypasses warning about non-standard path.
request_input(1),
# Attacker bypasses warning about non-standard path.
# Step: approve outputs
request_output(0),
messages.ButtonRequest(code=B.ConfirmOutput),
messages.ButtonRequest(code=B.SignTx),
# Step: verify inputs
request_input(0),
request_meta(prev_hash),
request_input(0, prev_hash),
request_output(0, prev_hash),
request_output(1, prev_hash),
request_input(1),
request_meta(prev_hash),
request_input(0, prev_hash),
request_output(0, prev_hash),
request_output(1, prev_hash),
# Step: serialize inputs
request_input(0),
request_input(1),
# Step: serialize outputs
request_output(0),
# Step: sign segwit inputs
request_input(0),
# Trezor must warn about non-standard path before signing.
messages.ButtonRequest(code=B.UnknownDerivationPath),
request_input(1),
# Trezor must warn about non-standard path before signing.
messages.ButtonRequest(code=B.UnknownDerivationPath),
request_finished(),
]
)
btc.sign_tx(
client, "Testnet", [inp1, inp2], [out1], prev_txes={prev_hash: prev_tx}
)
@pytest.mark.skip_t1(reason="T1 only prevents using paths known to be altcoins")
def test_invalid_path_fail_asap(client: Client):
inp1 = messages.TxInputType(
address_n=parse_path("m/0"),
amount=1_000_000,
prev_hash=b"\x42" * 32,
prev_index=0,
script_type=messages.InputScriptType.SPENDWITNESS,
sequence=4_294_967_293,
)
out1 = messages.TxOutputType(
address_n=parse_path("m/84h/0h/0h/1/0"),
amount=1_000_000,
script_type=messages.OutputScriptType.PAYTOWITNESS,
)
with client:
client.set_expected_responses(
[
request_input(0),
messages.Failure(code=messages.FailureType.DataError),
]
)
try:
btc.sign_tx(client, "Testnet", [inp1], [out1])
except TrezorFailure:
pass