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fix(crypto): In ecdsa_verify_digest() allow the digest to be equal to the order of the group.

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Andrew Kozlik 2020-11-28 11:54:17 +01:00 committed by Andrew Kozlik
parent 1187e4ddaf
commit fed59ec770
1 changed files with 10 additions and 9 deletions
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19
crypto/ecdsa.c
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@ -1036,25 +1036,26 @@ int ecdsa_verify_digest(const ecdsa_curve *curve, const uint8_t *pub_key,
if (result == 0) {
bn_read_be(sig, &r);
bn_read_be(sig + 32, &s);
bn_read_be(digest, &z);
if (bn_is_zero(&r) || bn_is_zero(&s) || (!bn_is_less(&r, &curve->order)) ||
(!bn_is_less(&s, &curve->order))) {
result = 2;
}
if (bn_is_zero(&z)) {
// The digest was all-zero. The probability of this happening by chance is
// infinitesimal, but it could be induced by a fault injection. In this
// case the signature (r,s) can be forged by taking r := (t * Q).x mod n
// and s := r * t^-1 mod n for any t in [1, n-1]. We fail verification,
// because there is no guarantee that the signature was created by the
// owner of the private key.
result = 3;
}
}
if (result == 0) {
bn_read_be(digest, &z);
bn_inverse(&s, &curve->order); // s = s^-1
bn_multiply(&s, &z, &curve->order); // z = z * s [u1 = z * s^-1 mod n]
bn_mod(&z, &curve->order);
if (bn_is_zero(&z)) {
// The digest was all-zero. The probability of this happening by chance is
// infinitesimal. In this case the signature (r,s) can be forged by taking
// r := (t * Q).x mod n and s := r * t^-1 mod n for any t in [1, n-1]. We
// fail verification, because there is no guarantee that the signature was
// created by the owner of the private key.
result = 3;
}
}
if (result == 0) {