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https://github.com/trezor/trezor-firmware.git
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feat(core): Improve PIN progress precision.
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509e291118
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@ -42,9 +42,11 @@
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// Size of secrets used in PIN processing, e.g. salted PIN, master secret etc.
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#define OPTIGA_PIN_SECRET_SIZE 32
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// The number of milliseconds it takes to execute optiga_pin_set() or
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// optiga_pin_verify().
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#define OPTIGA_PIN_DERIVE_MS 1200
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// The number of milliseconds it takes to execute optiga_pin_set().
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#define OPTIGA_PIN_SET_MS 1300
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// The number of milliseconds it takes to execute optiga_pin_verify().
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#define OPTIGA_PIN_VERIFY_MS 900
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typedef secbool (*OPTIGA_UI_PROGRESS)(uint32_t elapsed_ms);
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@ -401,8 +401,6 @@ static int optiga_pin_stretch_common(
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hmac_sha256_Update(ctx, buffer, size);
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}
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ui_progress(200);
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// Combine intermediate result with OID_PIN_ECDH
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uint8_t encoded_point[BIT_STRING_HEADER_SIZE + 65] = {0x03, 0x42, 0x00};
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if (!hash_to_curve_optiga(input, &encoded_point[BIT_STRING_HEADER_SIZE])) {
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@ -417,7 +415,7 @@ static int optiga_pin_stretch_common(
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return res;
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}
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ui_progress(200);
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ui_progress(250);
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hmac_sha256_Update(ctx, buffer, size);
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memzero(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
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@ -517,7 +515,7 @@ int optiga_pin_set(OPTIGA_UI_PROGRESS ui_progress,
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goto end;
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}
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ui_progress(200);
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ui_progress(300);
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// Stretch the PIN more with stretching secrets from the Optiga. This step
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// ensures that if an attacker extracts the value of OID_STRETCHED_PIN or
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@ -596,6 +594,8 @@ int optiga_pin_set(OPTIGA_UI_PROGRESS ui_progress,
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goto end;
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}
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ui_progress(250);
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// Authorise using OID_STRETCHED_PIN so that we can write to OID_PIN_HMAC and
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// OID_PIN_HMAC_CTR.
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res = optiga_set_auto_state(OPTIGA_OID_SESSION_CTX, OID_STRETCHED_PIN, digest,
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@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ int optiga_pin_set(OPTIGA_UI_PROGRESS ui_progress,
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goto end;
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}
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ui_progress(200);
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ui_progress(250);
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// Stretch the PIN more with the counter-protected PIN secret. This method
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// ensures that if the user chooses a high-entropy PIN, then even if the
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@ -781,6 +781,8 @@ int optiga_pin_verify(OPTIGA_UI_PROGRESS ui_progress,
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return error_code + OPTIGA_COMMAND_ERROR_OFFSET;
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}
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ui_progress(200);
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// Reset the counter which limits the use of OID_PIN_HMAC.
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res = optiga_set_data_object(OID_PIN_HMAC_CTR, false, COUNTER_RESET,
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sizeof(COUNTER_RESET));
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@ -789,8 +791,6 @@ int optiga_pin_verify(OPTIGA_UI_PROGRESS ui_progress,
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return res;
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}
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ui_progress(200);
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// Read the counter-protected PIN secret from OID_PIN_SECRET.
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uint8_t pin_secret[OPTIGA_PIN_SECRET_SIZE] = {0};
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size_t size = 0;
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@ -91,11 +91,18 @@ const uint32_t V0_PIN_EMPTY = 1;
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// The number of milliseconds required to execute PBKDF2.
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#define PIN_PBKDF2_MS 1280
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// The number of milliseconds required to derive the KEK and KEIV.
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// The number of milliseconds required to set the PIN.
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#if USE_OPTIGA
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#define PIN_DERIVE_MS (PIN_PBKDF2_MS + OPTIGA_PIN_DERIVE_MS)
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#define PIN_SET_MS (PIN_PBKDF2_MS + OPTIGA_PIN_SET_MS)
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#else
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#define PIN_DERIVE_MS PIN_PBKDF2_MS
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#define PIN_SET_MS PIN_PBKDF2_MS
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#endif
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// The number of milliseconds required to verify the PIN.
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#if USE_OPTIGA
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#define PIN_VERIFY_MS (PIN_PBKDF2_MS + OPTIGA_PIN_VERIFY_MS)
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#else
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#define PIN_VERIFY_MS PIN_PBKDF2_MS
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#endif
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// The length of the hashed hardware salt in bytes.
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@ -451,6 +458,16 @@ static secbool is_not_wipe_code(const uint8_t *pin, size_t pin_len) {
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return sectrue;
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}
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static void ui_total_init(uint32_t total_ms) {
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ui_total = total_ms;
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ui_rem = total_ms;
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}
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static void ui_total_add(uint32_t added_ms) {
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ui_total += added_ms;
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ui_rem += added_ms;
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}
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static secbool ui_progress(uint32_t elapsed_ms) {
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ui_rem -= elapsed_ms;
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if (ui_callback && ui_message) {
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@ -721,8 +738,7 @@ static void init_wiped_storage(void) {
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ensure(set_wipe_code(WIPE_CODE_EMPTY, WIPE_CODE_EMPTY_LEN),
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"set_wipe_code failed");
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ui_total = PIN_DERIVE_MS;
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ui_rem = ui_total;
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ui_total_init(PIN_SET_MS);
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ui_message = PROCESSING_MSG;
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ensure(set_pin(PIN_EMPTY, PIN_EMPTY_LEN, NULL), "init_pin failed");
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}
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@ -921,8 +937,7 @@ static secbool unlock(const uint8_t *pin, size_t pin_len,
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// In case of an upgrade from version 4 or earlier bump the total time of UI
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// progress to account for the set_pin() call in storage_upgrade_unlocked().
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if (get_lock_version() <= 4) {
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ui_total += PIN_DERIVE_MS;
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ui_rem += PIN_DERIVE_MS;
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ui_total_add(PIN_SET_MS);
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}
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// Now we can check for wipe code.
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@ -945,8 +960,7 @@ static secbool unlock(const uint8_t *pin, size_t pin_len,
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// Sleep for 2^ctr - 1 seconds before checking the PIN.
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uint32_t wait = (1 << ctr) - 1;
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ui_total += wait * 1000;
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ui_rem += wait * 1000;
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ui_total_add(wait * 1000);
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ui_progress(0);
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < 10 * wait; i++) {
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if (sectrue == ui_progress(100)) {
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@ -1015,8 +1029,7 @@ secbool storage_unlock(const uint8_t *pin, size_t pin_len,
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return secfalse;
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}
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ui_total = PIN_DERIVE_MS;
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ui_rem = ui_total;
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ui_total_init(PIN_VERIFY_MS);
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if (pin_len == 0) {
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if (ui_message == NO_MSG) {
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ui_message = STARTING_MSG;
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@ -1311,8 +1324,7 @@ secbool storage_change_pin(const uint8_t *oldpin, size_t oldpin_len,
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return secfalse;
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}
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ui_total = 2 * PIN_DERIVE_MS;
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ui_rem = ui_total;
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ui_total_init(PIN_VERIFY_MS + PIN_SET_MS);
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ui_message =
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(oldpin_len != 0 && newpin_len == 0) ? VERIFYING_PIN_MSG : PROCESSING_MSG;
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@ -1360,8 +1372,7 @@ secbool storage_change_wipe_code(const uint8_t *pin, size_t pin_len,
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return secfalse;
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}
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ui_total = PIN_DERIVE_MS;
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ui_rem = ui_total;
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ui_total_init(PIN_VERIFY_MS);
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ui_message =
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(pin_len != 0 && wipe_code_len == 0) ? VERIFYING_PIN_MSG : PROCESSING_MSG;
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@ -1537,8 +1548,7 @@ static secbool storage_upgrade(void) {
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}
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// Set EDEK_PVC_KEY and PIN_NOT_SET_KEY.
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ui_total = PIN_DERIVE_MS;
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ui_rem = ui_total;
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ui_total_init(PIN_SET_MS);
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ui_message = PROCESSING_MSG;
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uint8_t pin[V0_MAX_PIN_LEN] = {0};
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size_t pin_len = 0;
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