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feat(core): Disable prevtx streaming for Taproot.
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core/.changelog.d/1656.removed
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1
core/.changelog.d/1656.removed
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Disable previous transaction streaming in Bitcoin if all internal inputs are Taproot.
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@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ class Bitcoin:
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# set of indices of inputs which are external
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self.external: set[int] = set()
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# indicates whether all internal inputs are Taproot
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self.taproot_only = True
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# transaction and signature serialization
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_SERIALIZED_TX_BUFFER[:] = bytes()
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self.serialized_tx = _SERIALIZED_TX_BUFFER
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@ -118,10 +121,10 @@ class Bitcoin:
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# stable device tests.
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self.orig_txs: list[OriginalTxInfo] = []
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# h_inputs is a digest of the inputs streamed for approval in Step 1, which
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# is used to ensure that the inputs streamed for verification in Step 3 are
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# the same as those in Step 1.
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# The digests of the inputs streamed for approval in Step 1. These are used to ensure that
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# the inputs streamed for verification in Step 3 are the same as those in Step 1.
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self.h_inputs: bytes | None = None
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self.h_external_inputs: bytes | None = None
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progress.init(tx.inputs_count, tx.outputs_count)
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@ -132,17 +135,25 @@ class Bitcoin:
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return Bip143Hash()
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async def step1_process_inputs(self) -> None:
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h_external_inputs_check = HashWriter(sha256())
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for i in range(self.tx_info.tx.inputs_count):
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# STAGE_REQUEST_1_INPUT in legacy
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txi = await helpers.request_tx_input(self.tx_req, i, self.coin)
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script_pubkey = self.input_derive_script(txi)
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self.tx_info.add_input(txi, script_pubkey)
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if txi.script_type not in (
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InputScriptType.SPENDTAPROOT,
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InputScriptType.EXTERNAL,
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):
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self.taproot_only = False
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if input_is_segwit(txi):
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self.segwit.add(i)
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if input_is_external(txi):
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self.external.add(i)
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writers.write_tx_input_check(h_external_inputs_check, txi)
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await self.process_external_input(txi)
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else:
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await self.process_internal_input(txi)
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@ -151,6 +162,7 @@ class Bitcoin:
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await self.process_original_input(txi, script_pubkey)
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self.h_inputs = self.tx_info.get_tx_check_digest()
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self.h_external_inputs = h_external_inputs_check.get_digest()
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# Finalize original inputs.
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for orig in self.orig_txs:
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@ -181,22 +193,44 @@ class Bitcoin:
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# should come out the same as h_inputs, checked before continuing
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h_check = HashWriter(sha256())
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for i in range(self.tx_info.tx.inputs_count):
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progress.advance()
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txi = await helpers.request_tx_input(self.tx_req, i, self.coin)
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if self.taproot_only:
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# All internal inputs are Taproot. We only need to verify external inputs. We can trust
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# the amounts and scriptPubKeys, because if an invalid value is provided then all
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# issued signatures will be invalid.
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expected_digest = self.h_external_inputs
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for i in self.external:
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progress.advance()
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txi = await helpers.request_tx_input(self.tx_req, i, self.coin)
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writers.write_tx_input_check(h_check, txi)
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assert txi.script_pubkey is not None # checked in sanitize_tx_input
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await self.verify_external_input(i, txi, txi.script_pubkey)
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progress.advance(self.tx_info.tx.inputs_count - len(self.external))
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else:
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# There are internal non-Taproot inputs. We need to verify all inputs, because we can't
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# trust any amounts or scriptPubKeys. If we did, then an attacker who provides invalid
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# information about amounts, scriptPubKeys and/or script types may still obtain valid
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# signatures for legacy and SegWit v0 inputs. These valid signatures could be exploited
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# in subsequent signing operations to falsely claim externality of the already signed
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# inputs or to falsely claim that a transaction is a replacement of an already approved
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# transaction or to construct a valid transaction by combining signatures obtained in
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# multiple rounds of the attack.
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expected_digest = self.h_inputs
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for i in range(self.tx_info.tx.inputs_count):
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progress.advance()
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txi = await helpers.request_tx_input(self.tx_req, i, self.coin)
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writers.write_tx_input_check(h_check, txi)
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writers.write_tx_input_check(h_check, txi)
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prev_amount, script_pubkey = await self.get_prevtx_output(
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txi.prev_hash, txi.prev_index
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)
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if prev_amount != txi.amount:
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raise wire.DataError("Invalid amount specified")
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prev_amount, script_pubkey = await self.get_prevtx_output(
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txi.prev_hash, txi.prev_index
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)
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if prev_amount != txi.amount:
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raise wire.DataError("Invalid amount specified")
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if i in self.external:
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await self.verify_external_input(i, txi, script_pubkey)
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if i in self.external:
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await self.verify_external_input(i, txi, script_pubkey)
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# check that the inputs were the same as those streamed for approval
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if h_check.get_digest() != self.h_inputs:
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if h_check.get_digest() != expected_digest:
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raise wire.ProcessError("Transaction has changed during signing")
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# verify the signature of one SIGHASH_ALL input in each original transaction
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@ -475,8 +509,10 @@ class Bitcoin:
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self.write_tx_input_derived(self.serialized_tx, txi, key_sign_pub, b"")
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def sign_bip143_input(self, txi: TxInput) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
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def sign_bip143_input(self, i: int, txi: TxInput) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
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self.tx_info.check_input(txi)
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if self.taproot_only:
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raise wire.ProcessError("Transaction has changed during signing")
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node = self.keychain.derive(txi.address_n)
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public_key = node.public_key()
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@ -528,7 +564,7 @@ class Bitcoin:
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self.serialized_tx, signature, self.get_hash_type(txi)
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)
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else:
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public_key, signature = self.sign_bip143_input(txi)
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public_key, signature = self.sign_bip143_input(i, txi)
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if txi.multisig:
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# find out place of our signature based on the pubkey
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@ -617,6 +653,9 @@ class Bitcoin:
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return tx_digest, txi_sign, node
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async def sign_nonsegwit_input(self, i: int) -> None:
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if self.taproot_only:
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raise wire.ProcessError("Transaction has changed during signing")
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tx_digest, txi, node = await self.get_legacy_tx_digest(i, self.tx_info)
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assert node is not None
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ class Bitcoinlike(Bitcoin):
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if txi.script_type not in NONSEGWIT_INPUT_SCRIPT_TYPES:
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raise wire.ProcessError("Transaction has changed during signing")
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public_key, signature = self.sign_bip143_input(txi)
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public_key, signature = self.sign_bip143_input(i_sign, txi)
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# if multisig, do a sanity check to ensure we are signing with a key that is included in the multisig
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if txi.multisig:
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