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mirror of https://github.com/trezor/trezor-firmware.git synced 2024-12-23 23:08:14 +00:00

storage: Add STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY to protect against fake storage upgrade attacks.

This commit is contained in:
Andrew Kozlik 2019-10-23 17:50:46 +02:00
parent a168d661cf
commit 1deebf1065
3 changed files with 43 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -53,6 +53,9 @@
// Norcow storage key of the wipe code data.
#define WIPE_CODE_DATA_KEY ((APP_STORAGE << 8) | 0x06)
// Norcow storage key of the storage upgrade flag.
#define STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY ((APP_STORAGE << 8) | 0x07)
// The PIN value corresponding to an empty PIN.
#define PIN_EMPTY 1
@ -150,6 +153,8 @@ static uint8_t hardware_salt[HARDWARE_SALT_SIZE] = {0};
static uint32_t norcow_active_version = 0;
static const uint8_t TRUE_BYTE = 0x01;
static const uint8_t FALSE_BYTE = 0x00;
static const uint32_t TRUE_WORD = 0xC35A69A5;
static const uint32_t FALSE_WORD = 0x3CA5965A;
static void __handle_fault(const char *msg, const char *file, int line,
const char *func);
@ -621,6 +626,8 @@ static void init_wiped_storage(void) {
ensure(auth_init(), "set_storage_auth_tag failed");
ensure(storage_set_encrypted(VERSION_KEY, &version, sizeof(version)),
"set_storage_version failed");
ensure(norcow_set(STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY, &FALSE_WORD, sizeof(FALSE_WORD)),
"set_storage_not_upgraded failed");
ensure(pin_logs_init(0), "init_pin_logs failed");
ensure(set_wipe_code(WIPE_CODE_EMPTY), "set_wipe_code failed");
@ -854,12 +861,36 @@ secbool check_storage_version(void) {
handle_fault("storage version check");
return secfalse;
}
const void *storage_upgraded = NULL;
if (sectrue != norcow_get(STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY, &storage_upgraded, &len) ||
len != sizeof(TRUE_WORD)) {
handle_fault("storage version check");
return secfalse;
}
if (version > norcow_active_version) {
// Attack: Storage was downgraded.
storage_wipe();
handle_fault("storage version check");
return secfalse;
} else if (version < norcow_active_version) {
// Storage was upgraded.
if (*(const uint32_t *)storage_upgraded != TRUE_WORD) {
// Attack: The upgrade process was bypassed.
storage_wipe();
handle_fault("storage version check");
return secfalse;
}
norcow_set(STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY, &FALSE_WORD, sizeof(FALSE_WORD));
storage_set_encrypted(VERSION_KEY, &norcow_active_version,
sizeof(norcow_active_version));
} else {
// Standard operation. The storage was neither upgraded nor downgraded.
if (*(const uint32_t *)storage_upgraded != FALSE_WORD) {
// Attack: The upgrade process was launched when it shouldn't have been.
storage_wipe();
handle_fault("storage version check");
return secfalse;
}
}
return sectrue;
}
@ -900,7 +931,6 @@ static secbool decrypt_dek(const uint8_t *kek, const uint8_t *keiv) {
memcpy(cached_keys, keys, sizeof(keys));
memzero(keys, sizeof(keys));
memzero(tag, sizeof(tag));
// Check that the authenticated version number matches the norcow version.
// NOTE: This also initializes the authentication_sum by calling
// storage_get_encrypted() which calls auth_get().
@ -1464,6 +1494,11 @@ static secbool storage_upgrade(void) {
}
}
if (sectrue !=
norcow_set(STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY, &TRUE_WORD, sizeof(TRUE_WORD))) {
return secfalse;
}
norcow_active_version = NORCOW_VERSION;
return norcow_upgrade_finish();
}

View File

@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ SAT_KEY = (PIN_APP_ID << 8) | 0x05
# Norcow storage key of the wipe code data.
WIPE_CODE_DATA_KEY = (PIN_APP_ID << 8) | 0x06
# Norcow storage key of the storage upgrade flag.
STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY = (PIN_APP_ID << 8) | 0x07
# The PIN value corresponding to an empty PIN.
PIN_EMPTY = 1
@ -102,6 +105,8 @@ WORD_SIZE = 4
# Boolean values are stored as a simple 0/1 int.
TRUE_BYTE = b"\x01"
FALSE_BYTE = b"\x00"
TRUE_WORD = b"\xA5\x69\x5A\xC3"
FALSE_WORD = b"\x5A\x96\xA5\x3C"
# ----- Crypto ----- #

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@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ class Storage:
self.nc.set(consts.SAT_KEY, crypto.init_hmacs(self.sak))
self._set_encrypt(consts.VERSION_KEY, b"\x02\x00\x00\x00")
self.nc.set(consts.STORAGE_UPGRADED_KEY, consts.FALSE_WORD)
self.pin_log.init()
self._set_wipe_code(consts.WIPE_CODE_EMPTY)
self._set_pin(consts.PIN_EMPTY)