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106 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
106 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
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# Use of SLIP-39 in trezor-core
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[SLIP-39](https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.md) describes a way
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to securely back up a secret value using Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme.
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The secret value, called a Master Secret (**MS**) in SLIP-39 terminology, is first
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encrypted by a passphrase, producing an Encrypted Master Secret (**EMS**). The EMS is
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then split into a number of shares, which are encoded as a set of mnemonic words.
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Afterwards, it is possible to recombine some or all of the shares to obtain back the
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EMS, and when the correct passphrase is provided, decrypt the original Master Secret.
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This does not quite match Trezor's use of the "passphrase protection" feature, namely
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that any passphrase is valid, and using any passphrase will yield a working wallet.
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SLIP-39 enables this usage by specifying that passphrases are not validated in any way.
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Decrypting an EMS with any passphrase will produce data usable as the Master Secret,
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regardless of whether it is the original data or not.
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## Seed handling in Trezor
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Trezor stores a _mnemonic secret_ in a storage field `_MNEMONIC_SECRET`. This is the
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input for the root node derivation process: `mnemonic.get_seed(passphrase)` takes the
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user-provided passphrase as an argument, and derives the appropriate root node from the
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mnemonic secret.
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With BIP-39, the recovery phrase itself is the mnemonic secret. During device
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initialization, the raw recovery phrase is given to the user, and also directly stored
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in the `_MNEMONIC_SECRET` field. Whenever the root node is required, it is derived by
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applying PBKDF2 to the mnemonic secret plus passphrase.
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For SLIP-39 it is not practical to store the raw data of the recovery shares. During
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device initialization, a random Encrypted Master Secret is generated and stored as
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`_MNEMONIC_SECRET`. SLIP-39 encryption parameters (a random identifier and an iteration
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exponent) are stored alongside the mnemonic secret in their own storage fields. Whenever
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the root node is required, it is derived by "decrypting" the stored mnemonic secret with
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the provided passphrase.
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## SLIP-39 implementation
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The [reference implementation](https://github.com/trezor/python-shamir-mnemonic) of
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SLIP-39 provides the following high-level API:
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* `generate_mnemonics(group parameters, master_secret, passphrase)`: Encrypt Master
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Secret with the provided passphrase, and split into a number of shares defined via
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the group parameters.
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Implemented using the following:
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- `encrypt(master_secret, passphrase, iteration_exponent, identifier)`: Encrypt the
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Master Secret with the given passphrase and parameters.
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- **`split_ems(group parameters, identifier, iteration_exponent, encrypted_master_secret)`**:
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Split the encrypted secret and encode the metadata into a set of shares defined via
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the group parameters.
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* `combine_mnemonics(set of shares, passphrase)`: Combine the given set of shares to
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reconstruct the secret, then decrypt it with the provided passphrase.
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Implemented using the following:
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- **`recover_ems(set of shares)`**: Combine the given set of shares to obtain the
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encrypted master secret, identifier and iteration exponent.
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- **`decrypt(encrypted_master_secret, passphrase, iteration_exponent, identifier)`**:
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Decrypt the secret with the given passphrase and parameters, to obtain the original
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Master Secret.
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Only the functions denoted in **bold** are implemented in trezor-core. Recovery shares
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are generated with `split_ems` and combined with `recover_ems`. Passphrase decryption is
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done with `decrypt`. There is never an original "master secret" to be encrypted, so the
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`encrypt` function is also omitted.
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## Step-by-step
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### Device initialization
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This process does not use passphrase.
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1. Generate the required number of random bits (128 or 256), and store as
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`_MNEMONIC_SECRET`.
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2. Generate a random identifier and store as `_SLIP39_IDENTIFIER`.
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3. Store the default iteration exponent `1` as `_SLIP39_ITERATION_EXPONENT`.
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4. The storage now contains all parameters required for seed derivation.
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### Seed derivation
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This is the only process that uses passphrase.
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1. If passphrase is enabled, prompt user for passphrase. Otherwise use empty string.
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2. Use `slip39.decrypt(_MNEMONIC_SECRET, passphrase, _SLIP39_ITERATION_EXPONENT, _SLIP39_IDENTIFIER)`
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to "decrypt" the root node that matches the provided passphrase.
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### Seed backup
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This process does not use passphrase.
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1. Prompt user for group parameters (number of groups, number of shares per group, etc.).
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2. Use `slip39.split_ems(group parameters, _SLIP39_IDENTIFIER, _SLIP39_ITERATION_EXPONENT, _MNEMONIC_SECRET)` to split the secret into the given number of shares.
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### Seed recovery
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This process does not use passphrase.
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1. Prompt the user to enter enough shares.
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2. Use `slip39.recover_ems(shares)` to combine the shares and get metadata.
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3. Store the Encrypted Master Secret as `_MNEMONIC_SECRET`.
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4. Store the identifier as `_SLIP39_IDENTIFIER`.
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5. Store the iteration exponent as `_SLIP39_ITERATION_EXPONENT`.
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6. The storage now contains all parameters required for seed derivation.
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