trezor-firmware/crypto/monero/range_proof.c

//
// Created by Dusan Klinec on 10/05/2018.
//

#include "range_proof.h"

static void xmr_hash_ge25519_to_scalar(bignum256modm r, const ge25519 *p) {
  unsigned char buff[32] = {0};
  ge25519_pack(buff, p);
  xmr_hash_to_scalar(r, buff, sizeof(buff));
}

void xmr_gen_range_sig(xmr_range_sig_t *sig, ge25519 *C, bignum256modm mask,
                       xmr_amount amount, bignum256modm *last_mask) {
  bignum256modm ai[64] = {0};
  bignum256modm alpha[64] = {0};
  xmr_gen_range_sig_ex(sig, C, mask, amount, last_mask, ai, alpha);
}

void xmr_gen_range_sig_ex(xmr_range_sig_t *sig, ge25519 *C, bignum256modm mask,
                          xmr_amount amount, bignum256modm *last_mask,
                          bignum256modm ai[64], bignum256modm alpha[64]) {
  const unsigned n = XMR_ATOMS;
  bignum256modm a = {0};
  bignum256modm si = {0};
  bignum256modm c = {0};
  bignum256modm ee = {0};
  unsigned char buff[32] = {0};

  Hasher kck = {0};
  xmr_hasher_init(&kck);

  ge25519 C_acc = {0};
  ge25519 C_h = {0};
  ge25519 C_tmp = {0};
  ge25519 L = {0};
  ge25519 Zero = {0};

  ge25519_set_neutral(&Zero);
  ge25519_set_neutral(&C_acc);
  ge25519_set_xmr_h(&C_h);
  set256_modm(a, 0);

#define BB(i) ((amount >> (i)) & 1)

  // First pass, generates: ai, alpha, Ci, ee, s1
  for (unsigned ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
    xmr_random_scalar(ai[ii]);
    if (last_mask != NULL && ii == n - 1) {
      sub256_modm(ai[ii], *last_mask, a);
    }

    add256_modm(a, a, ai[ii]);  // creating the total mask since you have to
                                // pass this to receiver...
    xmr_random_scalar(alpha[ii]);

    ge25519_scalarmult_base_niels(&L, ge25519_niels_base_multiples, alpha[ii]);
    ge25519_scalarmult_base_niels(&C_tmp, ge25519_niels_base_multiples, ai[ii]);

    // C_tmp += &Zero if BB(ii) == 0 else &C_h
    ge25519_add(&C_tmp, &C_tmp, BB(ii) == 0 ? &Zero : &C_h, 0);
    ge25519_add(&C_acc, &C_acc, &C_tmp, 0);

    // Set Ci[ii] to sigs
    ge25519_pack(sig->Ci[ii], &C_tmp);

    if (BB(ii) == 0) {
      xmr_random_scalar(si);
      xmr_hash_ge25519_to_scalar(c, &L);

      ge25519_add(&C_tmp, &C_tmp, &C_h, 1);  // Ci[ii] -= c_h
      xmr_add_keys2_vartime(&L, si, c, &C_tmp);

      // Set s1[ii] to sigs
      contract256_modm(sig->asig.s1[ii], si);
    }

    ge25519_pack(buff, &L);
    xmr_hasher_update(&kck, buff, sizeof(buff));

    ge25519_double(&C_h, &C_h);  // c_H = crypto.scalarmult(c_H, 2)
  }

  // Compute ee
  xmr_hasher_final(&kck, buff);
  expand256_modm(ee, buff, sizeof(buff));

  ge25519_set_xmr_h(&C_h);

  // Second pass, s0, s1
  for (unsigned ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
    if (BB(ii) == 0) {
      mulsub256_modm(si, ai[ii], ee, alpha[ii]);
      contract256_modm(sig->asig.s0[ii], si);

    } else {
      xmr_random_scalar(si);
      contract256_modm(sig->asig.s0[ii], si);

      ge25519_unpack_vartime(&C_tmp, sig->Ci[ii]);
      xmr_add_keys2_vartime(&L, si, ee, &C_tmp);
      xmr_hash_ge25519_to_scalar(c, &L);

      mulsub256_modm(si, ai[ii], c, alpha[ii]);
      contract256_modm(sig->asig.s1[ii], si);
    }

    ge25519_double(&C_h, &C_h);  // c_H = crypto.scalarmult(c_H, 2)
  }

  ge25519_copy(C, &C_acc);
  copy256_modm(mask, a);
  contract256_modm(sig->asig.ee, ee);
#undef BB
}