When file opened with O_TMPFILE but use_tmpfile==0, the file will not be
linked to the directory (the code at the end of process_one_file_reg).
Additionally it is waste of time trying using O_TMPFILE when it's
already known it shouldn't be.
Also use_tmpfile==0 can mean we don't have access to /proc
(set_procfs_fd wasn't called), so even if linking the file to its
directory would be attempted, it would fail. This is the case for
dom0-updates copy.
Otherwise source domain can modify (append) the file while the user
already is accessing it. While incoming files should be treated as
untrusted, this problem could allow file modification after the user
makes some sanity checks.
add support for netvm, proxyvm, dispvm.
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Merge tag 'hw42_debian-systemd-1'
Use native systemd services (like in the fedora templates). This should also
add support for netvm, proxyvm, dispvm.
# gpg: Signature made Tue Nov 4 00:12:53 2014 CET using RSA key ID E09C093C
# gpg: Good signature from "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key) <hw42-qubes@ipsumj.de>"
# gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
# gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
# Primary key fingerprint: FC1A C023 76D0 4C68 341F 406F 8C05 216C E09C 093C
It can happen during device reconfiguration - do not decide to expose
the device until its known what device it will be.
This fixes bug where root.img was visible in qvm-block as normal device
and could be detached.
We have no control over package installation, so it can happen to be
before qubes-release got installed. Simply enable both dom0 and VM
services - they contains relevant start conditions.
By passing an empty file with a declared negative size,
a hostile VM can decrease the total bytes counter, while
not have do supply a huge amount of data, thus disabing
the byte size check, and potentially filling the target
filesystem.
