add support for netvm, proxyvm, dispvm.
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Merge tag 'hw42_debian-systemd-1'
Use native systemd services (like in the fedora templates). This should also
add support for netvm, proxyvm, dispvm.
# gpg: Signature made Tue Nov 4 00:12:53 2014 CET using RSA key ID E09C093C
# gpg: Good signature from "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key) <hw42-qubes@ipsumj.de>"
# gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
# gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
# Primary key fingerprint: FC1A C023 76D0 4C68 341F 406F 8C05 216C E09C 093C
It can happen during device reconfiguration - do not decide to expose
the device until its known what device it will be.
This fixes bug where root.img was visible in qvm-block as normal device
and could be detached.
We have no control over package installation, so it can happen to be
before qubes-release got installed. Simply enable both dom0 and VM
services - they contains relevant start conditions.
By passing an empty file with a declared negative size,
a hostile VM can decrease the total bytes counter, while
not have do supply a huge amount of data, thus disabing
the byte size check, and potentially filling the target
filesystem.
