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mirror of https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench.git synced 2025-01-30 01:21:12 +00:00
kube-bench/cfg/cis-1.10/controlplane.yaml
Andy Pitcher 3a2348eba7
Add CIS Kubernetes CIS-1.10 for k8s v1.28 - v1.31 (#1753)
* Create cis-1.10 yamls and Update info
	- Modify yaml versions from 1.9 to 1.10
	- Adapt configmap to cover cis-1.10
	- Adapt docs and cmd files

* Adapt master.yaml
	- 1.2.29 update cipher list to remove the following insecure ones (RC4-Based, 3DES-Based, RSA-Based AES CBC):
          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
          TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
          TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
          TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
          TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
          ticket: https://workbench.cisecurity.org/community/43/tickets/21760

* Adapt policies.yaml
	- 5.1.11 typo in sub-resource name 'certificatesigningrequest' https://workbench.cisecurity.org/tickets/21352
	- 5.2.2 new audit to verify if a container is privileged or not. https://workbench.cisecurity.org/tickets/20919
	- 5.2.3 new audit to verify the presence of hostPID opt-in across all pods. https://workbench.cisecurity.org/tickets/20919
	- 5.2.4 new audit to verify the presence of hostIPC opt-in across all pods. https://workbench.cisecurity.org/tickets/20923
	- 5.2.5 new audit to verify the presence of hostNetwork opt-in across all pods. https://workbench.cisecurity.org/tickets/20921
	- 5.2.6 new audit to verify the presence of 'allowPrivilegeEscalation' to true across all pods' container(s)
	- 5.2.6 the 'allowPrivilegeEscalation' setting is moved from 'spec' to 'securityContext' https://workbench.cisecurity.org/tickets/20922
	- 5.2.9 new audit to verify the presence of added capabilities across all pods' container(s)

* Fix 5.2.6 remediation
2025-01-13 11:18:15 +06:00

63 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML

---
controls:
version: "cis-1.10"
id: 3
text: "Control Plane Configuration"
type: "controlplane"
groups:
- id: 3.1
text: "Authentication and Authorization"
checks:
- id: 3.1.1
text: "Client certificate authentication should not be used for users (Manual)"
type: "manual"
remediation: |
Alternative mechanisms provided by Kubernetes such as the use of OIDC should be
implemented in place of client certificates.
scored: false
- id: 3.1.2
text: "Service account token authentication should not be used for users (Manual)"
type: "manual"
remediation: |
Alternative mechanisms provided by Kubernetes such as the use of OIDC should be implemented
in place of service account tokens.
scored: false
- id: 3.1.3
text: "Bootstrap token authentication should not be used for users (Manual)"
type: "manual"
remediation: |
Alternative mechanisms provided by Kubernetes such as the use of OIDC should be implemented
in place of bootstrap tokens.
scored: false
- id: 3.2
text: "Logging"
checks:
- id: 3.2.1
text: "Ensure that a minimal audit policy is created (Manual)"
audit: "/bin/ps -ef | grep $apiserverbin | grep -v grep"
tests:
test_items:
- flag: "--audit-policy-file"
set: true
remediation: |
Create an audit policy file for your cluster.
scored: false
- id: 3.2.2
text: "Ensure that the audit policy covers key security concerns (Manual)"
type: "manual"
remediation: |
Review the audit policy provided for the cluster and ensure that it covers
at least the following areas,
- Access to Secrets managed by the cluster. Care should be taken to only
log Metadata for requests to Secrets, ConfigMaps, and TokenReviews, in
order to avoid risk of logging sensitive data.
- Modification of Pod and Deployment objects.
- Use of `pods/exec`, `pods/portforward`, `pods/proxy` and `services/proxy`.
For most requests, minimally logging at the Metadata level is recommended
(the most basic level of logging).
scored: false