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440 lines
11 KiB
Common Lisp
440 lines
11 KiB
Common Lisp
/**
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* Author......: See docs/credits.txt
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* License.....: MIT
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*/
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// https://web.archive.org/web/20220306152229/https://www.adobe.com/content/dam/acom/en/devnet/pdf/pdfs/pdf_reference_archives/PDFReference.pdf
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#ifdef KERNEL_STATIC
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_vendor.h)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_types.h)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_platform.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_common.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_hash_md5.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_cipher_rc4.cl)
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#endif
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#define COMPARE_S M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_comp_single.cl)
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#define COMPARE_M M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_comp_multi.cl)
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typedef struct pdf
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{
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int V;
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int R;
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int P;
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int enc_md;
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u32 id_buf[8];
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u32 u_buf[32];
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u32 o_buf[32];
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u32 u_pass_buf[8];
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int id_len;
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int o_len;
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int u_len;
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int u_pass_len;
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u32 rc4key[2];
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u32 rc4data[2];
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int P_minus;
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} pdf_t;
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typedef struct pdf14_tmp
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{
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u32 digest[4];
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u32 out[8];
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} pdf14_tmp_t;
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KERNEL_FQ void m25400_init (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
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{
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/**
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* base
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*/
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const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
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//const u64 lid = get_local_id (0);
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if (gid >= GID_CNT) return;
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u32 w0[4];
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w0[0] = pws[gid].i[ 0];
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w0[1] = pws[gid].i[ 1];
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w0[2] = pws[gid].i[ 2];
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w0[3] = pws[gid].i[ 3];
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u32 w1[4];
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w1[0] = pws[gid].i[ 4];
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w1[1] = pws[gid].i[ 5];
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w1[2] = pws[gid].i[ 6];
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w1[3] = pws[gid].i[ 7];
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const u32 pw_len = pws[gid].pw_len;
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const u32 padding[8] =
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{
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0x5e4ebf28,
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0x418a754e,
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0x564e0064,
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0x0801faff,
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0xb6002e2e,
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0x803e68d0,
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0xfea90c2f,
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0x7a695364
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};
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/**
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* shared
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*/
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u32 P = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].P; // TODO this is never used, but should be according according to "Algorithm 3.2 Computing an encryption key" line 4.
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u32 id_buf[12]; // TODO this is never used, but should be according according to "Algorithm 3.2 Computing an encryption key" line 5.
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id_buf[ 0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[0];
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id_buf[ 1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[1];
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id_buf[ 2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[2];
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id_buf[ 3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[3];
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id_buf[ 4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[4];
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id_buf[ 5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[5];
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id_buf[ 6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[6];
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id_buf[ 7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].id_buf[7];
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id_buf[ 8] = 0;
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id_buf[ 9] = 0;
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id_buf[10] = 0;
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id_buf[11] = 0;
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u32 rc4data[2];
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rc4data[0] = padding[0];
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rc4data[1] = padding[1];
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/**
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* main init
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*/
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u32 w0_t[4];
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u32 w1_t[4];
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u32 w2_t[4];
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u32 w3_t[4];
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// max length supported by pdf11 is 32
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w0_t[0] = padding[0];
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w0_t[1] = padding[1];
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w0_t[2] = padding[2];
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w0_t[3] = padding[3];
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w1_t[0] = padding[4];
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w1_t[1] = padding[5];
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w1_t[2] = padding[6];
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w1_t[3] = padding[7];
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w2_t[0] = 0;
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w2_t[1] = 0;
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w2_t[2] = 0;
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w2_t[3] = 0;
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w3_t[0] = 0;
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w3_t[1] = 0;
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w3_t[2] = 0;
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w3_t[3] = 0;
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switch_buffer_by_offset_le (w0_t, w1_t, w2_t, w3_t, pw_len);
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// add password
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// truncate at 32 is wanted, not a bug!
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// add padding
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w0_t[0] |= w0[0];
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w0_t[1] |= w0[1];
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w0_t[2] |= w0[2];
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w0_t[3] |= w0[3];
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w1_t[0] |= w1[0];
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w1_t[1] |= w1[1];
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w1_t[2] |= w1[2];
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w1_t[3] |= w1[3];
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w2_t[0] = 0x80;
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w2_t[1] = 0;
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w2_t[2] = 0;
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w2_t[3] = 0;
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w3_t[0] = 0;
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w3_t[1] = 0;
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w3_t[2] = 32 * 8;
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w3_t[3] = 0;
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u32 digest[4];
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digest[0] = MD5M_A;
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digest[1] = MD5M_B;
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digest[2] = MD5M_C;
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digest[3] = MD5M_D;
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md5_transform (w0_t, w1_t, w2_t, w3_t, digest);
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tmps[gid].digest[0] = digest[0];
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tmps[gid].digest[1] = digest[1];
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tmps[gid].digest[2] = digest[2];
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tmps[gid].digest[3] = digest[3];
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tmps[gid].out[0] = rc4data[0];
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tmps[gid].out[1] = rc4data[1];
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tmps[gid].out[2] = 0;
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tmps[gid].out[3] = 0;
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tmps[gid].out[4] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
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tmps[gid].out[5] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
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tmps[gid].out[6] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
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tmps[gid].out[7] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
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}
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KERNEL_FQ void m25400_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
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{
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/**
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* base
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*/
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const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
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const u64 lid = get_local_id (0);
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if (gid >= GID_CNT) return;
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/**
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* shared
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*/
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LOCAL_VK u32 S[64 * FIXED_LOCAL_SIZE];
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/**
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* loop
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*/
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u32 digest[4];
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digest[0] = tmps[gid].digest[0];
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digest[1] = tmps[gid].digest[1];
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digest[2] = tmps[gid].digest[2];
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digest[3] = tmps[gid].digest[3];
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for (u32 i = 0, j = LOOP_POS; i < LOOP_CNT; i++, j++)
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{
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if (j < 50)
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{
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// the owner-key is generated by iterating a md5 hash 50 times
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// see: "Algorithm 3.3 Computing the encryption dictionary’s O (owner password) value"
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u32 w0_t[4];
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u32 w1_t[4];
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u32 w2_t[4];
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u32 w3_t[4];
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w0_t[0] = digest[0];
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w0_t[1] = digest[1];
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w0_t[2] = digest[2];
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w0_t[3] = digest[3];
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w1_t[0] = 0x80;
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w1_t[1] = 0;
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w1_t[2] = 0;
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w1_t[3] = 0;
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w2_t[0] = 0;
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w2_t[1] = 0;
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w2_t[2] = 0;
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w2_t[3] = 0;
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w3_t[0] = 0;
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w3_t[1] = 0;
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w3_t[2] = 16 * 8;
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w3_t[3] = 0;
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digest[0] = MD5M_A;
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digest[1] = MD5M_B;
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digest[2] = MD5M_C;
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digest[3] = MD5M_D;
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md5_transform (w0_t, w1_t, w2_t, w3_t, digest);
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}
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}
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u32 out[4];
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out[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[0]; // store original o-value in out (scratchpad)
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out[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[1];
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out[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[2];
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out[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[3];
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u32 out2[4];
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out2[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[4]; // store original o-value in out (scratchpad)
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out2[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[5];
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out2[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[6];
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out2[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[7];
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u32 o_rc4_decryption_key[4];
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o_rc4_decryption_key[0] = digest[0]; // store the owner-key
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o_rc4_decryption_key[1] = digest[1];
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o_rc4_decryption_key[2] = digest[2];
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o_rc4_decryption_key[3] = digest[3];
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// we decrypt the o-value to obtain either the owner-password (or user-password if no owner-password is set)
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// see: "Algorithm 3.3 Computing the encryption dictionary’s O (owner password) value": "If there is no owner password, use the user password instead".
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u32 tmp[4];
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u8 j;
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for (u32 i = 19; i>0; i--)
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{
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// xor the iterator into the rc4 key
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const u32 xv = i << 0
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| i << 8
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| i << 16
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| i << 24;
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tmp[0] = o_rc4_decryption_key[0] ^ xv;
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tmp[1] = o_rc4_decryption_key[1] ^ xv;
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tmp[2] = o_rc4_decryption_key[2] ^ xv;
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tmp[3] = o_rc4_decryption_key[3] ^ xv;
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rc4_init_128 (S, tmp, lid);
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j = rc4_next_16 (S, 0, 0, out, out, lid);
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rc4_next_16 (S, 16, j, out2, out2, lid);
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}
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rc4_init_128 (S, o_rc4_decryption_key, lid);
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j = rc4_next_16 (S, 0, 0, out, out, lid); // output of the rc4 decrypt of the o-value should be the padded user-password
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tmps[gid].out[0] = out[0];
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tmps[gid].out[1] = out[1];
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tmps[gid].out[2] = out[2];
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tmps[gid].out[3] = out[3];
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rc4_next_16 (S, 16, j, out2, out2, lid); // decrypt a second block of rc4 to improve plaintext check and limit false positives
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tmps[gid].out[4] = out2[0];
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tmps[gid].out[5] = out2[1];
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tmps[gid].out[6] = out2[2];
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tmps[gid].out[7] = out2[3];
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tmps[gid].digest[0] = digest[0];
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tmps[gid].digest[1] = digest[1];
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tmps[gid].digest[2] = digest[2];
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tmps[gid].digest[3] = digest[3];
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}
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KERNEL_FQ void m25400_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
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{
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const u32 digest[4] =
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{
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esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[0],
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esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[1],
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0x0,// apparently only the first 16 bytes of the digest are used to look it up?
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0x0 // apparently only the first 16 bytes of the digest are used to look it up?
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};
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const u32 padding[8] =
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{
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0x5e4ebf28,
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0x418a754e,
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0x564e0064,
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0x0801faff,
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0xb6002e2e,
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0x803e68d0,
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0xfea90c2f,
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0x7a695364
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};
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/**
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* modifier
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*/
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const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
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if (gid >= GID_CNT) return;
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const u64 lid = get_local_id (0);
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#define il_pos 0
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const u32 out[8] =
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{
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tmps[gid].out[0],
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tmps[gid].out[1],
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tmps[gid].out[2],
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tmps[gid].out[3],
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tmps[gid].out[4],
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tmps[gid].out[5],
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tmps[gid].out[6],
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tmps[gid].out[7]
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};
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// the best comparison I can think of is checking each byte
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// whether it's a padding byte or ASCII, if so we're good,
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// if not, decryption was not successful
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bool correct = true;
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int i_padding=0;
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for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) // check all 32 bytes of the decrypted o-value, this including the padding.
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{
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// cast out buffer to byte such that we can do a byte per byte comparison
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PRIVATE_AS const u32 *u32OutBufPtr = (PRIVATE_AS u32 *) out;
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PRIVATE_AS const u8 *u8OutBufPtr = (PRIVATE_AS u8 *) u32OutBufPtr;
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// cast padding buffer to byte such that we can do a byte per byte comparison
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PRIVATE_AS const u32 *u32OutPadPtr = (PRIVATE_AS u32 *) padding;
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PRIVATE_AS const u8 *u8OutPadPtr = (PRIVATE_AS u8 *) u32OutPadPtr;
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// we don't use the user-password in the attack now (as we don't need it),
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// however we could use it in the comparison of the decrypted o-value,
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// yet it may make this attack a bit more fragile, as now we just check for padding and ASCII
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if (is_valid_printable_8(u8OutBufPtr[i]) ||
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(u8OutBufPtr[i] == u8OutPadPtr[i_padding]))
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{
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if (u8OutBufPtr[i] == u8OutPadPtr[i_padding])
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{
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//if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) printf("correct padding byte[%d]=0x%02x==0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i], u8OutPadPtr[i_padding]);
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i_padding = i_padding + 1;
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}
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else
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{
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if (is_valid_printable_8(u8OutBufPtr[i]))
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{
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//if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) printf("correct ASCII byte[%d]=0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i]);
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}
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}
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}
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else
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{
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//if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) {
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// printf("wrong byte[%d]=0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i]);
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//
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// printf("u8OutBufPtr=0x");
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// for(int j=0;j<32;j++) {
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// printf("%02x", u8OutBufPtr[j]);
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// }
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// printf("\n");
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//
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// printf("u8OutPadPtr=0x");
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// for(int j=0;j<32;j++) {
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// printf("%02x", u8OutPadPtr[j]);
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// }
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// printf("\n");
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//}
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correct = false;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (correct)
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{
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int digest_pos = find_hash (digest, DIGESTS_CNT, &digests_buf[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST]);
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if (digest_pos != -1)
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{
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const u32 final_hash_pos = DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST + digest_pos;
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if (hc_atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[final_hash_pos]) == 0)
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{
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mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, SALT_POS_HOST, DIGESTS_CNT, digest_pos, final_hash_pos, gid, il_pos, 0, 0);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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