mirror of
https://github.com/hashcat/hashcat.git
synced 2025-07-23 15:08:37 +00:00
15ada5124e
Updated kernel declarations from "KERNEL_FQ void HC_ATTR_SEQ" to "KERNEL_FQ KERNEL_FA void". Please update your custom plugin kernels accordingly. Added spilling size as a factor in calculating usable memory per device. This is based on undocumented variables and may not be 100% accurate, but it works well in practice. Added a compiler hint to scrypt-based kernels indicating the guaranteed maximum thread count per kernel invocation. Removed redundant kernel code 29800, as it is identical to 27700, and updated the plugin.
396 lines
8.7 KiB
Common Lisp
396 lines
8.7 KiB
Common Lisp
/**
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* Author......: See docs/credits.txt
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* License.....: MIT
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*/
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//#define NEW_SIMD_CODE
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#define SECP256K1_TMPS_TYPE PRIVATE_AS
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#ifdef KERNEL_STATIC
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_vendor.h)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_types.h)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_platform.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_common.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_scalar.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_hash_base58.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_hash_sha256.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_hash_ripemd160.cl)
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#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_ecc_secp256k1.cl)
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#endif
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KERNEL_FQ KERNEL_FA void m28501_mxx (KERN_ATTR_BASIC ())
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{
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/**
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* modifier
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*/
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const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
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if (gid >= GID_CNT) return;
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/**
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* base
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*/
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const u32 pw_len = pws[gid].pw_len;
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// copy password to w
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u32 w[13] = { 0 }; // 52 bytes needed
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// for (u32 i = 0, idx = 0; i < pw_len; i += 4, idx += 1)
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for (u32 idx = 0; idx < 13; idx++)
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{
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w[idx] = pws[gid].i[idx];
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}
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if (pw_len > 3)
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{
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const u32 b = hc_swap32_S (w[0]);
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if ((b < 0x4b774469) || // 'KwDi'
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(b > 0x4c356f4c)) return; // 'L5oL'
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}
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const bool status_base58 = is_valid_base58 (w, 0, pw_len);
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if (status_base58 != true) return;
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secp256k1_t preG; // need to change SECP256K1_TMPS_TYPE above to: PRIVATE_AS
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set_precomputed_basepoint_g (&preG);
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/**
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* loop
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*/
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for (u32 il_pos = 0; il_pos < IL_CNT; il_pos++)
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{
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const u32 comb_len = combs_buf[il_pos].pw_len;
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if ((pw_len + comb_len) != 52) continue;
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u32 c[64] = { 0 };
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#ifdef _unroll
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#pragma unroll
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#endif
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for (u32 i = 0; i < 13; i++)
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{
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c[i] = combs_buf[il_pos].i[i];
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}
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switch_buffer_by_offset_1x64_le_S (c, pw_len);
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#ifdef _unroll
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#pragma unroll
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#endif
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for (u32 i = 0; i < 13; i++)
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{
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c[i] |= w[i];
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}
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const u32 b = hc_swap32_S (c[0]);
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if ((b < 0x4b774469) || // 'KwDi'
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(b > 0x4c356f4c)) continue; // 'L5oL'
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const bool status_base58 = is_valid_base58 (c, pw_len, 52);
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if (status_base58 != true) continue;
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// convert password from b58 to binary
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u32 tmp[16] = { 0 };
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const bool status_dec = b58dec_52 (tmp, c);
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if (status_dec != true) continue;
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// check for bitcoin main network identifier:
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if ((tmp[0] & 0xff000000) != 0x80000000) continue;
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// check that compression is enabled:
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if ((tmp[8] & 0x00ff0000) != 0x00010000) continue; // 33th byte
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// verify sha256 (sha256 (tmp[0..38 - 4]))
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// real work is done in b58check where sha256 is run twice
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const bool status_check = b58check_38 (tmp); // length is 34 (+ 4 checksum bytes)
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if (status_check != true) continue;
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u32 prv_key[9]; // why is re-using the "tmp" variable here slower ?
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prv_key[0] = (tmp[7] << 8) | (tmp[8] >> 24);
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prv_key[1] = (tmp[6] << 8) | (tmp[7] >> 24);
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prv_key[2] = (tmp[5] << 8) | (tmp[6] >> 24);
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prv_key[3] = (tmp[4] << 8) | (tmp[5] >> 24);
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prv_key[4] = (tmp[3] << 8) | (tmp[4] >> 24);
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prv_key[5] = (tmp[2] << 8) | (tmp[3] >> 24);
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prv_key[6] = (tmp[1] << 8) | (tmp[2] >> 24);
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prv_key[7] = (tmp[0] << 8) | (tmp[1] >> 24);
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// convert: pub_key = G * prv_key
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u32 x[8];
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u32 y[8];
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point_mul_xy (x, y, prv_key, &preG);
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// to public key:
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u32 pub_key[16] = { 0 }; // why is re-using the "tmp" variable here slower ?
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const u32 type = 0x02 | (y[0] & 1);
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pub_key[8] = (x[0] << 24);
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pub_key[7] = (x[0] >> 8) | (x[1] << 24);
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pub_key[6] = (x[1] >> 8) | (x[2] << 24);
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pub_key[5] = (x[2] >> 8) | (x[3] << 24);
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pub_key[4] = (x[3] >> 8) | (x[4] << 24);
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pub_key[3] = (x[4] >> 8) | (x[5] << 24);
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pub_key[2] = (x[5] >> 8) | (x[6] << 24);
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pub_key[1] = (x[6] >> 8) | (x[7] << 24);
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pub_key[0] = (x[7] >> 8) | (type << 24);
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// calculate HASH160 for pub key
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sha256_ctx_t ctx;
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sha256_init (&ctx);
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sha256_update (&ctx, pub_key, 33); // length of public key: 33
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sha256_final (&ctx);
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for (u32 i = 0; i < 8; i++) tmp[i] = ctx.h[i];
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// tmp[ 8] = 0; tmp[ 9] = 0; tmp[10] = 0; tmp[11] = 0;
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// tmp[12] = 0; tmp[13] = 0; tmp[14] = 0; tmp[15] = 0;
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for (u32 i = 8; i < 16; i++) tmp[i] = 0;
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// now let's do RIPEMD-160 on the sha256sum
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ripemd160_ctx_t rctx;
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ripemd160_init (&rctx);
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ripemd160_update_swap (&rctx, tmp, 32);
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ripemd160_final (&rctx);
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const u32 r0 = rctx.h[0];
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const u32 r1 = rctx.h[1];
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const u32 r2 = rctx.h[2];
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const u32 r3 = rctx.h[3];
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COMPARE_M_SCALAR (r0, r1, r2, r3);
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}
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}
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KERNEL_FQ KERNEL_FA void m28501_sxx (KERN_ATTR_BASIC ())
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{
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/**
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* modifier
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*/
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const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
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if (gid >= GID_CNT) return;
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/**
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* digest
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*/
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const u32 search[4] =
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{
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digests_buf[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].digest_buf[DGST_R0],
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digests_buf[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].digest_buf[DGST_R1],
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digests_buf[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].digest_buf[DGST_R2],
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digests_buf[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].digest_buf[DGST_R3]
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};
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/**
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* base
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*/
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const u32 pw_len = pws[gid].pw_len;
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// copy password to w
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u32 w[13] = { 0 }; // 52 bytes needed
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// for (u32 i = 0, idx = 0; i < pw_len; i += 4, idx += 1)
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for (u32 idx = 0; idx < 13; idx++)
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{
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w[idx] = pws[gid].i[idx];
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}
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if (pw_len > 3)
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{
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const u32 b = hc_swap32_S (w[0]);
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if ((b < 0x4b774469) || // 'KwDi'
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(b > 0x4c356f4c)) return; // 'L5oL'
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}
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const bool status_base58 = is_valid_base58 (w, 0, pw_len);
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if (status_base58 != true) return;
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secp256k1_t preG; // need to change SECP256K1_TMPS_TYPE above to: PRIVATE_AS
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set_precomputed_basepoint_g (&preG);
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/**
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* loop
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*/
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for (u32 il_pos = 0; il_pos < IL_CNT; il_pos++)
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{
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const u32 comb_len = combs_buf[il_pos].pw_len;
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if ((pw_len + comb_len) != 52) continue;
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u32 c[64] = { 0 };
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#ifdef _unroll
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#pragma unroll
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#endif
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for (u32 i = 0; i < 13; i++)
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{
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c[i] = combs_buf[il_pos].i[i];
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}
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switch_buffer_by_offset_1x64_le_S (c, pw_len);
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#ifdef _unroll
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#pragma unroll
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#endif
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for (u32 i = 0; i < 13; i++)
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{
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c[i] |= w[i];
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}
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const u32 b = hc_swap32_S (c[0]);
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if ((b < 0x4b774469) || // 'KwDi'
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(b > 0x4c356f4c)) continue; // 'L5oL'
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const bool status_base58 = is_valid_base58 (c, pw_len, 52);
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if (status_base58 != true) continue;
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// convert password from b58 to binary
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u32 tmp[16] = { 0 };
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const bool status_dec = b58dec_52 (tmp, c);
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if (status_dec != true) continue;
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// check for bitcoin main network identifier:
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if ((tmp[0] & 0xff000000) != 0x80000000) continue;
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// check that compression is enabled:
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if ((tmp[8] & 0x00ff0000) != 0x00010000) continue; // 33th byte
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// verify sha256 (sha256 (tmp[0..38 - 4]))
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// real work is done in b58check where sha256 is run twice
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const bool status_check = b58check_38 (tmp); // length is 34 (+ 4 checksum bytes)
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if (status_check != true) continue;
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u32 prv_key[9]; // why is re-using the "tmp" variable here slower ?
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prv_key[0] = (tmp[7] << 8) | (tmp[8] >> 24);
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prv_key[1] = (tmp[6] << 8) | (tmp[7] >> 24);
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prv_key[2] = (tmp[5] << 8) | (tmp[6] >> 24);
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prv_key[3] = (tmp[4] << 8) | (tmp[5] >> 24);
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prv_key[4] = (tmp[3] << 8) | (tmp[4] >> 24);
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prv_key[5] = (tmp[2] << 8) | (tmp[3] >> 24);
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prv_key[6] = (tmp[1] << 8) | (tmp[2] >> 24);
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prv_key[7] = (tmp[0] << 8) | (tmp[1] >> 24);
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// convert: pub_key = G * prv_key
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u32 x[8];
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u32 y[8];
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point_mul_xy (x, y, prv_key, &preG);
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// to public key:
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u32 pub_key[16] = { 0 }; // why is re-using the "tmp" variable here slower ?
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const u32 type = 0x02 | (y[0] & 1);
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pub_key[8] = (x[0] << 24);
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pub_key[7] = (x[0] >> 8) | (x[1] << 24);
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pub_key[6] = (x[1] >> 8) | (x[2] << 24);
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pub_key[5] = (x[2] >> 8) | (x[3] << 24);
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pub_key[4] = (x[3] >> 8) | (x[4] << 24);
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pub_key[3] = (x[4] >> 8) | (x[5] << 24);
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pub_key[2] = (x[5] >> 8) | (x[6] << 24);
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pub_key[1] = (x[6] >> 8) | (x[7] << 24);
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pub_key[0] = (x[7] >> 8) | (type << 24);
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// calculate HASH160 for pub key
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sha256_ctx_t ctx;
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sha256_init (&ctx);
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sha256_update (&ctx, pub_key, 33); // length of public key: 33
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sha256_final (&ctx);
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for (u32 i = 0; i < 8; i++) tmp[i] = ctx.h[i];
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// tmp[ 8] = 0; tmp[ 9] = 0; tmp[10] = 0; tmp[11] = 0;
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// tmp[12] = 0; tmp[13] = 0; tmp[14] = 0; tmp[15] = 0;
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for (u32 i = 8; i < 16; i++) tmp[i] = 0;
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// now let's do RIPEMD-160 on the sha256sum
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ripemd160_ctx_t rctx;
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ripemd160_init (&rctx);
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ripemd160_update_swap (&rctx, tmp, 32);
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ripemd160_final (&rctx);
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const u32 r0 = rctx.h[0];
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const u32 r1 = rctx.h[1];
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const u32 r2 = rctx.h[2];
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const u32 r3 = rctx.h[3];
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COMPARE_S_SCALAR (r0, r1, r2, r3);
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}
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}
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