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hashcat/OpenCL/m21800-pure.cl
Jens Steube d7fb2ffa06 Fixed both a false positive and a false negative in -m 21800. Previously, 
only the first hash in a multihash list was marked as cracked, regardless
of which hash was actually cracked. For example, if the second hash was
cracked, it incorrectly marked the first as cracked and left the second
uncracked. This issue only affected beta versions and only in multihash
cracking mode.

Added deep-comp kernel support for Kerberos modes 28800 and 28900,
enabling multihash cracking for the same user in the same domain, even if
the password was changed or the recording was bad.

Added a rule ensuring that device buffer sizes for password candidates,
hooks, and transport (tmps) must be smaller than 1/4 of the maximum
allocatable memory. If not, hashcat now automatically reduces kernel-accel
down to 1, then halves the number of threads and restores kernel-accel up
to its maximum, repeating until the size requirement is met.

Fixed salt length limit verification for -m 20712.

Fixed password length limit for -m 14400.

Fixed unit test salt generator for -m 21100, which could produce duplicate
hashes under certain conditions.

Added the OPTS_TYPE_NATIVE_THREADS flag to the following hash modes
(after benchmarking): 7700, 7701, 9000, 1375x, 1376x, 14800, 19500, 23900.
2025-07-11 15:02:58 +02:00

687 lines
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Common Lisp
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/**
* Author......: See docs/credits.txt
* License.....: MIT
*/
#define NEW_SIMD_CODE
#ifdef KERNEL_STATIC
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_vendor.h)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_types.h)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_platform.cl)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_common.cl)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_simd.cl)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_hash_sha512.cl)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_ecc_secp256k1.cl)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_cipher_aes.cl)
#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_zip_inflate.cl)
#endif
typedef struct electrum
{
secp256k1_t coords;
u32 data_buf[256];
} electrum_t;
typedef struct electrum_tmp
{
u64 ipad[8];
u64 opad[8];
u64 dgst[8];
u64 out[8];
} electrum_tmp_t;
#define MIN_ENTROPY 3.0
#define MAX_ENTROPY 6.0
DECLSPEC void hmac_sha512_run_V (PRIVATE_AS u32x *w0, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w1, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w2, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w3, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w4, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w5, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w6, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w7, PRIVATE_AS u64x *ipad, PRIVATE_AS u64x *opad, PRIVATE_AS u64x *digest)
{
digest[0] = ipad[0];
digest[1] = ipad[1];
digest[2] = ipad[2];
digest[3] = ipad[3];
digest[4] = ipad[4];
digest[5] = ipad[5];
digest[6] = ipad[6];
digest[7] = ipad[7];
sha512_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, digest);
w0[0] = h32_from_64 (digest[0]);
w0[1] = l32_from_64 (digest[0]);
w0[2] = h32_from_64 (digest[1]);
w0[3] = l32_from_64 (digest[1]);
w1[0] = h32_from_64 (digest[2]);
w1[1] = l32_from_64 (digest[2]);
w1[2] = h32_from_64 (digest[3]);
w1[3] = l32_from_64 (digest[3]);
w2[0] = h32_from_64 (digest[4]);
w2[1] = l32_from_64 (digest[4]);
w2[2] = h32_from_64 (digest[5]);
w2[3] = l32_from_64 (digest[5]);
w3[0] = h32_from_64 (digest[6]);
w3[1] = l32_from_64 (digest[6]);
w3[2] = h32_from_64 (digest[7]);
w3[3] = l32_from_64 (digest[7]);
w4[0] = 0x80000000;
w4[1] = 0;
w4[2] = 0;
w4[3] = 0;
w5[0] = 0;
w5[1] = 0;
w5[2] = 0;
w5[3] = 0;
w6[0] = 0;
w6[1] = 0;
w6[2] = 0;
w6[3] = 0;
w7[0] = 0;
w7[1] = 0;
w7[2] = 0;
w7[3] = (128 + 64) * 8;
digest[0] = opad[0];
digest[1] = opad[1];
digest[2] = opad[2];
digest[3] = opad[3];
digest[4] = opad[4];
digest[5] = opad[5];
digest[6] = opad[6];
digest[7] = opad[7];
sha512_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, digest);
}
KERNEL_FQ KERNEL_FA void m21800_init (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (electrum_tmp_t, electrum_t))
{
/**
* base
*/
const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
if (gid >= GID_CNT) return;
sha512_hmac_ctx_t sha512_hmac_ctx;
sha512_hmac_init_global_swap (&sha512_hmac_ctx, pws[gid].i, pws[gid].pw_len);
tmps[gid].ipad[0] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[0];
tmps[gid].ipad[1] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[1];
tmps[gid].ipad[2] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[2];
tmps[gid].ipad[3] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[3];
tmps[gid].ipad[4] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[4];
tmps[gid].ipad[5] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[5];
tmps[gid].ipad[6] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[6];
tmps[gid].ipad[7] = sha512_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[7];
tmps[gid].opad[0] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0];
tmps[gid].opad[1] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1];
tmps[gid].opad[2] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2];
tmps[gid].opad[3] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[3];
tmps[gid].opad[4] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[4];
tmps[gid].opad[5] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[5];
tmps[gid].opad[6] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[6];
tmps[gid].opad[7] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[7];
u32 w0[4];
u32 w1[4];
u32 w2[4];
u32 w3[4];
u32 w4[4];
u32 w5[4];
u32 w6[4];
u32 w7[4];
w0[0] = 1;
w0[1] = 0;
w0[2] = 0;
w0[3] = 0;
w1[0] = 0;
w1[1] = 0;
w1[2] = 0;
w1[3] = 0;
w2[0] = 0;
w2[1] = 0;
w2[2] = 0;
w2[3] = 0;
w3[0] = 0;
w3[1] = 0;
w3[2] = 0;
w3[3] = 0;
w4[0] = 0;
w4[1] = 0;
w4[2] = 0;
w4[3] = 0;
w5[0] = 0;
w5[1] = 0;
w5[2] = 0;
w5[3] = 0;
w6[0] = 0;
w6[1] = 0;
w6[2] = 0;
w6[3] = 0;
w7[0] = 0;
w7[1] = 0;
w7[2] = 0;
w7[3] = 0;
sha512_hmac_update_128 (&sha512_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, 4);
sha512_hmac_final (&sha512_hmac_ctx);
tmps[gid].dgst[0] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0];
tmps[gid].dgst[1] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1];
tmps[gid].dgst[2] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2];
tmps[gid].dgst[3] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[3];
tmps[gid].dgst[4] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[4];
tmps[gid].dgst[5] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[5];
tmps[gid].dgst[6] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[6];
tmps[gid].dgst[7] = sha512_hmac_ctx.opad.h[7];
tmps[gid].out[0] = tmps[gid].dgst[0];
tmps[gid].out[1] = tmps[gid].dgst[1];
tmps[gid].out[2] = tmps[gid].dgst[2];
tmps[gid].out[3] = tmps[gid].dgst[3];
tmps[gid].out[4] = tmps[gid].dgst[4];
tmps[gid].out[5] = tmps[gid].dgst[5];
tmps[gid].out[6] = tmps[gid].dgst[6];
tmps[gid].out[7] = tmps[gid].dgst[7];
}
KERNEL_FQ KERNEL_FA void m21800_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (electrum_tmp_t, electrum_t))
{
const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
if ((gid * VECT_SIZE) >= GID_CNT) return;
u64x ipad[8];
u64x opad[8];
ipad[0] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 0);
ipad[1] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 1);
ipad[2] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 2);
ipad[3] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 3);
ipad[4] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 4);
ipad[5] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 5);
ipad[6] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 6);
ipad[7] = pack64v (tmps, ipad, gid, 7);
opad[0] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 0);
opad[1] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 1);
opad[2] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 2);
opad[3] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 3);
opad[4] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 4);
opad[5] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 5);
opad[6] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 6);
opad[7] = pack64v (tmps, opad, gid, 7);
u64x dgst[8];
u64x out[8];
dgst[0] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 0);
dgst[1] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 1);
dgst[2] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 2);
dgst[3] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 3);
dgst[4] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 4);
dgst[5] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 5);
dgst[6] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 6);
dgst[7] = pack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 7);
out[0] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 0);
out[1] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 1);
out[2] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 2);
out[3] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 3);
out[4] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 4);
out[5] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 5);
out[6] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 6);
out[7] = pack64v (tmps, out, gid, 7);
for (u32 j = 0; j < LOOP_CNT; j++)
{
u32x w0[4];
u32x w1[4];
u32x w2[4];
u32x w3[4];
u32x w4[4];
u32x w5[4];
u32x w6[4];
u32x w7[4];
w0[0] = h32_from_64 (dgst[0]);
w0[1] = l32_from_64 (dgst[0]);
w0[2] = h32_from_64 (dgst[1]);
w0[3] = l32_from_64 (dgst[1]);
w1[0] = h32_from_64 (dgst[2]);
w1[1] = l32_from_64 (dgst[2]);
w1[2] = h32_from_64 (dgst[3]);
w1[3] = l32_from_64 (dgst[3]);
w2[0] = h32_from_64 (dgst[4]);
w2[1] = l32_from_64 (dgst[4]);
w2[2] = h32_from_64 (dgst[5]);
w2[3] = l32_from_64 (dgst[5]);
w3[0] = h32_from_64 (dgst[6]);
w3[1] = l32_from_64 (dgst[6]);
w3[2] = h32_from_64 (dgst[7]);
w3[3] = l32_from_64 (dgst[7]);
w4[0] = 0x80000000;
w4[1] = 0;
w4[2] = 0;
w4[3] = 0;
w5[0] = 0;
w5[1] = 0;
w5[2] = 0;
w5[3] = 0;
w6[0] = 0;
w6[1] = 0;
w6[2] = 0;
w6[3] = 0;
w7[0] = 0;
w7[1] = 0;
w7[2] = 0;
w7[3] = (128 + 64) * 8;
hmac_sha512_run_V (w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, ipad, opad, dgst);
out[0] ^= dgst[0];
out[1] ^= dgst[1];
out[2] ^= dgst[2];
out[3] ^= dgst[3];
out[4] ^= dgst[4];
out[5] ^= dgst[5];
out[6] ^= dgst[6];
out[7] ^= dgst[7];
}
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 0, dgst[0]);
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 1, dgst[1]);
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 2, dgst[2]);
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 3, dgst[3]);
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 4, dgst[4]);
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 5, dgst[5]);
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 6, dgst[6]);
unpack64v (tmps, dgst, gid, 7, dgst[7]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 0, out[0]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 1, out[1]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 2, out[2]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 3, out[3]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 4, out[4]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 5, out[5]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 6, out[6]);
unpack64v (tmps, out, gid, 7, out[7]);
}
KERNEL_FQ KERNEL_FA void m21800_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (electrum_tmp_t, electrum_t))
{
const u64 gid = get_global_id (0);
const u64 lid = get_local_id (0);
const u64 lsz = get_local_size (0);
/**
* aes shared
*/
#ifdef REAL_SHM
LOCAL_VK u32 s_td0[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_td1[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_td2[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_td3[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_td4[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_te0[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_te1[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_te2[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_te3[256];
LOCAL_VK u32 s_te4[256];
for (u32 i = lid; i < 256; i += lsz)
{
s_td0[i] = td0[i];
s_td1[i] = td1[i];
s_td2[i] = td2[i];
s_td3[i] = td3[i];
s_td4[i] = td4[i];
s_te0[i] = te0[i];
s_te1[i] = te1[i];
s_te2[i] = te2[i];
s_te3[i] = te3[i];
s_te4[i] = te4[i];
}
SYNC_THREADS ();
#else
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td0 = td0;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td1 = td1;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td2 = td2;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td3 = td3;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td4 = td4;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te0 = te0;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te1 = te1;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te2 = te2;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te3 = te3;
CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te4 = te4;
#endif
if (gid >= GID_CNT) return;
const u32 digest_pos = LOOP_POS;
const u32 digest_cur = DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST + digest_pos;
GLOBAL_AS const electrum_t *electrum = &esalt_bufs[digest_cur];
/*
* Start by copying/aligning the data
*/
u64 out[8];
out[0] = tmps[gid].out[0];
out[1] = tmps[gid].out[1];
out[2] = tmps[gid].out[2];
out[3] = tmps[gid].out[3];
out[4] = tmps[gid].out[4];
out[5] = tmps[gid].out[5];
out[6] = tmps[gid].out[6];
out[7] = tmps[gid].out[7];
/*
* First calculate the modulo of the pbkdf2 hash with SECP256K1_N:
*/
u32 a[16];
a[ 0] = h32_from_64_S (out[0]);
a[ 1] = l32_from_64_S (out[0]);
a[ 2] = h32_from_64_S (out[1]);
a[ 3] = l32_from_64_S (out[1]);
a[ 4] = h32_from_64_S (out[2]);
a[ 5] = l32_from_64_S (out[2]);
a[ 6] = h32_from_64_S (out[3]);
a[ 7] = l32_from_64_S (out[3]);
a[ 8] = h32_from_64_S (out[4]);
a[ 9] = l32_from_64_S (out[4]);
a[10] = h32_from_64_S (out[5]);
a[11] = l32_from_64_S (out[5]);
a[12] = h32_from_64_S (out[6]);
a[13] = l32_from_64_S (out[6]);
a[14] = h32_from_64_S (out[7]);
a[15] = l32_from_64_S (out[7]);
mod_512 (a);
// copy the last 256 bit (32 bytes) of modulo (a):
u32 tweak[8];
tweak[0] = a[15];
tweak[1] = a[14];
tweak[2] = a[13];
tweak[3] = a[12];
tweak[4] = a[11];
tweak[5] = a[10];
tweak[6] = a[ 9];
tweak[7] = a[ 8];
/*
* the main secp256k1 point multiplication by a scalar/tweak:
*/
GLOBAL_AS const secp256k1_t *coords = (GLOBAL_AS const secp256k1_t *) &electrum->coords;
u32 pubkey[64] = { 0 }; // for point_mul () we need: 1 + 32 bytes (for sha512 () we need more)
point_mul (pubkey, tweak, coords);
/*
* sha512 () of the pubkey:
*/
sha512_ctx_t sha512_ctx;
sha512_init (&sha512_ctx);
sha512_update (&sha512_ctx, pubkey, 33); // 33 because of 32 byte curve point + sign
sha512_final (&sha512_ctx);
// ... now we have the result in sha512_ctx.h[0]...sha512_ctx.h[7]
u32 iv[4];
iv[0] = h32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[0]);
iv[1] = l32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[0]);
iv[2] = h32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[1]);
iv[3] = l32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[1]);
iv[0] = hc_swap32_S (iv[0]);
iv[1] = hc_swap32_S (iv[1]);
iv[2] = hc_swap32_S (iv[2]);
iv[3] = hc_swap32_S (iv[3]);
u32 key[4];
key[0] = h32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[2]);
key[1] = l32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[2]);
key[2] = h32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[3]);
key[3] = l32_from_64_S (sha512_ctx.h[3]);
key[0] = hc_swap32_S (key[0]);
key[1] = hc_swap32_S (key[1]);
key[2] = hc_swap32_S (key[2]);
key[3] = hc_swap32_S (key[3]);
/*
* AES decrypt the data_buf
*/
// init AES
#define KEYLEN 44
u32 ks[KEYLEN];
aes128_set_decrypt_key (ks, key, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3);
// #define AES_LEN 1024
// in my tests it also worked with only 128 input bytes !
#define AES_LEN 1024
#define AES_LEN_DIV_4 256
u32 buf_full[AES_LEN_DIV_4];
// we need to run it at least once:
GLOBAL_AS const u32 *data_buf = (GLOBAL_AS const u32 *) electrum->data_buf;
u32 data[4];
data[0] = data_buf[0];
data[1] = data_buf[1];
data[2] = data_buf[2];
data[3] = data_buf[3];
u32 buf[4];
aes128_decrypt (ks, data, buf, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4);
buf[0] ^= iv[0];
// early reject
// changed: 17.11.2021
// I had not cracked some sample Salt Type 5 wallets with known passwords provided by the owner.
// It was necessary to remove this early rejection and add a new signature
// The decrypted data was this: {"seed_version": ...
//if ((buf[0] & 0x0006ffff) != 0x00049c78) return; // allow 0b100 or 0b101 at the end of 3rd byte
buf[1] ^= iv[1];
buf[2] ^= iv[2];
buf[3] ^= iv[3];
buf_full[0] = buf[0];
buf_full[1] = buf[1];
buf_full[2] = buf[2];
buf_full[3] = buf[3];
iv[0] = data[0];
iv[1] = data[1];
iv[2] = data[2];
iv[3] = data[3];
// for AES_LEN > 16 we need to loop
for (int i = 16, j = 4; i < AES_LEN; i += 16, j += 4)
{
data[0] = data_buf[j + 0];
data[1] = data_buf[j + 1];
data[2] = data_buf[j + 2];
data[3] = data_buf[j + 3];
aes128_decrypt (ks, data, buf, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4);
buf[0] ^= iv[0];
buf[1] ^= iv[1];
buf[2] ^= iv[2];
buf[3] ^= iv[3];
iv[0] = data[0];
iv[1] = data[1];
iv[2] = data[2];
iv[3] = data[3];
buf_full[j + 0] = buf[0];
buf_full[j + 1] = buf[1];
buf_full[j + 2] = buf[2];
buf_full[j + 3] = buf[3];
}
/*
* zlib inflate/decompress:
*/
mz_stream infstream;
infstream.opaque = Z_NULL;
// input:
infstream.avail_in = AES_LEN;
infstream.next_in = (PRIVATE_AS u8 *) buf_full;
// output:
#define OUT_SIZE 1024
u8 tmp[OUT_SIZE];
infstream.avail_out = OUT_SIZE;
infstream.next_out = tmp;
// decompress it:
inflate_state pStream;
mz_inflateInit2 (&infstream, MAX_WBITS, &pStream);
const int zlib_ret = inflate (&infstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
if ((zlib_ret != MZ_OK) && (zlib_ret != MZ_STREAM_END))
{
return;
}
for (mz_ulong i = 1; i < infstream.total_out; i++)
{
if (tmp[i] == '\t') continue;
if (tmp[i] == '\r') continue;
if (tmp[i] == '\n') continue;
if (tmp[i] < 0x20)
{
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7159
// 7. Strings
// All Unicode characters may be placed within the
// quotation marks, except for the characters that must be escaped:
// quotation mark, reverse solidus, and the control characters (U+0000
// through U+001F).
if (tmp[i - 1] != '\\') return;
}
}
/*
* Check with some strange signature.
* The main problem is that the (invalid) decrypted data processed by zlib often results in random patterns but with low entropy,
* so that a simple entropy check is not sufficient
*/
if (tmp[0] == '{')
{
int qcnt1 = 0;
int ccnt1 = 0;
for (int i = 1; i < 16; i++)
{
if (tmp[i] == '"') qcnt1++;
if (tmp[i] == ':') ccnt1++;
}
int qcnt2 = 0;
int ccnt2 = 0;
for (mz_ulong i = 1; i < infstream.total_out; i++)
{
if (tmp[i] == '"') qcnt2++;
if (tmp[i] == ':') ccnt2++;
}
if ((qcnt1 >= 1) && (ccnt1 >= 1) && (qcnt2 >= 4) && (ccnt2 >= 3))
{
const float entropy = hc_get_entropy ((PRIVATE_AS const u32 *) tmp, infstream.total_out / 4);
if ((entropy >= MIN_ENTROPY) && (entropy <= MAX_ENTROPY))
{
if (hc_atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
{
mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, SALT_POS_HOST, DIGESTS_CNT, 0, digest_cur, gid, 0, 0, 0);
}
//return;
}
}
}
/*
* Verify if decompressed data is either:
* - "{\n \"" or
* - "{\r\n \""
*/
if (((tmp[0] == 0x7b) && (tmp[1] == 0x0a) && (tmp[2] == 0x20) && (tmp[3] == 0x20) &&
(tmp[4] == 0x20) && (tmp[5] == 0x20) && (tmp[6] == 0x22)) ||
((tmp[0] == 0x7b) && (tmp[1] == 0x0d) && (tmp[2] == 0x0a) && (tmp[3] == 0x20) &&
(tmp[4] == 0x20) && (tmp[5] == 0x20) && (tmp[6] == 0x20) && (tmp[7] == 0x22)))
{
if (hc_atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digest_cur]) == 0)
{
mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, SALT_POS_HOST, DIGESTS_CNT, 0, digest_cur, gid, 0, 0, 0);
}
//return;
}
}
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