diff --git a/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.cl b/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.cl
index 388356a48..b882095c8 100644
--- a/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.cl
@@ -303,3 +303,9 @@ DECLSPEC void AES_GCM_GHASH_GLOBAL (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *subkey, PRIVATE_AS con
 
   AES_GCM_ghash (subkey, len_buf, 16, out);
 }
+
+void AES_GCM_decrypt (PRIVATE_AS u32 *key, PRIVATE_AS u32 *J0, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *in, int in_len, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te4)
+{
+    AES_GCM_inc32(J0); // the first ctr is used to compute the tag, only the second is used for decryption: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#/media/File:GCM-Galois_Counter_Mode_with_IV.svg
+    AES_GCM_GCTR (key, J0, in, in_len, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); // decrypt the first block of ciphertext
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.h b/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.h
index 3c40c20b9..1b5e52d9f 100644
--- a/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.h
+++ b/OpenCL/inc_cipher_aes-gcm.h
@@ -17,5 +17,6 @@ DECLSPEC void AES_GCM_gctr (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *key, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *iv,
 DECLSPEC void AES_GCM_GCTR (PRIVATE_AS u32 *key, PRIVATE_AS u32 *J0, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *in, int in_len, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te4);
 DECLSPEC void AES_GCM_GHASH (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *subkey, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *aad_buf, int aad_len, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *enc_buf, int enc_len, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out);
 DECLSPEC void AES_GCM_GHASH_GLOBAL (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *subkey, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *aad_buf, int aad_len, GLOBAL_AS const u32 *enc_buf, int enc_len, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out);
+DECLSPEC void AES_GCM_decrypt (PRIVATE_AS u32 *key, PRIVATE_AS u32 *J0, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *in, int in_len, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te4);
 
 #endif // INC_CIPHER_AES_GCM_H
diff --git a/OpenCL/m25400-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m25400-pure.cl
index 5063d09f1..8ab75831c 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m25400-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m25400-pure.cl
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * License.....: MIT
  */
 
-// https://www.adobe.com/content/dam/acom/en/devnet/pdf/pdfs/pdf_reference_archives/PDFReference.pdf
+// https://web.archive.org/web/20220306152229/https://www.adobe.com/content/dam/acom/en/devnet/pdf/pdfs/pdf_reference_archives/PDFReference.pdf
 
 #ifdef KERNEL_STATIC
 #include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_vendor.h)
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ typedef struct pdf
 typedef struct pdf14_tmp
 {
   u32 digest[4];
-  u32 out[4];
+  u32 out[8];
 
 } pdf14_tmp_t;
 
@@ -183,6 +183,10 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_init (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
   tmps[gid].out[1] = rc4data[1];
   tmps[gid].out[2] = 0;
   tmps[gid].out[3] = 0;
+  tmps[gid].out[4] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
+  tmps[gid].out[5] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
+  tmps[gid].out[6] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
+  tmps[gid].out[7] = 0; // we only need the size of out for the plaintext check
 }
 
 KERNEL_FQ void m25400_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
@@ -212,12 +216,6 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
   digest[2] = tmps[gid].digest[2];
   digest[3] = tmps[gid].digest[3];
 
-  u32 out[4];
-  out[0] = tmps[gid].out[0];
-  out[1] = tmps[gid].out[1];
-  out[2] = tmps[gid].out[2];
-  out[3] = tmps[gid].out[3];
-
   for (u32 i = 0, j = LOOP_POS; i < LOOP_CNT; i++, j++)
   {
     if (j < 50)
@@ -255,10 +253,19 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
     }
   }
 
+
+  u32 out[4];
   out[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[0]; // store original o-value in out (scratchpad)
   out[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[1];
   out[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[2];
   out[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[3];
+
+  u32 out2[4];
+  out2[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[4]; // store original o-value in out (scratchpad)
+  out2[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[5];
+  out2[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[6];
+  out2[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].o_buf[7];
+
   u32 o_rc4_decryption_key[4];
   o_rc4_decryption_key[0] = digest[0]; // store the owner-key
   o_rc4_decryption_key[1] = digest[1];
@@ -268,6 +275,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
   // we decrypt the o-value to obtain either the owner-password (or user-password if no owner-password is set)
   //  see: "Algorithm 3.3 Computing the encryption dictionary’s O (owner password) value": "If there is no owner password, use the user password instead".
   u32 tmp[4];
+  u8 j;
   for (u32 i = 19; i>0; i--)
   {
     // xor the iterator into the rc4 key
@@ -282,21 +290,27 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
     tmp[3] = o_rc4_decryption_key[3] ^ xv;
 
     rc4_init_128 (S, tmp, lid);
-    rc4_next_16 (S, 0, 0, out, out, lid);
+    j = rc4_next_16 (S, 0, 0, out, out, lid);
+    rc4_next_16 (S, 16, j, out2, out2, lid);
   }
 
   rc4_init_128 (S, o_rc4_decryption_key, lid);
-  rc4_next_16 (S, 0, 0, out, out, lid); // output of the rc4 decrypt of the o-value should be the padded user-password
+  j = rc4_next_16 (S, 0, 0, out, out, lid); // output of the rc4 decrypt of the o-value should be the padded user-password
+  tmps[gid].out[0] = out[0];
+  tmps[gid].out[1] = out[1];
+  tmps[gid].out[2] = out[2];
+  tmps[gid].out[3] = out[3];
+
+  rc4_next_16 (S, 16, j, out2, out2, lid); // decrypt a second block of rc4 to improve plaintext check and limit false positives
+  tmps[gid].out[4] = out2[0];
+  tmps[gid].out[5] = out2[1];
+  tmps[gid].out[6] = out2[2];
+  tmps[gid].out[7] = out2[3];
 
   tmps[gid].digest[0] = digest[0];
   tmps[gid].digest[1] = digest[1];
   tmps[gid].digest[2] = digest[2];
   tmps[gid].digest[3] = digest[3];
-
-  tmps[gid].out[0] = out[0];
-  tmps[gid].out[1] = out[1];
-  tmps[gid].out[2] = out[2];
-  tmps[gid].out[3] = out[3];
 }
 
 KERNEL_FQ void m25400_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
@@ -334,12 +348,16 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
   #define il_pos 0
 
 
-  const u32 out[4] =
+  const u32 out[8] =
   {
     tmps[gid].out[0],
     tmps[gid].out[1],
     tmps[gid].out[2],
-    tmps[gid].out[3]
+    tmps[gid].out[3],
+    tmps[gid].out[4],
+    tmps[gid].out[5],
+    tmps[gid].out[6],
+    tmps[gid].out[7]
   };
 
 
@@ -351,7 +369,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
 
   int i_padding=0;
 
-  for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+  for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) // check all 32 bytes of the decrypted o-value, this including the padding.
   {
     // cast out buffer to byte such that we can do a byte per byte comparison
     PRIVATE_AS const u32 *u32OutBufPtr = (PRIVATE_AS u32 *) out;
@@ -363,39 +381,40 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25400_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pdf14_tmp_t, pdf_t))
 
     // we don't use the user-password in the attack now (as we don't need it),
     //  however we could use it in the comparison of the decrypted o-value,
-    //  yet it may make this attack a bit more fragile, as now we just check for ASCII
-    if ((u8OutBufPtr[i] >= 20 && u8OutBufPtr[i] <= 0x7e) ||
+    //  yet it may make this attack a bit more fragile, as now we just check for padding and ASCII
+    if (is_valid_printable_8(u8OutBufPtr[i]) ||
         (u8OutBufPtr[i] == u8OutPadPtr[i_padding]))
     {
       if (u8OutBufPtr[i] == u8OutPadPtr[i_padding])
       {
-        //printf("correct padding byte[%d]=0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i]);
+        //if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) printf("correct padding byte[%d]=0x%02x==0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i], u8OutPadPtr[i_padding]);
         i_padding = i_padding + 1;
       }
       else
       {
-        if (u8OutBufPtr[i] >= 20 && u8OutBufPtr[i] <= 0x7e)
+        if (is_valid_printable_8(u8OutBufPtr[i]))
         {
-          //printf("correct ASCII byte[%d]=0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i]);
+          //if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) printf("correct ASCII byte[%d]=0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i]);
         }
       }
     }
     else
     {
-      //printf("wrong byte[%d]=0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i]);
+      //if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) {
+      //  printf("wrong byte[%d]=0x%02x\n", i, u8OutBufPtr[i]);
       //
-      //printf("u8OutBufPtr=0x");
-      //for(int j=0;j<16;j++) {
-      //  printf("%02x", u8OutBufPtr[j]);
-      //}
-      //printf("\n");
+      //  printf("u8OutBufPtr=0x");
+      //  for(int j=0;j<32;j++) {
+      //    printf("%02x", u8OutBufPtr[j]);
+      //  }
+      //  printf("\n");
       //
-      //printf("u8OutPadPtr=0x");
-      //for(int j=0;j<16;j++) {
-      //  printf("%02x", u8OutPadPtr[j]);
+      //  printf("u8OutPadPtr=0x");
+      //  for(int j=0;j<32;j++) {
+      //    printf("%02x", u8OutPadPtr[j]);
+      //  }
+      //  printf("\n");
       //}
-      //printf("\n");
-
       correct = false;
       break;
     }
diff --git a/OpenCL/m26610-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m26610-pure.cl
index 4bc6bfbf3..e625af1c3 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m26610-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m26610-pure.cl
@@ -349,23 +349,23 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m26610_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pbkdf2_sha256_tmp_t, pbkdf2_sh
 
   AES_GCM_Prepare_J0 (iv, iv_len, subKey, J0);
 
-  //ct
-
-  u32 ct[4];
-
-  ct[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[0];
+  u32 ct[8];
+  ct[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[0]; // first block of ciphertext
   ct[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[1];
   ct[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[2];
   ct[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[3];
+  ct[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[4]; // second block of ciphertext
+  ct[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[5];
+  ct[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[6];
+  ct[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].ct_buf[7];
 
-  u32 pt[4] = { 0 };
+  u32 pt[8] = { 0 };
 
-  // we try to decrypt the ciphertext
-  // TODO this can be moved to a separate decryption function in inc_cipher_aes-gcm.cl
-  AES_GCM_inc32(J0); // the first ctr is used to compute the tag, only the second is used for decryption: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#/media/File:GCM-Galois_Counter_Mode_with_IV.svg
-  AES_GCM_GCTR (key, J0, ct, 16, pt, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); // decrypt the ciphertext
+
+  AES_GCM_decrypt (key, J0, ct, 32, pt, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
 
   // if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) printf ("pt[0]=%08x\n", pt[0]); // should be 5b7b2274 or [{"type"
+  // if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) printf ("pt[0]=%08x%08x\n", pt[4], pt[5]); // should be 2054726565222c22 or  Tree","
 
   u32 digest[4];
 
@@ -382,9 +382,15 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m26610_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pbkdf2_sha256_tmp_t, pbkdf2_sh
   const int correct = is_valid_printable_32 (pt[0])
                     + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[1])
                     + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[2])
-                    + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[3]);
+                    + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[3])
+                    + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[4])
+                    + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[5])
+                    + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[6])
+                    + is_valid_printable_32 (pt[7]);
 
-  if (correct == 4)
+  // if ((gid == 0) && (lid == 0)) printf("correct=%d\n", correct);
+
+  if (correct == 8)
   {
     int digest_pos = find_hash (digest, DIGESTS_CNT, &digests_buf[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST]);
 
diff --git a/docs/changes.txt b/docs/changes.txt
index 83f5b75eb..93909e8db 100644
--- a/docs/changes.txt
+++ b/docs/changes.txt
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 - Prevent Hashcat from hanging by checking during startup that the output file is a named pipe
 - Fixed debug mode 5 by adding the missing colon between original-word and finding-rule
 - Skip generated rule that was the result of chaining rule operation and caused this generated rule to exceed the maximum number of function calls
+- Fixed incorrect plaintext check for 25400 and 26610. Increased plaintext check to 32 bytes to prevent false positives.
 
 ##
 ## Technical
diff --git a/src/modules/module_25400.c b/src/modules/module_25400.c
index c38c91de9..baad6e6fd 100644
--- a/src/modules/module_25400.c
+++ b/src/modules/module_25400.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ typedef struct pdf
 typedef struct pdf14_tmp
 {
   u32 digest[4];
-  u32 out[4];
+  u32 out[8];
 
 } pdf14_tmp_t;
 
@@ -501,7 +501,11 @@ int module_build_plain_postprocess (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig,
   if (pdf_tmp->out[0] == padding[0] &&
       pdf_tmp->out[1] == padding[1] &&
       pdf_tmp->out[2] == padding[2] &&
-      pdf_tmp->out[3] == padding[3])
+      pdf_tmp->out[3] == padding[3] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[4] == padding[4] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[5] == padding[5] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[6] == padding[6] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[7] == padding[7])
   {
     return snprintf ((char *) dst_buf, dst_sz, "%s    (user password not set)", (char *) src_buf);
   }
@@ -534,10 +538,14 @@ int module_build_plain_postprocess (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig,
   //     however, we'd need to include a lot of code/complexity here to do so (or call into 10500 kernel).
   //     this seems relevant: run_kernel (hashcat_ctx, device_param, KERN_RUN_3, 0, 1, false, 0)
 
-  if (pdf_tmp->out[0] == src_buf[0] &&
-      pdf_tmp->out[1] == src_buf[1] &&
-      pdf_tmp->out[2] == src_buf[2] &&
-      pdf_tmp->out[3] == src_buf[3])
+  if (pdf_tmp->out[0] == padding[0] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[1] == padding[1] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[2] == padding[2] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[3] == padding[3] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[4] == padding[4] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[5] == padding[5] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[6] == padding[6] &&
+      pdf_tmp->out[7] == padding[7])
   {
     if (pdf->u_pass_len == 0)
     {