From 33581b4155cea76dbcda0a86ee000a65df0fb18e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christo Erasmus <131447877+erasmusc@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 13:32:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Added plugins for AES128 and AES256 AS-REPs --- OpenCL/m33100-pure.cl | 1038 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ OpenCL/m33200-pure.cl | 1101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/modules/module_33100.c | 420 +++++++++++++ src/modules/module_33200.c | 419 +++++++++++++ tools/test_modules/m33100.pm | 217 +++++++ tools/test_modules/m33200.pm | 224 +++++++ 6 files changed, 3419 insertions(+) create mode 100755 OpenCL/m33100-pure.cl create mode 100755 OpenCL/m33200-pure.cl create mode 100755 src/modules/module_33100.c create mode 100755 src/modules/module_33200.c create mode 100755 tools/test_modules/m33100.pm create mode 100755 tools/test_modules/m33200.pm diff --git a/OpenCL/m33100-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m33100-pure.cl new file mode 100755 index 000000000..a7869ea33 --- /dev/null +++ b/OpenCL/m33100-pure.cl @@ -0,0 +1,1038 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#define NEW_SIMD_CODE + +#ifdef KERNEL_STATIC +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_vendor.h) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_types.h) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_platform.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_common.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_simd.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_hash_sha1.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_cipher_aes.cl) +#endif + +typedef struct krb5asrep_17 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 edata2[5120]; + u32 edata2_len; + u32 format; + +} krb5asrep_17_t; + +typedef struct krb5asrep_17_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[10]; + u32 out[10]; + +} krb5asrep_17_tmp_t; + +DECLSPEC void aes128_encrypt_cbc (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *aes_ks, PRIVATE_AS u32 *aes_iv, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *in, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te4) +{ + u32 data[4]; + + data[0] = hc_swap32_S (in[0]); + data[1] = hc_swap32_S (in[1]); + data[2] = hc_swap32_S (in[2]); + data[3] = hc_swap32_S (in[3]); + + data[0] ^= aes_iv[0]; + data[1] ^= aes_iv[1]; + data[2] ^= aes_iv[2]; + data[3] ^= aes_iv[3]; + + aes128_encrypt (aes_ks, data, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + aes_iv[0] = out[0]; + aes_iv[1] = out[1]; + aes_iv[2] = out[2]; + aes_iv[3] = out[3]; + + out[0] = hc_swap32_S (out[0]); + out[1] = hc_swap32_S (out[1]); + out[2] = hc_swap32_S (out[2]); + out[3] = hc_swap32_S (out[3]); +} + +DECLSPEC void aes128_decrypt_cbc (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *ks1, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *in, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out, PRIVATE_AS u32 *essiv, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td4) +{ + aes128_decrypt (ks1, in, out, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + out[0] ^= essiv[0]; + out[1] ^= essiv[1]; + out[2] ^= essiv[2]; + out[3] ^= essiv[3]; + + essiv[0] = in[0]; + essiv[1] = in[1]; + essiv[2] = in[2]; + essiv[3] = in[3]; +} + +DECLSPEC void hmac_sha1_run_V (PRIVATE_AS u32x *w0, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w1, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w2, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w3, PRIVATE_AS u32x *ipad, PRIVATE_AS u32x *opad, PRIVATE_AS u32x *digest) +{ + digest[0] = ipad[0]; + digest[1] = ipad[1]; + digest[2] = ipad[2]; + digest[3] = ipad[3]; + digest[4] = ipad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); + + w0[0] = digest[0]; + w0[1] = digest[1]; + w0[2] = digest[2]; + w0[3] = digest[3]; + w1[0] = digest[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + digest[0] = opad[0]; + digest[1] = opad[1]; + digest[2] = opad[2]; + digest[3] = opad[3]; + digest[4] = opad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m33100_init (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5asrep_17_tmp_t, krb5asrep_17_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if (gid >= GID_CNT) return; + + /** + * main + */ + + /* initialize hmac-sha1 for pbkdf2(password, account, 4096, account_len) */ + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + sha1_hmac_init_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, pws[gid].i, pws[gid].pw_len); + + tmps[gid].ipad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].ipad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].ipad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].ipad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].ipad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].opad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].opad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].opad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].opad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].opad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[4]; + + sha1_hmac_update_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].account_info, esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].account_info_len); + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 1; i < 4; i += 5, j += 1) + { + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx2 = sha1_hmac_ctx; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + w0[0] = j; + w0[1] = 0; + w0[2] = 0; + w0[3] = 0; + w1[0] = 0; + w1[1] = 0; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx2, w0, w1, w2, w3, 4); + + sha1_hmac_final (&sha1_hmac_ctx2); + + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].out[i + 0] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 1] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 2] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 3] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 4] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4]; + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m33100_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5asrep_17_tmp_t, krb5asrep_17_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if ((gid * VECT_SIZE) >= GID_CNT) return; + + u32x ipad[5]; + u32x opad[5]; + + ipad[0] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 0); + ipad[1] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 1); + ipad[2] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 2); + ipad[3] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 3); + ipad[4] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 4); + + opad[0] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 0); + opad[1] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 1); + opad[2] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 2); + opad[3] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 3); + opad[4] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 4); + + for (u32 i = 0; i < 4; i += 5) + { + u32x dgst[5]; + u32x out[5]; + + dgst[0] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0); + dgst[1] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1); + dgst[2] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2); + dgst[3] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3); + dgst[4] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4); + + out[0] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0); + out[1] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1); + out[2] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2); + out[3] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3); + out[4] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4); + + for (u32 j = 0; j < LOOP_CNT; j++) + { + u32x w0[4]; + u32x w1[4]; + u32x w2[4]; + u32x w3[4]; + + w0[0] = dgst[0]; + w0[1] = dgst[1]; + w0[2] = dgst[2]; + w0[3] = dgst[3]; + w1[0] = dgst[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + hmac_sha1_run_V (w0, w1, w2, w3, ipad, opad, dgst); + + out[0] ^= dgst[0]; + out[1] ^= dgst[1]; + out[2] ^= dgst[2]; + out[3] ^= dgst[3]; + out[4] ^= dgst[4]; + } + + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0, dgst[0]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1, dgst[1]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2, dgst[2]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3, dgst[3]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4, dgst[4]); + + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0, out[0]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1, out[1]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2, out[2]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3, out[3]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4, out[4]); + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m33100_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5asrep_17_tmp_t, krb5asrep_17_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + const u64 lid = get_local_id (0); + const u64 lsz = get_local_size (0); + + /** + * aes shared + */ + + #ifdef REAL_SHM + + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te0[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te1[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te2[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te3[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te4[256]; + + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td0[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td1[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td2[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td3[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td4[256]; + + for (u32 i = lid; i < 256; i += lsz) + { + s_te0[i] = te0[i]; + s_te1[i] = te1[i]; + s_te2[i] = te2[i]; + s_te3[i] = te3[i]; + s_te4[i] = te4[i]; + + s_td0[i] = td0[i]; + s_td1[i] = td1[i]; + s_td2[i] = td2[i]; + s_td3[i] = td3[i]; + s_td4[i] = td4[i]; + } + + SYNC_THREADS (); + + #else + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te0 = te0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te1 = te1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te2 = te2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te3 = te3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te4 = te4; + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td0 = td0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td1 = td1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td2 = td2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td3 = td3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td4 = td4; + + #endif + + if (gid >= GID_CNT) return; + + /* + at this point, the output ('seed') will be used to generate AES keys: + + key_bytes = derive(seed, 'kerberos'.encode(), seedsize) + + 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ke' and 'ki' + 'ke' will be the AES key to decrypt the ticket + 'ki' will be the key to compute the final HMAC + */ + + u32 nfolded[4]; + + // we can precompute _nfold('kerberos', 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x6b657262; + nfolded[1] = 0x65726f73; + nfolded[2] = 0x7b9b5b2b; + nfolded[3] = 0x93132b93; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'seed' as key along with a null IV + u32 aes_key[4]; + + aes_key[0] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[0]); + aes_key[1] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[1]); + aes_key[2] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[2]); + aes_key[3] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[3]); + + u32 aes_iv[4]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + u32 aes_ks[44]; + + aes128_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, aes_key, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + u32 key_bytes[4]; + + aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, key_bytes, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + /* + We will now compute 'ki', having 'key_bytes' + + Description of the key derivation function from RFC3961 Section 5.3: + The "well-known constant" used for the DK function is the key usage + number, expressed as four octets in big-endian order, followed by + one octet indicated below. + Kc = DK(base-key, usage | 0x99); + Ke = DK(base-key, usage | 0xAA); + Ki = DK(base-key, usage | 0x55); + + The key usage numbers are defined in RFC4120. In Section 5.4.2, it + specifies that a key usage number of 3 is used for the EncASRepPart + of an AS-REP message. + */ + + u32 ki[4]; + + key_bytes[0] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[0]); + key_bytes[1] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[1]); + key_bytes[2] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[2]); + key_bytes[3] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[3]); + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 3, 0x55), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x6b60b058; + nfolded[1] = 0x2a6ba80d; + nfolded[2] = 0x5aad56ab; + nfolded[3] = 0x55406ad5; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes128_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, key_bytes, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, ki, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + /* we will now compute 'ke' */ + + u32 ke[4]; + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 3, 0xAA), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0xbe349a4d; + nfolded[1] = 0x24be500e; + nfolded[2] = 0xaf57abd5; + nfolded[3] = 0xea80757a; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, ke, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + /* + We now have 'ke' and 'ki' + + We will decrypt (with 'ke') the 32 first bytes to search for ASN.1 structs + and if we find ASN.1 structs, we will compute the hmac (with 'ki') + + For AS-REP EncASRepPart: + The first byte is 0x79 (01 1 11001, where 01 = "class=APPLICATION", 1 = "form=constructed", 11001 is application type 25) + + According to RFC4120 Section 5.4.2: "Some implementations unconditionally send an encrypted EncTGSRepPart (application + tag number 26) in this field regardless of whether the reply is a AS-REP or a TGS-REP. In the interest of compatibility, + implementors MAY relax the check on the tag number of the decrypted ENC-PART" + + The first byte can thus also be 0x7a (corresponding to application type 26) instead of 0x79 + + The next byte is the length: + + if length < 128 bytes: + length is on 1 byte, and the next byte is 0x30 (class=SEQUENCE) + else if length <= 256: + length is on 2 bytes, the first byte is 0x81, and the third byte is 0x30 (class=SEQUENCE) + else if length > 256: + length is on 3 bytes, the first byte is 0x82, and the fourth byte is 0x30 (class=SEQUENCE) + */ + + u32 first_blocks[16]; + + u32 decrypted_block[4]; + + first_blocks[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[0]; + first_blocks[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[1]; + first_blocks[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[2]; + first_blocks[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[3]; + + first_blocks[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[4]; // possible ASN1 structs + first_blocks[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[5]; + first_blocks[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[6]; // possible ASN1 structs + first_blocks[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[7]; + + /* + we will decrypt them here in order to be able to compute hmac directly + if ASN1 structs were to be found + */ + first_blocks[8] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[8]; + first_blocks[9] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[9]; + first_blocks[10] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[10]; + first_blocks[11] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[11]; + + first_blocks[12] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[12]; + first_blocks[13] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[13]; + first_blocks[14] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[14]; + first_blocks[15] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[15]; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + u32 aes_cts_decrypt_ks[44]; + + AES128_set_decrypt_key (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, ke, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3); + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + if (((decrypted_block[0] & 0x00ff80ff) == 0x00300079) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0x00ff80ff) == 0x0030007a) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0xFF00FFFF) == 0x30008179) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0xFF00FFFF) == 0x3000817a) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0x0000FFFF) == 0x00008279 && (decrypted_block[1] & 0x000000FF) == 0x00000030) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0x0000FFFF) == 0x0000827a && (decrypted_block[1] & 0x000000FF) == 0x00000030)) + { + // now we decrypt all the ticket to verify checksum + int block_position; + + int edata2_len = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2_len; + + int edata2_left; + + u32 block[16]; + + int last_block_size = edata2_len % 16; + + if (last_block_size == 0) + { + last_block_size = 16; + } + + int last_part = last_block_size + 16; + + int need = edata2_len - last_part; + + int last_block_cbc_position = (need - 16) / 4; + + // we need to decrypt also the 2 following blocks in order to be able to compute the hmac directly + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks + 12, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w3[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w3[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w3[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w3[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + /* + hmac message = plaintext + hmac key = ki + */ + + u32 k0[4]; + u32 k1[4]; + u32 k2[4]; + u32 k3[4]; + + k0[0] = ki[0]; + k0[1] = ki[1]; + k0[2] = ki[2]; + k0[3] = ki[3]; + + k1[0] = 0; + k1[1] = 0; + k1[2] = 0; + k1[3] = 0; + + k2[0] = 0; + k2[1] = 0; + k2[2] = 0; + k2[3] = 0; + + k3[0] = 0; + k3[1] = 0; + k3[2] = 0; + k3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_init_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, k0, k1, k2, k3); + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 64); + + block_position = 16; + + // first 4 blocks are already decrypted + for (edata2_left = need - 64; edata2_left >= 64; edata2_left -= 64) + { + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + block[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 4]; + block[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 5]; + block[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 6]; + block[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 7]; + block[8] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 8]; + block[9] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 9]; + block[10] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 10]; + block[11] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 11]; + block[12] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 12]; + block[13] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 13]; + block[14] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 14]; + block[15] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 15]; + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 12, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w3[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w3[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w3[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w3[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 64); + + block_position += 16; + } + + if (edata2_left == 16) + { + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w1[0] = 0; + w1[1] = 0; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 16); + + block_position += 4; + } + else if (edata2_left == 32) + { + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + block[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 4]; + block[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 5]; + block[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 6]; + block[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 7]; + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 32); + + block_position += 8; + } + else if (edata2_left == 48) + { + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + block[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 4]; + block[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 5]; + block[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 6]; + block[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 7]; + block[8] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 8]; + block[9] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 9]; + block[10] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 10]; + block[11] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 11]; + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 48); + + block_position += 12; + } + + /* + now all the ticket should be decrypted until block n-1 (not included) + and n + */ + + // this is block n-2, it will be xored with the n-1 block later crafted + u32 last_block_cbc[4]; + + last_block_cbc[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 0]; + last_block_cbc[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 1]; + last_block_cbc[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 2]; + last_block_cbc[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 3]; + + // n-1 block is decrypted separately from the previous blocks which were cbc decrypted + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + + aes128_decrypt (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + u32 last_block[4]; + + int last_block_position = (edata2_len - last_block_size) / 4; + + u32 n_1_crafted[4]; + + u32 last_plaintext[4]; + + last_plaintext[0] = 0; + last_plaintext[1] = 0; + last_plaintext[2] = 0; + last_plaintext[3] = 0; + + /* + n-1 block is first computed as follows: + - fill n-1 block with the X first bytes of the encrypted last block (n) + with X == length of last block + - complete the rest of the block with + + Final block (n) is computed as follows: + - fill with the X first bytes from n-1 block decrypted and xor them with last block (n) + with X == length of last block + */ + int remaining_blocks = last_block_size / 4; + + /* + last block is not necessarily aligned on 4 bytes so we will have + to shift values for the CTS crap... + */ + u32 shift = last_block_size % 4; + + u32 mask; + + switch (remaining_blocks) + { + case 0: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - last_block_size) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ (decrypted_block[0] & mask); + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = (last_block[0] & mask) | (decrypted_block[0] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + n_1_crafted[1] = decrypted_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + break; + + case 1: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + + if (shift == 0) + { + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = decrypted_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + } + else + { + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - (last_block_size % 4)) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ (decrypted_block[1] & mask); + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = (last_block[1] & mask) | (decrypted_block[1] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + } + break; + + case 2: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + + if (shift == 0) + { + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + } + else + { + last_block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 2]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - (last_block_size % 4)) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ (decrypted_block[2] & mask); + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = (last_block[2] & mask) | (decrypted_block[2] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + } + break; + + case 3: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + last_block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 2]; + + if (shift == 0) + { + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = last_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ decrypted_block[2]; + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + } + else + { + last_block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 3]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - (last_block_size % 4)) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ decrypted_block[2]; + last_plaintext[3] = last_block[3] ^ (decrypted_block[3] & mask); + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + last_plaintext[3] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[3]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = last_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = (last_block[3] & mask) | (decrypted_block[3] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + } + break; + + case 4: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + last_block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 2]; + last_block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 3]; + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = last_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = last_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ decrypted_block[2]; + last_plaintext[3] = last_block[3] ^ decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + last_plaintext[3] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[3]); + break; + + default: + return; + } + + // then decrypt this newly created n-1 with 'ke' + aes128_decrypt (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, n_1_crafted, n_1_crafted, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + // then xor with the encrypted n-2 block + n_1_crafted[0] ^= last_block_cbc[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] ^= last_block_cbc[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] ^= last_block_cbc[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] ^= last_block_cbc[3]; + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[3]); + + w1[0] = last_plaintext[0]; + w1[1] = last_plaintext[1]; + w1[2] = last_plaintext[2]; + w1[3] = last_plaintext[3]; + + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 16 + last_block_size); + + sha1_hmac_final (&sha1_hmac_ctx); + + if (sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0] == esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].checksum[0] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1] == esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].checksum[1] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2] == esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].checksum[2]) + { + if (hc_atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST]) == 0) + { + #define il_pos 0 + mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, SALT_POS_HOST, DIGESTS_CNT, 0, DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST + 0, gid, il_pos, 0, 0); + } + } + } +} diff --git a/OpenCL/m33200-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m33200-pure.cl new file mode 100755 index 000000000..26f9840c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/OpenCL/m33200-pure.cl @@ -0,0 +1,1101 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#define NEW_SIMD_CODE + +#ifdef KERNEL_STATIC +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_vendor.h) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_types.h) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_platform.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_common.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_simd.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_hash_sha1.cl) +#include M2S(INCLUDE_PATH/inc_cipher_aes.cl) +#endif + +typedef struct krb5asrep_18 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 edata2[5120]; + u32 edata2_len; + u32 format; + +} krb5asrep_18_t; + +typedef struct krb5asrep_18_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[16]; + u32 out[16]; + +} krb5asrep_18_tmp_t; + +DECLSPEC void aes256_encrypt_cbc (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *aes_ks, PRIVATE_AS u32 *aes_iv, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *in, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te4) +{ + u32 data[4]; + + data[0] = hc_swap32_S (in[0]); + data[1] = hc_swap32_S (in[1]); + data[2] = hc_swap32_S (in[2]); + data[3] = hc_swap32_S (in[3]); + + data[0] ^= aes_iv[0]; + data[1] ^= aes_iv[1]; + data[2] ^= aes_iv[2]; + data[3] ^= aes_iv[3]; + + aes256_encrypt (aes_ks, data, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + aes_iv[0] = out[0]; + aes_iv[1] = out[1]; + aes_iv[2] = out[2]; + aes_iv[3] = out[3]; + + out[0] = hc_swap32_S (out[0]); + out[1] = hc_swap32_S (out[1]); + out[2] = hc_swap32_S (out[2]); + out[3] = hc_swap32_S (out[3]); +} + +DECLSPEC void aes256_decrypt_cbc (PRIVATE_AS const u32 *ks1, PRIVATE_AS const u32 *in, PRIVATE_AS u32 *out, PRIVATE_AS u32 *essiv, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td4) +{ + aes256_decrypt (ks1, in, out, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + out[0] ^= essiv[0]; + out[1] ^= essiv[1]; + out[2] ^= essiv[2]; + out[3] ^= essiv[3]; + + essiv[0] = in[0]; + essiv[1] = in[1]; + essiv[2] = in[2]; + essiv[3] = in[3]; +} + +DECLSPEC void hmac_sha1_run_V (PRIVATE_AS u32x *w0, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w1, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w2, PRIVATE_AS u32x *w3, PRIVATE_AS u32x *ipad, PRIVATE_AS u32x *opad, PRIVATE_AS u32x *digest) +{ + digest[0] = ipad[0]; + digest[1] = ipad[1]; + digest[2] = ipad[2]; + digest[3] = ipad[3]; + digest[4] = ipad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); + + w0[0] = digest[0]; + w0[1] = digest[1]; + w0[2] = digest[2]; + w0[3] = digest[3]; + w1[0] = digest[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + digest[0] = opad[0]; + digest[1] = opad[1]; + digest[2] = opad[2]; + digest[3] = opad[3]; + digest[4] = opad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m33200_init (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5asrep_18_tmp_t, krb5asrep_18_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if (gid >= GID_CNT) return; + + /** + * main + */ + + /* initialize hmac-sha1 for pbkdf2(password, account, 4096, account_len) */ + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + sha1_hmac_init_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, pws[gid].i, pws[gid].pw_len); + + tmps[gid].ipad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].ipad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].ipad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].ipad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].ipad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].opad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].opad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].opad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].opad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].opad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[4]; + + sha1_hmac_update_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].account_info, esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].account_info_len); + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 1; i < 8; i += 5, j += 1) + { + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx2 = sha1_hmac_ctx; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + w0[0] = j; + w0[1] = 0; + w0[2] = 0; + w0[3] = 0; + w1[0] = 0; + w1[1] = 0; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx2, w0, w1, w2, w3, 4); + + sha1_hmac_final (&sha1_hmac_ctx2); + + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].out[i + 0] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 1] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 2] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 3] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 4] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4]; + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m33200_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5asrep_18_tmp_t, krb5asrep_18_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if ((gid * VECT_SIZE) >= GID_CNT) return; + + u32x ipad[5]; + u32x opad[5]; + + ipad[0] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 0); + ipad[1] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 1); + ipad[2] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 2); + ipad[3] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 3); + ipad[4] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 4); + + opad[0] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 0); + opad[1] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 1); + opad[2] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 2); + opad[3] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 3); + opad[4] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 4); + + for (u32 i = 0; i < 8; i += 5) + { + u32x dgst[5]; + u32x out[5]; + + dgst[0] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0); + dgst[1] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1); + dgst[2] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2); + dgst[3] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3); + dgst[4] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4); + + out[0] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0); + out[1] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1); + out[2] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2); + out[3] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3); + out[4] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4); + + for (u32 j = 0; j < LOOP_CNT; j++) + { + u32x w0[4]; + u32x w1[4]; + u32x w2[4]; + u32x w3[4]; + + w0[0] = dgst[0]; + w0[1] = dgst[1]; + w0[2] = dgst[2]; + w0[3] = dgst[3]; + w1[0] = dgst[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + hmac_sha1_run_V (w0, w1, w2, w3, ipad, opad, dgst); + + out[0] ^= dgst[0]; + out[1] ^= dgst[1]; + out[2] ^= dgst[2]; + out[3] ^= dgst[3]; + out[4] ^= dgst[4]; + } + + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0, dgst[0]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1, dgst[1]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2, dgst[2]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3, dgst[3]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4, dgst[4]); + + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0, out[0]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1, out[1]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2, out[2]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3, out[3]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4, out[4]); + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m33200_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5asrep_18_tmp_t, krb5asrep_18_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + const u64 lid = get_local_id (0); + const u64 lsz = get_local_size (0); + + /** + * aes shared + */ + + #ifdef REAL_SHM + + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td0[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td1[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td2[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td3[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_td4[256]; + + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te0[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te1[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te2[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te3[256]; + LOCAL_VK u32 s_te4[256]; + + for (u32 i = lid; i < 256; i += lsz) + { + s_td0[i] = td0[i]; + s_td1[i] = td1[i]; + s_td2[i] = td2[i]; + s_td3[i] = td3[i]; + s_td4[i] = td4[i]; + + s_te0[i] = te0[i]; + s_te1[i] = te1[i]; + s_te2[i] = te2[i]; + s_te3[i] = te3[i]; + s_te4[i] = te4[i]; + } + + SYNC_THREADS (); + + #else + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td0 = td0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td1 = td1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td2 = td2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td3 = td3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td4 = td4; + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te0 = te0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te1 = te1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te2 = te2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te3 = te3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te4 = te4; + + #endif + + if (gid >= GID_CNT) return; + + /* + at this point, the output ('seed') will be used to generate AES keys: + + key_bytes = derive(seed, 'kerberos'.encode(), seedsize) + + 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ke' and 'ki' + 'ke' will be the AES key to decrypt the ticket + 'ki' will be the key to compute the final HMAC + */ + + u32 nfolded[4]; + + // we can precompute _nfold('kerberos', 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x6b657262; + nfolded[1] = 0x65726f73; + nfolded[2] = 0x7b9b5b2b; + nfolded[3] = 0x93132b93; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'seed' as key along with a null IV + u32 aes_key[8]; + + aes_key[0] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[0]); + aes_key[1] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[1]); + aes_key[2] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[2]); + aes_key[3] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[3]); + aes_key[4] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[4]); + aes_key[5] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[5]); + aes_key[6] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[6]); + aes_key[7] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[7]); + + u32 aes_iv[4]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + u32 aes_ks[60]; + + aes256_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, aes_key, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + u32 key_bytes[8]; + + u32 out[4]; + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + key_bytes[0] = out[0]; + key_bytes[1] = out[1]; + key_bytes[2] = out[2]; + key_bytes[3] = out[3]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, out, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + key_bytes[4] = out[0]; + key_bytes[5] = out[1]; + key_bytes[6] = out[2]; + key_bytes[7] = out[3]; + + /* + We will now compute 'ki', having 'key_bytes' + + Description of the key derivation function from RFC3961 Section 5.3: + The "well-known constant" used for the DK function is the key usage + number, expressed as four octets in big-endian order, followed by + one octet indicated below. + Kc = DK(base-key, usage | 0x99); + Ke = DK(base-key, usage | 0xAA); + Ki = DK(base-key, usage | 0x55); + + The key usage numbers are defined in RFC4120. In Section 5.4.2, it + specifies that a key usage number of 3 is used for the EncASRepPart + of an AS-REP message. + */ + + u32 ki[8]; + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 3, 0x55), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x6b60b058; + nfolded[1] = 0x2a6ba80d; + nfolded[2] = 0x5aad56ab; + nfolded[3] = 0x55406ad5; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + key_bytes[0] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[0]); + key_bytes[1] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[1]); + key_bytes[2] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[2]); + key_bytes[3] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[3]); + key_bytes[4] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[4]); + key_bytes[5] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[5]); + key_bytes[6] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[6]); + key_bytes[7] = hc_swap32_S (key_bytes[7]); + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes256_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, key_bytes, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ki[0] = out[0]; + ki[1] = out[1]; + ki[2] = out[2]; + ki[3] = out[3]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, out, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ki[4] = out[0]; + ki[5] = out[1]; + ki[6] = out[2]; + ki[7] = out[3]; + + /* we will now compute 'ke' */ + + u32 ke[8]; + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 3, 0xAA), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0xbe349a4d; + nfolded[1] = 0x24be500e; + nfolded[2] = 0xaf57abd5; + nfolded[3] = 0xea80757a; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ke[0] = out[0]; + ke[1] = out[1]; + ke[2] = out[2]; + ke[3] = out[3]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, out, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ke[4] = out[0]; + ke[5] = out[1]; + ke[6] = out[2]; + ke[7] = out[3]; + + /* + We now have 'ke' and 'ki' + + We will decrypt (with 'ke') the 32 first bytes to search for ASN.1 structs + and if we find ASN.1 structs, we will compute the hmac (with 'ki') + + For AS-REP EncASRepPart: + The first byte is 0x79 (01 1 11001, where 01 = "class=APPLICATION", 1 = "form=constructed", 11001 is application type 25) + + According to RFC4120 Section 5.4.2: "Some implementations unconditionally send an encrypted EncTGSRepPart (application + tag number 26) in this field regardless of whether the reply is a AS-REP or a TGS-REP. In the interest of compatibility, + implementors MAY relax the check on the tag number of the decrypted ENC-PART" + + The first byte can thus also be 0x7a (corresponding to application type 26) instead of 0x79 + + The next byte is the length: + + if length < 128 bytes: + length is on 1 byte, and the next byte is 0x30 (class=SEQUENCE) + else if length <= 256: + length is on 2 bytes, the first byte is 0x81, and the third byte is 0x30 (class=SEQUENCE) + else if length > 256: + length is on 3 bytes, the first byte is 0x82, and the fourth byte is 0x30 (class=SEQUENCE) + */ + + u32 first_blocks[16]; + + u32 decrypted_block[8]; + + first_blocks[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[0]; + first_blocks[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[1]; + first_blocks[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[2]; + first_blocks[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[3]; + + first_blocks[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[4]; // possible ASN1 structs + first_blocks[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[5]; + first_blocks[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[6]; // possible ASN1 structs + first_blocks[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[7]; + + /* + we will decrypt them here in order to be able to compute hmac directly + if ASN1 structs were to be found + */ + first_blocks[8] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[8]; + first_blocks[9] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[9]; + first_blocks[10] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[10]; + first_blocks[11] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[11]; + + first_blocks[12] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[12]; + first_blocks[13] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[13]; + first_blocks[14] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[14]; + first_blocks[15] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[15]; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + u32 aes_cts_decrypt_ks[60]; + + AES256_set_decrypt_key (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, ke, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3); + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + if (((decrypted_block[0] & 0x00ff80ff) == 0x00300079) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0x00ff80ff) == 0x0030007a) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0xFF00FFFF) == 0x30008179) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0xFF00FFFF) == 0x3000817a) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0x0000FFFF) == 0x00008279 && (decrypted_block[1] & 0x000000FF) == 0x00000030) || + ((decrypted_block[0] & 0x0000FFFF) == 0x0000827a && (decrypted_block[1] & 0x000000FF) == 0x00000030)) + { + // now we decrypt all the ticket to verify checksum + + // we need to decrypt also the 2 following blocks in order to be able to compute the hmac directly + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, first_blocks + 12, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w3[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w3[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w3[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w3[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + int block_position; + + int edata2_len = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2_len; + + int edata2_left; + + u32 block[16]; + + int last_block_size = edata2_len % 16; + + if (last_block_size == 0) + { + last_block_size = 16; + } + + int last_part = last_block_size + 16; + + int need = edata2_len - last_part; + + int last_block_cbc_position = (need - 16) / 4; + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + /* + hmac message = plaintext + hmac key = ki + */ + + u32 k0[4]; + u32 k1[4]; + u32 k2[4]; + u32 k3[4]; + + k0[0] = ki[0]; + k0[1] = ki[1]; + k0[2] = ki[2]; + k0[3] = ki[3]; + + k1[0] = ki[4]; + k1[1] = ki[5]; + k1[2] = ki[6]; + k1[3] = ki[7]; + + k2[0] = 0; + k2[1] = 0; + k2[2] = 0; + k2[3] = 0; + + k3[0] = 0; + k3[1] = 0; + k3[2] = 0; + k3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_init_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, k0, k1, k2, k3); + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 64); + + block_position = 16; + + // first 4 blocks are already decrypted + for (edata2_left = need - 64; edata2_left >= 64; edata2_left -= 64) + { + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + block[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 4]; + block[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 5]; + block[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 6]; + block[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 7]; + block[8] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 8]; + block[9] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 9]; + block[10] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 10]; + block[11] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 11]; + block[12] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 12]; + block[13] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 13]; + block[14] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 14]; + block[15] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 15]; + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 12, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w3[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w3[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w3[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w3[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 64); + + block_position += 16; + } + + if (edata2_left == 16) + { + + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w1[0] = 0; + w1[1] = 0; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 16); + + block_position += 4; + } + else if (edata2_left == 32) + { + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + block[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 4]; + block[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 5]; + block[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 6]; + block[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 7]; + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 32); + + block_position += 8; + } + else if (edata2_left == 48) + { + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + block[4] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 4]; + block[5] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 5]; + block[6] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 6]; + block[7] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 7]; + block[8] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 8]; + block[9] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 9]; + block[10] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 10]; + block[11] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 11]; + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 48); + + block_position += 12; + } + + /* + now all the ticket should be decrypted until block n-1 (not included) + and n + */ + + // this is block n-2, it will be xored with the n-1 block later crafted + u32 last_block_cbc[4]; + + last_block_cbc[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 0]; + last_block_cbc[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 1]; + last_block_cbc[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 2]; + last_block_cbc[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_cbc_position + 3]; + + // n-1 block is decrypted separately from the previous blocks which were cbc decrypted + block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 0]; + block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 1]; + block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 2]; + block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[block_position + 3]; + + aes256_decrypt (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, block, decrypted_block, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + u32 last_block[4]; + + int last_block_position = (edata2_len - last_block_size) / 4; + + u32 n_1_crafted[4]; + + u32 last_plaintext[4]; + + last_plaintext[0] = 0; + last_plaintext[1] = 0; + last_plaintext[2] = 0; + last_plaintext[3] = 0; + + /* + n-1 block is first computed as follows: + - fill n-1 block with the X first bytes of the encrypted last block (n) + with X == length of last block + - complete the rest of the block with + + Final block (n) is computed as follows: + - fill with the X first bytes from n-1 block decrypted and xor them with last block (n) + with X == length of last block + */ + int remaining_blocks = last_block_size / 4; + + /* + last block is not necessarily aligned on 4 bytes so we will have + to shift values for the CTS crap... + */ + u32 shift = last_block_size % 4; + + u32 mask; + + switch (remaining_blocks) + { + case 0: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - last_block_size) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ (decrypted_block[0] & mask); + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = (last_block[0] & mask) | (decrypted_block[0] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + n_1_crafted[1] = decrypted_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + break; + + case 1: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + + if (shift == 0) + { + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = decrypted_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + } + else + { + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - (last_block_size % 4)) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ (decrypted_block[1] & mask); + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = (last_block[1] & mask) | (decrypted_block[1] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + } + break; + + case 2: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + + if (shift == 0) + { + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + } + else + { + last_block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 2]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - (last_block_size % 4)) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ (decrypted_block[2] & mask); + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = (last_block[2] & mask) | (decrypted_block[2] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + } + break; + + case 3: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + last_block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 2]; + + if (shift == 0) + { + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = last_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ decrypted_block[2]; + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + } + else + { + last_block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 3]; + + mask = (0xffffffff >> ((4 - (last_block_size % 4)) * 8)); + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ decrypted_block[2]; + last_plaintext[3] = last_block[3] ^ (decrypted_block[3] & mask); + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + last_plaintext[3] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[3]); + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = last_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = (last_block[3] & mask) | (decrypted_block[3] & (mask ^ 0xffffffff)); + } + break; + + case 4: + + last_block[0] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 0]; + last_block[1] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 1]; + last_block[2] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 2]; + last_block[3] = esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].edata2[last_block_position + 3]; + + n_1_crafted[0] = last_block[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] = last_block[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] = last_block[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] = last_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = last_block[0] ^ decrypted_block[0]; + last_plaintext[1] = last_block[1] ^ decrypted_block[1]; + last_plaintext[2] = last_block[2] ^ decrypted_block[2]; + last_plaintext[3] = last_block[3] ^ decrypted_block[3]; + + last_plaintext[0] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[0]); + last_plaintext[1] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[1]); + last_plaintext[2] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[2]); + last_plaintext[3] = hc_swap32_S (last_plaintext[3]); + break; + + default: + return; + } + + + // then decrypt this newly created n-1 with 'ke' + aes256_decrypt (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, n_1_crafted, n_1_crafted, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + // then xor with the encrypted n-2 block + n_1_crafted[0] ^= last_block_cbc[0]; + n_1_crafted[1] ^= last_block_cbc[1]; + n_1_crafted[2] ^= last_block_cbc[2]; + n_1_crafted[3] ^= last_block_cbc[3]; + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (n_1_crafted[3]); + + w1[0] = last_plaintext[0]; + w1[1] = last_plaintext[1]; + w1[2] = last_plaintext[2]; + w1[3] = last_plaintext[3]; + + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, 16 + last_block_size); + + sha1_hmac_final (&sha1_hmac_ctx); + + if (sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0] == esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].checksum[0] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1] == esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].checksum[1] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2] == esalt_bufs[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST].checksum[2]) + { + if (hc_atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST]) == 0) + { + #define il_pos 0 + mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, SALT_POS_HOST, DIGESTS_CNT, 0, DIGESTS_OFFSET_HOST + 0, gid, il_pos, 0, 0); + } + } + } +} diff --git a/src/modules/module_33100.c b/src/modules/module_33100.c new file mode 100755 index 000000000..e34a1a677 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/modules/module_33100.c @@ -0,0 +1,420 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "types.h" +#include "modules.h" +#include "bitops.h" +#include "convert.h" +#include "shared.h" + +static const u32 ATTACK_EXEC = ATTACK_EXEC_OUTSIDE_KERNEL; +static const u32 DGST_POS0 = 0; +static const u32 DGST_POS1 = 1; +static const u32 DGST_POS2 = 2; +static const u32 DGST_POS3 = 3; +static const u32 DGST_SIZE = DGST_SIZE_4_4; +static const u32 HASH_CATEGORY = HASH_CATEGORY_NETWORK_PROTOCOL; +static const char *HASH_NAME = "Kerberos 5, etype 17, AS-REP"; +static const u64 KERN_TYPE = 33100; +static const u32 OPTI_TYPE = OPTI_TYPE_ZERO_BYTE + | OPTI_TYPE_NOT_ITERATED + | OPTI_TYPE_SLOW_HASH_SIMD_LOOP; +static const u64 OPTS_TYPE = OPTS_TYPE_STOCK_MODULE + | OPTS_TYPE_PT_GENERATE_LE; +static const u32 SALT_TYPE = SALT_TYPE_EMBEDDED; +static const char *ST_PASS = "hashcat"; +static const char *ST_HASH = "$krb5asrep$17$user$EXAMPLE.COM$a419c4030e555734b06c2629$c09a1421f96eb126c757a4b87830381f142477d9a85b2beb3093dbfd44f38ddb6016a479537fb7b36e046315869fe79187217971ff6a12c1e0a2df3f68045e03814b21f756d8981f781803d65e8572823c88979581d93cf7d768f2efced16f3719b8d1004d9e73d798de255383476bced47d1982f16be77d0feb55a1f44f58bd013fa4caee58ac614caf0f1cf9101ec9623c5b8c2a1491b73f134f074790088fdb360b5ebce0d32a8145ed00a81ddf77188e150b92d8e8ddd0285d27f1514253e5546e6bba864b362bb1e6483b26d08fa4cc268bfbefe0f690039bcc524b774599df3680c1c3431d891bfa99514a877f964e"; + +u32 module_attack_exec (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ATTACK_EXEC; } +u32 module_dgst_pos0 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS0; } +u32 module_dgst_pos1 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS1; } +u32 module_dgst_pos2 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS2; } +u32 module_dgst_pos3 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS3; } +u32 module_dgst_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_SIZE; } +u32 module_hash_category (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_CATEGORY; } +const char *module_hash_name (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_NAME; } +u64 module_kern_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return KERN_TYPE; } +u32 module_opti_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTI_TYPE; } +u64 module_opts_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTS_TYPE; } +u32 module_salt_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return SALT_TYPE; } +const char *module_st_hash (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_HASH; } +const char *module_st_pass (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_PASS; } + +// Struct to store the hash structure - same fields as TGS-REP type 17 +typedef struct krb5asrep_17 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 edata2[5120]; + u32 edata2_len; + u32 format; + +} krb5asrep_17_t; + +typedef struct krb5asrep_17_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[16]; + u32 out[16]; + +} krb5asrep_17_tmp_t; + +static const char *SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP = "$krb5asrep$17$"; + +u64 module_tmp_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 tmp_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5asrep_17_tmp_t); + + return tmp_size; +} + +u64 module_esalt_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 esalt_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5asrep_17_t); + + return esalt_size; +} + +int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED hashinfo_t *hash_info, const char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_len) +{ + u32 *digest = (u32 *) digest_buf; + + krb5asrep_17_t *krb5asrep = (krb5asrep_17_t *) esalt_buf; + + hc_token_t token; + + memset (&token, 0, sizeof (hc_token_t)); + + token.signatures_cnt = 1; + token.signatures_buf[0] = SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP; + + token.len[0] = strlen (SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP); + token.attr[0] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_SIGNATURE; + + /** + * Haschat + * format 1: $krb5asrep$18$user$realm$checksum$edata2 + * + * JtR + * format 2: $krb5asrep$18$salt$edata2$checksum + */ + + if (line_len < (int) strlen (SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP)) return (PARSER_SALT_LENGTH); + + memset (krb5asrep, 0, sizeof (krb5asrep_17_t)); + + /** + * JtR format has the checksum at the end, so can identify it based on the + * separator ('$') being at a fixed length from the end of the line. Checksum + * is 24 characters in length, so then there should be a '$' at line_len - 25 + */ + + if (line_buf[line_len - 25] == '$') + { + // JtR format + krb5asrep->format = 2; + } + else + { + // Hashcat format + krb5asrep->format = 1; + } + + token.token_cnt = 4; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + token.token_cnt++; + + // user + token.sep[1] = '$'; + token.len_min[1] = 1; + token.len_max[1] = 512; + token.attr[1] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + // realm + token.sep[2] = '$'; + token.len_min[2] = 1; + token.len_max[2] = 512; + token.attr[2] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + // checksum + token.sep[3] = '$'; + // hmac-sha1 stripped to 12bytes + token.len[3] = 24; + token.attr[3] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + + // edata2 + token.sep[4] = '$'; + token.len_min[4] = 64; + token.len_max[4] = 40960; + token.attr[4] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + } + else + { + // salt + token.sep[1] = '$'; + token.len_min[1] = 1; + token.len_max[1] = 512; + token.attr[1] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + // edata2 + token.sep[2] = '$'; + token.len_min[2] = 64; + token.len_max[2] = 40960; + token.attr[2] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + + // checksum + token.sep[3] = '$'; + // hmac-sha1 stripped to 12bytes + token.len[3] = 24; + token.attr[3] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + } + + + const int rc_tokenizer = input_tokenizer ((const u8 *) line_buf, line_len, &token); + + if (rc_tokenizer != PARSER_OK) return (rc_tokenizer); + + const u8 *user_pos; + const u8 *domain_pos; + const u8 *salt_pos; + const u8 *checksum_pos; + const u8 *data_pos; + + int user_len; + int domain_len; + int data_len; + int account_info_len; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + user_pos = token.buf[1]; + user_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->user, user_pos, user_len); + + domain_pos = token.buf[2]; + domain_len = token.len[2]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + + checksum_pos = token.buf[3]; + + data_pos = token.buf[4]; + data_len = token.len[4]; + + account_info_len = token.len[2] + token.len[1]; + } + else + { + salt_pos = token.buf[1]; + account_info_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->account_info, salt_pos, account_info_len); + + /** + * JtR format only has the final salt/account_info value (combination of + * user and domain), rather than separate "user" and "domain" values. Since + * user and domain won't be used for the JtR format, their values won't + * matter, so set them both to the same value as account_info. + */ + + user_pos = token.buf[1]; + user_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->user, user_pos, user_len); + + domain_pos = token.buf[1]; + domain_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + + data_pos = token.buf[2]; + data_len = token.len[2]; + + checksum_pos = token.buf[3]; + } + + u8 *account_info_ptr = (u8 *) krb5asrep->account_info; + + // Domain must be uppercase + u8 domain[128]; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + memcpy (domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + uppercase (domain, domain_len); + + memcpy (account_info_ptr, domain, domain_len); + memcpy (account_info_ptr + domain_len, user_pos, user_len); + } + + krb5asrep->account_info_len = account_info_len; + + // hmac-sha1 is reduced to 12 bytes + krb5asrep->checksum[0] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 0)); + krb5asrep->checksum[1] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 8)); + krb5asrep->checksum[2] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 16)); + + u8 *edata_ptr = (u8 *) krb5asrep->edata2; + + for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i += 2) + { + const u8 p0 = data_pos[i + 0]; + const u8 p1 = data_pos[i + 1]; + + *edata_ptr++ = hex_convert (p1) << 0 + | hex_convert (p0) << 4; + } + + krb5asrep->edata2_len = data_len / 2; + + salt->salt_buf[0] = krb5asrep->checksum[0]; + salt->salt_buf[1] = krb5asrep->checksum[1]; + salt->salt_buf[2] = krb5asrep->checksum[2]; + + salt->salt_len = 12; + + salt->salt_iter = 4096 - 1; + + digest[0] = krb5asrep->checksum[0]; + digest[1] = krb5asrep->checksum[1]; + digest[2] = krb5asrep->checksum[2]; + digest[3] = 0; + + return (PARSER_OK); +} + +int module_hash_encode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const hashinfo_t *hash_info, char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_size) +{ + const krb5asrep_17_t *krb5asrep = (const krb5asrep_17_t *) esalt_buf; + + char data[5120 * 4 * 2] = { 0 }; + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 0; i < krb5asrep->edata2_len; i += 1, j += 2) + { + u8 *ptr_edata2 = (u8 *) krb5asrep->edata2; + + sprintf (data + j, "%02x", ptr_edata2[i]); + } + + int line_len = 0; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + line_len = snprintf (line_buf, line_size, "%s%s$%s$%08x%08x%08x$%s", + SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP, + (char *) krb5asrep->user, + (char *) krb5asrep->domain, + krb5asrep->checksum[0], + krb5asrep->checksum[1], + krb5asrep->checksum[2], + data); + } + else + { + line_len = snprintf (line_buf, line_size, "%s%s$%s$%08x%08x%08x", + SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP, + (char *) krb5asrep->account_info, + data, + krb5asrep->checksum[0], + krb5asrep->checksum[1], + krb5asrep->checksum[2]); + } + + return line_len; +} + +void module_init (module_ctx_t *module_ctx) +{ + module_ctx->module_context_size = MODULE_CONTEXT_SIZE_CURRENT; + module_ctx->module_interface_version = MODULE_INTERFACE_VERSION_CURRENT; + + module_ctx->module_attack_exec = module_attack_exec; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_esalt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_hook_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_mask = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_charset = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_build_plain_postprocess = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_deep_comp_kernel = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_deprecated_notice = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos0 = module_dgst_pos0; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos1 = module_dgst_pos1; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos2 = module_dgst_pos2; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos3 = module_dgst_pos3; + module_ctx->module_dgst_size = module_dgst_size; + module_ctx->module_dictstat_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_esalt_size = module_esalt_size; + module_ctx->module_extra_buffer_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_extra_tmp_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_extra_tuningdb_block = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_forced_outfile_format = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_count = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_parse = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_save = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_postprocess = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_zero_hash = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode = module_hash_decode; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_status = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode = module_hash_encode; + module_ctx->module_hash_init_selftest = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_mode = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_category = module_hash_category; + module_ctx->module_hash_name = module_hash_name; + module_ctx->module_hashes_count_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hashes_count_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hlfmt_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_extra_param_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_extra_param_init = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_extra_param_term = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook12 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook23 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_salt_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_build_options = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_cache_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kern_type = module_kern_type; + module_ctx->module_kern_type_dynamic = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_opti_type = module_opti_type; + module_ctx->module_opts_type = module_opts_type; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_nocomp = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_custom_check = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_keep_all_hashes = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pwdump_column = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_type = module_salt_type; + module_ctx->module_separator = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_st_hash = module_st_hash; + module_ctx->module_st_pass = module_st_pass; + module_ctx->module_tmp_size = module_tmp_size; + module_ctx->module_unstable_warning = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_warmup_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; +} diff --git a/src/modules/module_33200.c b/src/modules/module_33200.c new file mode 100755 index 000000000..508565136 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/modules/module_33200.c @@ -0,0 +1,419 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "types.h" +#include "modules.h" +#include "bitops.h" +#include "convert.h" +#include "shared.h" + +static const u32 ATTACK_EXEC = ATTACK_EXEC_OUTSIDE_KERNEL; +static const u32 DGST_POS0 = 0; +static const u32 DGST_POS1 = 1; +static const u32 DGST_POS2 = 2; +static const u32 DGST_POS3 = 3; +static const u32 DGST_SIZE = DGST_SIZE_4_4; +static const u32 HASH_CATEGORY = HASH_CATEGORY_NETWORK_PROTOCOL; +static const char *HASH_NAME = "Kerberos 5, etype 18, AS-REP"; +static const u64 KERN_TYPE = 33200; +static const u32 OPTI_TYPE = OPTI_TYPE_ZERO_BYTE + | OPTI_TYPE_NOT_ITERATED + | OPTI_TYPE_SLOW_HASH_SIMD_LOOP; +static const u64 OPTS_TYPE = OPTS_TYPE_STOCK_MODULE + | OPTS_TYPE_PT_GENERATE_LE; +static const u32 SALT_TYPE = SALT_TYPE_EMBEDDED; +static const char *ST_PASS = "hashcat"; +static const char *ST_HASH = "$krb5asrep$18$user$EXAMPLE.COM$aa4c494f520b27873a4de8f7$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"; + +u32 module_attack_exec (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ATTACK_EXEC; } +u32 module_dgst_pos0 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS0; } +u32 module_dgst_pos1 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS1; } +u32 module_dgst_pos2 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS2; } +u32 module_dgst_pos3 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS3; } +u32 module_dgst_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_SIZE; } +u32 module_hash_category (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_CATEGORY; } +const char *module_hash_name (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_NAME; } +u64 module_kern_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return KERN_TYPE; } +u32 module_opti_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTI_TYPE; } +u64 module_opts_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTS_TYPE; } +u32 module_salt_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return SALT_TYPE; } +const char *module_st_hash (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_HASH; } +const char *module_st_pass (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_PASS; } + +// Struct to store the hash structure - same fields as TGS-REP type 18 +typedef struct krb5asrep_18 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 edata2[5120]; + u32 edata2_len; + u32 format; + +} krb5asrep_18_t; + +typedef struct krb5asrep_18_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[16]; + u32 out[16]; + +} krb5asrep_18_tmp_t; + +static const char *SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP = "$krb5asrep$18$"; + +u64 module_tmp_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 tmp_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5asrep_18_tmp_t); + + return tmp_size; +} + +u64 module_esalt_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 esalt_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5asrep_18_t); + + return esalt_size; +} + +int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED hashinfo_t *hash_info, const char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_len) +{ + u32 *digest = (u32 *) digest_buf; + + krb5asrep_18_t *krb5asrep = (krb5asrep_18_t *) esalt_buf; + + hc_token_t token; + + memset (&token, 0, sizeof (hc_token_t)); + + token.signatures_cnt = 1; + token.signatures_buf[0] = SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP; + + token.len[0] = strlen (SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP); + token.attr[0] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_SIGNATURE; + + /** + * Haschat + * format 1: $krb5asrep$18$user$realm$checksum$edata2 + * + * JtR + * format 2: $krb5asrep$18$salt$edata2$checksum + */ + + if (line_len < (int) strlen (SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP)) return (PARSER_SALT_LENGTH); + + memset (krb5asrep, 0, sizeof (krb5asrep_18_t)); + + /** + * JtR format has the checksum at the end, so can identify it based on the + * separator ('$') being at a fixed length from the end of the line. Checksum + * is 24 characters in length, so then there should be a '$' at line_len - 25 + */ + + if (line_buf[line_len - 25] == '$') + { + // JtR format + krb5asrep->format = 2; + } + else + { + // Hashcat format + krb5asrep->format = 1; + } + + token.token_cnt = 4; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + token.token_cnt++; + + // user + token.sep[1] = '$'; + token.len_min[1] = 1; + token.len_max[1] = 512; + token.attr[1] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + // realm + token.sep[2] = '$'; + token.len_min[2] = 1; + token.len_max[2] = 512; + token.attr[2] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + // checksum + token.sep[3] = '$'; + // hmac-sha1 stripped to 12bytes + token.len[3] = 24; + token.attr[3] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + + // edata2 + token.sep[4] = '$'; + token.len_min[4] = 64; + token.len_max[4] = 40960; + token.attr[4] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + } + else + { + // salt + token.sep[1] = '$'; + token.len_min[1] = 1; + token.len_max[1] = 512; + token.attr[1] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + // edata2 + token.sep[2] = '$'; + token.len_min[2] = 64; + token.len_max[2] = 40960; + token.attr[2] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + + // checksum + token.sep[3] = '$'; + // hmac-sha1 stripped to 12bytes + token.len[3] = 24; + token.attr[3] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + } + + const int rc_tokenizer = input_tokenizer ((const u8 *) line_buf, line_len, &token); + + if (rc_tokenizer != PARSER_OK) return (rc_tokenizer); + + const u8 *user_pos; + const u8 *domain_pos; + const u8 *salt_pos; + const u8 *checksum_pos; + const u8 *data_pos; + + int user_len; + int domain_len; + int data_len; + int account_info_len; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + user_pos = token.buf[1]; + user_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->user, user_pos, user_len); + + domain_pos = token.buf[2]; + domain_len = token.len[2]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + + checksum_pos = token.buf[3]; + + data_pos = token.buf[4]; + data_len = token.len[4]; + + account_info_len = token.len[2] + token.len[1]; + } + else + { + salt_pos = token.buf[1]; + account_info_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->account_info, salt_pos, account_info_len); + + /** + * JtR format only has the final salt/account_info value (combination of + * user and domain), rather than separate "user" and "domain" values. Since + * user and domain won't be used for the JtR format, their values won't + * matter, so set them both to the same value as account_info. + */ + + user_pos = token.buf[1]; + user_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->user, user_pos, user_len); + + domain_pos = token.buf[1]; + domain_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy (krb5asrep->domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + + data_pos = token.buf[2]; + data_len = token.len[2]; + + checksum_pos = token.buf[3]; + } + + u8 *account_info_ptr = (u8 *) krb5asrep->account_info; + + // Domain must be uppercase + u8 domain[128]; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + memcpy (domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + uppercase (domain, domain_len); + + memcpy (account_info_ptr, domain, domain_len); + memcpy (account_info_ptr + domain_len, user_pos, user_len); + } + + krb5asrep->account_info_len = account_info_len; + + // hmac-sha1 is reduced to 12 bytes + krb5asrep->checksum[0] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 0)); + krb5asrep->checksum[1] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 8)); + krb5asrep->checksum[2] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 16)); + + u8 *edata_ptr = (u8 *) krb5asrep->edata2; + + for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i += 2) + { + const u8 p0 = data_pos[i + 0]; + const u8 p1 = data_pos[i + 1]; + + *edata_ptr++ = hex_convert (p1) << 0 + | hex_convert (p0) << 4; + } + + krb5asrep->edata2_len = data_len / 2; + + salt->salt_buf[0] = krb5asrep->checksum[0]; + salt->salt_buf[1] = krb5asrep->checksum[1]; + salt->salt_buf[2] = krb5asrep->checksum[2]; + + salt->salt_len = 12; + + salt->salt_iter = 4096 - 1; + + digest[0] = krb5asrep->checksum[0]; + digest[1] = krb5asrep->checksum[1]; + digest[2] = krb5asrep->checksum[2]; + digest[3] = 0; + + return (PARSER_OK); +} + +int module_hash_encode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const hashinfo_t *hash_info, char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_size) +{ + const krb5asrep_18_t *krb5asrep = (const krb5asrep_18_t *) esalt_buf; + + char data[5120 * 4 * 2] = { 0 }; + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 0; i < krb5asrep->edata2_len; i += 1, j += 2) + { + u8 *ptr_edata2 = (u8 *) krb5asrep->edata2; + + sprintf (data + j, "%02x", ptr_edata2[i]); + } + + int line_len = 0; + + if (krb5asrep->format == 1) + { + line_len = snprintf (line_buf, line_size, "%s%s$%s$%08x%08x%08x$%s", + SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP, + (char *) krb5asrep->user, + (char *) krb5asrep->domain, + krb5asrep->checksum[0], + krb5asrep->checksum[1], + krb5asrep->checksum[2], + data); + } + else + { + line_len = snprintf (line_buf, line_size, "%s%s$%s$%08x%08x%08x", + SIGNATURE_KRB5ASREP, + (char *) krb5asrep->account_info, + data, + krb5asrep->checksum[0], + krb5asrep->checksum[1], + krb5asrep->checksum[2]); + } + + return line_len; +} + +void module_init (module_ctx_t *module_ctx) +{ + module_ctx->module_context_size = MODULE_CONTEXT_SIZE_CURRENT; + module_ctx->module_interface_version = MODULE_INTERFACE_VERSION_CURRENT; + + module_ctx->module_attack_exec = module_attack_exec; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_esalt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_hook_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_mask = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_charset = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_build_plain_postprocess = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_deep_comp_kernel = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_deprecated_notice = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos0 = module_dgst_pos0; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos1 = module_dgst_pos1; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos2 = module_dgst_pos2; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos3 = module_dgst_pos3; + module_ctx->module_dgst_size = module_dgst_size; + module_ctx->module_dictstat_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_esalt_size = module_esalt_size; + module_ctx->module_extra_buffer_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_extra_tmp_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_extra_tuningdb_block = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_forced_outfile_format = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_count = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_parse = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_save = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_postprocess = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_zero_hash = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode = module_hash_decode; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_status = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode = module_hash_encode; + module_ctx->module_hash_init_selftest = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_mode = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_category = module_hash_category; + module_ctx->module_hash_name = module_hash_name; + module_ctx->module_hashes_count_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hashes_count_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hlfmt_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_extra_param_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_extra_param_init = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_extra_param_term = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook12 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook23 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_salt_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_build_options = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_cache_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kern_type = module_kern_type; + module_ctx->module_kern_type_dynamic = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_opti_type = module_opti_type; + module_ctx->module_opts_type = module_opts_type; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_nocomp = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_custom_check = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_keep_all_hashes = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pwdump_column = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_type = module_salt_type; + module_ctx->module_separator = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_st_hash = module_st_hash; + module_ctx->module_st_pass = module_st_pass; + module_ctx->module_tmp_size = module_tmp_size; + module_ctx->module_unstable_warning = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_warmup_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; +} diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m33100.pm b/tools/test_modules/m33100.pm new file mode 100755 index 000000000..499eddd12 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/test_modules/m33100.pm @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +## +## Author......: See docs/credits.txt +## License.....: MIT +## + +use strict; +use warnings; + +use Digest::SHA qw (hmac_sha1); +use Crypt::Mode::CBC; +use Crypt::PBKDF2; + +sub byte2hex +{ + my $input = shift; + return unpack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub hex2byte +{ + my $input = shift; + return pack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub pad +{ + my $n = shift; + my $size = shift; + + return (~$n + 1) & ($size - 1); +} + +sub module_constraints { [[0, 256], [16, 16], [-1, -1], [-1, -1], [-1, -1]] } + +sub module_generate_hash +{ + my $word = shift; + my $salt = shift; + my $user = shift // "user"; + my $realm = shift // "example.com"; + my $checksum = shift; + my $edata2 = shift; + + my $mysalt = uc $realm; + $mysalt = $mysalt . $user; + + # first we generate the 'seed' + my $iter = 4096; + my $pbkdf2 = Crypt::PBKDF2->new + ( + hash_class => 'HMACSHA1', + iterations => $iter, + output_len => 16 + ); + + my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word); + + # we can precompute this + my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte ('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93'); + + my $b_iv = hex2byte ('0' x 32); + + # 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ki' (for final hmac-sha1) + # and 'ke' (AES key to decrypt/encrypt the ticket) + my $cbc = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ('AES', 0); + my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv); + + # precomputed stuff + my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte ('6b60b0582a6ba80d5aad56ab55406ad5'); + my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte ('be349a4d24be500eaf57abd5ea80757a'); + + my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + my $b_ke = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded2, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + my $cleartext_ticket = '7981df3081dca01b3019a003020111a1120410e2aa1c894df7'. + '23b7277eef29700bf760a11c301a3018a003020100a111180f32303233303333313132303'. + '434355aa20602041d9d970ba311180f32303337303931343032343830355aa40703050040'. + 'c10000a511180f32303233303333313132303434355aa611180f323032333033333131323'. + '03434355aa711180f32303233303333313232303434355aa811180f323032333034303731'. + '32303434355aa90d1b0b4558414d504c452e434f4daa20301ea003020102a11730151b066'. + 'b72627467741b0b6578616d706c652e636f6d'; + + if (defined $edata2) + { + my $len_last_block = length ($edata2) % 32; + + my $tmp = $len_last_block + 32; + + my $b_truncated_enc_ticket = hex2byte (substr $edata2, 0, -$tmp); + + my $b_last_block = hex2byte (substr $edata2, -$len_last_block); + + my $b_n_1_block = hex2byte (substr (substr ($edata2, -$tmp), 0, 32)); + + my $b_truncated_ticket_decrypted = $cbc->decrypt ($b_truncated_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $truncated_ticket_decrypted = byte2hex ($b_truncated_ticket_decrypted); + + my $check_correct = ((substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7981" || substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7a81") && (substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 22, 2) eq "30")) || + ((substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 2) eq "79" || substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 2) eq "7a") && (substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 20, 2) eq "30")) || + ((substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7982" || substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7a82") && (substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 24, 2) eq "30")); + + if ($check_correct == 1) + { + my $b_n_2 = substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, -16; + + my $b_n_1_decrypted = $cbc->decrypt ($b_n_1_block, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_last_plain = substr $b_n_1_decrypted, 0, $len_last_block / 2; + + $b_last_plain = $b_last_plain ^ $b_last_block; + + my $omitted = substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block / 2); + + my $b_n_1 = $b_last_block . $omitted; + + $b_n_1 = $cbc->decrypt ($b_n_1, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + $b_n_1 = $b_n_1 ^ $b_n_2; + + my $b_cleartext_ticket = $b_truncated_ticket_decrypted . $b_n_1 . $b_last_plain; + + $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex ($b_cleartext_ticket); + } + else # validation failed + { + # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end + #up with false positives all the time) + $cleartext_ticket = "0" x (length ($cleartext_ticket) + 32); + } + } + + if (defined $checksum) + { + $checksum = pack ("H*", $checksum); + } + else + { + if (!defined $edata2) + { + my $nonce = unpack ("H*", random_bytes (16)); + + $cleartext_ticket = $nonce . $cleartext_ticket; + } + # we have what is required to compute checksum + $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki); + + $checksum = substr $checksum, 0, 12; + } + + my $len_cleartext_last_block = length ($cleartext_ticket) % 32; + my $cleartext_last_block = substr $cleartext_ticket, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $padding = pad (length ($cleartext_ticket), 32); + + my $b_cleartext_last_block_padded = hex2byte ($cleartext_last_block . '0' x $padding); + + # we will encrypt until n-1 block (included) + my $truncated_cleartext_ticket = substr $cleartext_ticket, 0, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $b_truncated_enc_ticket = $cbc->encrypt (hex2byte ($truncated_cleartext_ticket), $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block= substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, -16; + + my $b_enc_last_block = substr $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block, 0, $len_cleartext_last_block / 2; + + # we now craft the new n-1 block + my $tmp = $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block ^ $b_cleartext_last_block_padded; + + $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block = $cbc->encrypt ($tmp, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + $tmp = substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, 0, -16; + + $edata2 = $tmp . $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block . $b_enc_last_block; + + my $tmp_hash = sprintf ('$krb5asrep$17$%s$%s$%s$%s', $user, $realm, unpack ("H*", $checksum), unpack ("H*", $edata2)); + + return $tmp_hash; +} + +sub module_verify_hash +{ + my $line = shift; + + my ($hash, $word) = split (':', $line); + + return unless defined $hash; + return unless defined $word; + + my @data = split ('\$', $hash); + + return unless scalar @data == 7; + + shift @data; + + my $signature = shift @data; + my $algorithm = shift @data; + my $user = shift @data; + my $realm = shift @data; + my $checksum = shift @data; + my $edata2 = shift @data; + + return unless ($signature eq "krb5asrep"); + return unless ($algorithm eq "17"); + return unless (length ($checksum) == 24); + return unless (length ($edata2) >= 64); + + my $word_packed = pack_if_HEX_notation ($word); + + my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed, undef, $user, $realm, $checksum, $edata2); + + return ($new_hash, $word); +} + +1; diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m33200.pm b/tools/test_modules/m33200.pm new file mode 100755 index 000000000..6a3710621 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/test_modules/m33200.pm @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +## +## Author......: See docs/credits.txt +## License.....: MIT +## + +use strict; +use warnings; + +use Digest::SHA qw (hmac_sha1); +use Crypt::Mode::CBC; +use Crypt::PBKDF2; + +sub byte2hex +{ + my $input = shift; + return unpack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub hex2byte +{ + my $input = shift; + return pack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub pad +{ + my $n = shift; + my $size = shift; + + return (~$n + 1) & ($size - 1); +} + +sub module_constraints { [[0, 256], [16, 16], [-1, -1], [-1, -1], [-1, -1]] } + +sub module_generate_hash +{ + my $word = shift; + my $salt = shift; + my $user = shift // "user"; + my $realm = shift // "example.com"; + my $checksum = shift; + my $edata2 = shift; + + my $mysalt = uc $realm; + $mysalt = $mysalt . $user; + + # first we generate the 'seed' + my $iter = 4096; + my $pbkdf2 = Crypt::PBKDF2->new + ( + hash_class => 'HMACSHA1', + iterations => $iter, + output_len => 32 + ); + + my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word); + + # we can precompute this + my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte ('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93'); + + my $b_iv = hex2byte ('0' x 32); + + # 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ki' (for final hmac-sha1) + # and 'ke' (AES key to decrypt/encrypt the ticket) + my $cbc = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ('AES', 0); + my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv); + + $b_key_bytes = $b_key_bytes . $cbc->encrypt ($b_key_bytes, $b_seed, $b_iv); + + # precomputed stuff + my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte ('6b60b0582a6ba80d5aad56ab55406ad5'); + my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte ('be349a4d24be500eaf57abd5ea80757a'); + + my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + $b_ki = $b_ki . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ki, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + my $b_ke = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded2, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + $b_ke = $b_ke . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ke, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + my $cleartext_ticket = '7981ef3081eca02b3029a003020112a12204200e97d1626616'. + '6e06252cbec52003e0f6b4f0280deec6dc58cdbf39845d6f0e77a11c301a3018a00302010'. + '0a111180f32303233303331363135353732315aa20602045b66ac3ea311180f3230333730'. + '3931343032343830355aa40703050050c10000a511180f323032333033313631353537323'. + '15aa611180f32303233303331363135353732315aa711180f323032333033313730313537'. + '32315aa811180f32303233303331373135353732315aa90d1b0b4558414d504c452e434f4'. + 'daa20301ea003020101a11730151b066b72627467741b0b4558414d504c452e434f4d'; + + if (defined $edata2) + { + my $len_last_block = length ($edata2) % 32; + + my $tmp = $len_last_block + 32; + + my $b_truncated_enc_ticket = hex2byte (substr $edata2, 0, -$tmp); + + my $b_last_block = hex2byte (substr $edata2, -$len_last_block); + + my $b_n_1_block = hex2byte (substr (substr ($edata2, -$tmp), 0, 32)); + + my $b_truncated_ticket_decrypted = $cbc->decrypt ($b_truncated_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $truncated_ticket_decrypted = byte2hex ($b_truncated_ticket_decrypted); + + my $check_correct = ((substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7981" || substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7a81") && (substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 22, 2) eq "30")) || + ((substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 2) eq "79" || substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 2) eq "7a") && (substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 20, 2) eq "30")) || + ((substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7982" || substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 16, 4) eq "7a82") && (substr ($truncated_ticket_decrypted, 24, 2) eq "30")); + + if ($check_correct == 1) + { + my $b_n_2 = substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, -16; + + my $b_n_1_decrypted = $cbc->decrypt ($b_n_1_block, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_last_plain = substr $b_n_1_decrypted, 0, $len_last_block / 2; + + $b_last_plain = $b_last_plain ^ $b_last_block; + + my $omitted = substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block / 2); + + my $b_n_1 = $b_last_block . $omitted; + + $b_n_1 = $cbc->decrypt ($b_n_1, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + $b_n_1 = $b_n_1 ^ $b_n_2; + + my $b_cleartext_ticket = $b_truncated_ticket_decrypted . $b_n_1 . $b_last_plain; + + $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex ($b_cleartext_ticket); + } + else # validation failed + { + # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end + #up with false positives all the time) + $cleartext_ticket = "0" x (length ($cleartext_ticket) + 32); + } + } + + if (defined $checksum) + { + $checksum = pack ("H*", $checksum); + } + else + { + if (!defined $edata2) + { + my $nonce = unpack ("H*", random_bytes (16)); + + $cleartext_ticket = $nonce . $cleartext_ticket; + } + # we have what is required to compute checksum + $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki); + + $checksum = substr $checksum, 0, 12; + } + + my $len_cleartext_last_block = length ($cleartext_ticket) % 32; + my $cleartext_last_block = substr $cleartext_ticket, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $padding = pad (length ($cleartext_ticket), 32); + + my $b_cleartext_last_block_padded = hex2byte ($cleartext_last_block . '0' x $padding); + + # we will encrypt until n-1 block (included) + my $truncated_cleartext_ticket = substr $cleartext_ticket, 0, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $b_truncated_enc_ticket = $cbc->encrypt (hex2byte ($truncated_cleartext_ticket), $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block= substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, -16; + + my $b_enc_last_block = substr $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block, 0, $len_cleartext_last_block / 2; + + # we now craft the new n-1 block + my $tmp = $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block ^ $b_cleartext_last_block_padded; + + $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block = $cbc->encrypt ($tmp, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + $tmp = substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, 0, -16; + + $edata2 = $tmp . $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block . $b_enc_last_block; + + my $tmp_hash = sprintf ('$krb5asrep$18$%s$%s$%s$%s', $user, $realm, unpack ("H*", $checksum), unpack ("H*", $edata2)); + + return $tmp_hash; +} + +sub module_verify_hash +{ + my $line = shift; + + my ($hash, $word) = split (':', $line); + + return unless defined $hash; + return unless defined $word; + + my @data = split ('\$', $hash); + + return unless scalar @data == 7; + + shift @data; + + my $signature = shift @data; + my $algorithm = shift @data; + my $user = shift @data; + my $realm = shift @data; + my $checksum = shift @data; + my $edata2 = shift @data; + + return unless ($signature eq "krb5asrep"); + return unless ($algorithm eq "18"); + return unless (length ($checksum) == 24); + return unless (length ($edata2) >= 64); + + my $word_packed = pack_if_HEX_notation ($word); + + my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed, undef, $user, $realm, $checksum, $edata2); + + return ($new_hash, $word); +} + +1;