diff --git a/OpenCL/inc_ecc_secp256k1.cl b/OpenCL/inc_ecc_secp256k1.cl
index bd583b976..e21f528d6 100644
--- a/OpenCL/inc_ecc_secp256k1.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/inc_ecc_secp256k1.cl
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ DECLSPEC void point_mul_xy (u32 *x1, u32 *y1, const u32 *k, GLOBAL_AS const secp
 {
   u32 naf[SECP256K1_NAF_SIZE] = { 0 };
   int loop_start = convert_to_window_naf(naf, k);
-  
+
   // first set:
 
   const u32 multiplier = (naf[loop_start >> 3] >> ((loop_start & 7) << 2)) & 0x0f; // or use u8 ?
@@ -1973,7 +1973,7 @@ DECLSPEC void point_mul_xy (u32 *x1, u32 *y1, const u32 *k, GLOBAL_AS const secp
 
   mul_mod (z1, z2, z1); // z1^3
   mul_mod (y1, y1, z1); // y1_affine
-  
+
   // return values are already in x1 and y1
 }
 
diff --git a/OpenCL/m03500_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m03500_a0-pure.cl
index 582bce969..6e0332968 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m03500_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m03500_a0-pure.cl
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m03500_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES ())
 
   /**
    * base
-   */ 
+   */
 
   COPY_PW (pws[gid]);
 
diff --git a/OpenCL/m05000_a0-optimized.cl b/OpenCL/m05000_a0-optimized.cl
index d3615bd2c..8956f7db7 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m05000_a0-optimized.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m05000_a0-optimized.cl
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * Author......: See docs/credits.txt
  * License.....: MIT
- */ 
+ */
 
 #define NEW_SIMD_CODE
 
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14511_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14511_a0-pure.cl
index 52189158e..52ff108fc 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14511_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14511_a0-pure.cl
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14511_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       ctx.w0[0] = 0x41000000;
 
       ctx.len = 1;
-      
+
       sha1_update_swap (&ctx, w, w_len);
 
       sha1_final (&ctx);
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14512_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14512_a0-pure.cl
index 8e42b89fb..b33bf2065 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14512_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14512_a0-pure.cl
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14512_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14513_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14513_a0-pure.cl
index 2e7c9919b..a1acc0840 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14513_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14513_a0-pure.cl
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14513_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14522_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14522_a0-pure.cl
index de12209b9..ee781b89b 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14522_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14522_a0-pure.cl
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14522_a1-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14522_a1-pure.cl
index f94d62ffc..55b330afd 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14522_a1-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14522_a1-pure.cl
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_mxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_sxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14522_a3-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14522_a3-pure.cl
index d77dde0eb..016632a76 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14522_a3-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14522_a3-pure.cl
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_mxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_sxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14523_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14523_a0-pure.cl
index 5ded9cfbf..56e1d288d 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14523_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14523_a0-pure.cl
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14523_a1-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14523_a1-pure.cl
index 00daf2c86..9f4f10794 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14523_a1-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14523_a1-pure.cl
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_sxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14523_a3-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14523_a3-pure.cl
index bc4a95e24..373b29002 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14523_a3-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14523_a3-pure.cl
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_sxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14532_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14532_a0-pure.cl
index e643fc81c..5f51e9da9 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14532_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14532_a0-pure.cl
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14532_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);
diff --git a/OpenCL/m14553_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m14553_a0-pure.cl
index 98676a446..de6be29fd 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m14553_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m14553_a0-pure.cl
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14553_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);
diff --git a/OpenCL/m20720_a0-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m20720_a0-pure.cl
index ec288b26f..2ef382f20 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m20720_a0-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m20720_a0-pure.cl
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * License.....: MIT
  */
 
-//#define NEW_SIMD_CODE 
+//#define NEW_SIMD_CODE
 
 #ifdef KERNEL_STATIC
 #include "inc_vendor.h"
diff --git a/OpenCL/m24300_a3-optimized.cl b/OpenCL/m24300_a3-optimized.cl
index a641a98e5..0054891cd 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m24300_a3-optimized.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m24300_a3-optimized.cl
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ DECLSPEC void m24300m (u32 *w0, u32 *w1, u32 *w2, u32 *w3, const u32 pw_len, KER
     u32x wd_t = w3[1];
     u32x we_t = w3[2];
     u32x wf_t = pw_salt_len * 8;
-    
+
 
     u32x a = SHA1M_A;
     u32x b = SHA1M_B;
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ DECLSPEC void m24300s (u32 *w0, u32 *w1, u32 *w2, u32 *w3, const u32 pw_len, KER
     u32x wd_t = w3[1];
     u32x we_t = w3[2];
     u32x wf_t = pw_salt_len * 8;
-    
+
 
     u32x a = SHA1M_A;
     u32x b = SHA1M_B;
@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ DECLSPEC void m24300s (u32 *w0, u32 *w1, u32 *w2, u32 *w3, const u32 pw_len, KER
       wc_t = hc_swap32 (t3[0]);
       wd_t = hc_swap32 (t3[1]);
       we_t = hc_swap32 (t3[2]);
-      wf_t = hc_swap32 (t3[3]);     
+      wf_t = hc_swap32 (t3[3]);
 
       #undef K
       #define K SHA1C00
diff --git a/OpenCL/m25700_a0-optimized.cl b/OpenCL/m25700_a0-optimized.cl
index bbd9747e2..ef1050c0c 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m25700_a0-optimized.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m25700_a0-optimized.cl
@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ DECLSPEC u32 MurmurHash (const u32 seed, const u32 *w, const int pw_len)
     hash ^= hash >> R;
   }
 
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 10;
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 17;
 
   #undef M
diff --git a/OpenCL/m25700_a1-optimized.cl b/OpenCL/m25700_a1-optimized.cl
index 2d83f0cad..3996786dd 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m25700_a1-optimized.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m25700_a1-optimized.cl
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ DECLSPEC u32 MurmurHash (const u32 seed, const u32 *w, const int pw_len)
     hash ^= hash >> R;
   }
 
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 10;
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 17;
 
   #undef M
diff --git a/OpenCL/m25700_a3-optimized.cl b/OpenCL/m25700_a3-optimized.cl
index 2cc5455ee..783cf4fef 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m25700_a3-optimized.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m25700_a3-optimized.cl
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ DECLSPEC u32x MurmurHash_w0 (const u32 seed, const u32x w0, const u32 *w, const
     }
   }
 
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 10;
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 17;
 
   #undef M
diff --git a/OpenCL/m25900-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m25900-pure.cl
index 36ecd286a..56fe382e9 100644
--- a/OpenCL/m25900-pure.cl
+++ b/OpenCL/m25900-pure.cl
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25900_comp(KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT(pbkdf2_sha256_tmp_t, blocks_t))
   aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_cbc_iv, b1, yn, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
   aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_cbc_iv, b2, yn, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
   aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_cbc_iv, b3, yn, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
- 
+
   u32 nonce[4];
 
   nonce[0] = 0;
diff --git a/docs/hashcat-plugin-development-guide.md b/docs/hashcat-plugin-development-guide.md
index 86d9e3f3b..a4feb6e6e 100644
--- a/docs/hashcat-plugin-development-guide.md
+++ b/docs/hashcat-plugin-development-guide.md
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ This configuration item is a bitmask field and is very similar to the module_opt
 * OPTS_TYPE_COPY_TMPS: This option tells the hashcat host binary to copy the `tmps` data structure from the compute device to the host in case a hash was cracked. In order to access this data, you need to implement and register the module function module_build_plain_postprocess(). There are several scenarios in which this can be useful. For instance, if you have a weak algorithm that could be exploited to leak portions of the password and you use this leaked data to speed up your attacks, you still need to know the leaked data on the host to copy it to the password buffer before printing it to the user. A good example for this is PKZIP `src/modules/module_20510.c` which leaks the first 6 bytes of the password. Another scenario is the PIM brute force in VeraCrypt. The PIM in this case can be seen as an additional numeric password. In case we crack it, the user needs to know both the password and the PIM in order to mount the volume.
 * OPTS_TYPE_POTFILE_NOPASS: This option simply prevents the hashcat host binary from adding a cracked hash to the potfile. For instance, if a specific hashing algorithm is implemented with several hash formats and therefore your plugins hash format shares the same format with a different plugin hash format (think of it like a format clash where the potfile parser could not really decide if it is the correct hash format to accept). A good example is the WPA PMK, which cannot be used to login to a specific WPA network directly. There could be other reasons for not printing the cracked hashes to the potfile.
 * OPTS_TYPE_DYNAMIC_SHARED: This is a very special option which tells the hashcat host binary to query the real available shared memory on a device for a particular kernel. In addition it will also register the queried amount of shared memory from the host. On NVIDIA, this allows us to use the full available shared memory (regions in the post 48k range), though we still need to prepare the kernel in order to make use of the dynamic allocated shared memory. A good example is the bcrypt kernel `OpenCL/m03200-pure.cl`.
-* OPTS_TYPE_SELF_TEST_DISABLE: This option can be used if you want to disable the self-test functionality for your hash-mode. Valid reasons to disable this feature are: Your OpenCL kernel is using compile time optimizations such as fixed salts (like in DESCrypt), the hash primitive to be used has to be derived first from the target hash (like in JWT) or the hash-mode is so slow that it hurts startup time of hashcat (like in 	Ethereum Wallet SCRYPT). For the first two cases the problem is that hashcat would create a cached optimized OpenCL kernel with a configuration which is valid only for the self-test hash, but very likely the wrong ones for the real target hash. The real target hash would never crack.
+* OPTS_TYPE_SELF_TEST_DISABLE: This option can be used if you want to disable the self-test functionality for your hash-mode. Valid reasons to disable this feature are: Your OpenCL kernel is using compile time optimizations such as fixed salts (like in DESCrypt), the hash primitive to be used has to be derived first from the target hash (like in JWT) or the hash-mode is so slow that it hurts startup time of hashcat (like in Ethereum Wallet SCRYPT). For the first two cases the problem is that hashcat would create a cached optimized OpenCL kernel with a configuration which is valid only for the self-test hash, but very likely the wrong ones for the real target hash. The real target hash would never crack.
 * OPTS_TYPE_MP_MULTI_DISABLE: Do not multiply the kernel-accel with the multiprocessor count per device to allow more fine-tuned workload settings.
 * OPTS_TYPE_NATIVE_THREADS: Forces "native" thread count: CPU=1, GPU-Intel=8, GPU-AMD=64 (wavefront), GPU-NV=32 (warps). Does not override user-defined -u value.
 * OPTS_TYPE_POST_AMP_UTF16LE: Run the true UTF8 to UTF16LE conversion kernel after they have been processed from amplifiers. Works only for slow-hash kernels.
diff --git a/src/modules/module_24300.c b/src/modules/module_24300.c
index adced435e..14770ff33 100644
--- a/src/modules/module_24300.c
+++ b/src/modules/module_24300.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * Author......: See docs/credits.txt
  * License.....: MIT
- */ 
+ */
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "types.h"
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
 
   if (rc_tokenizer != PARSER_OK) return (rc_tokenizer);
 
-  const u8 *hash_pos = token.buf[0]; 
+  const u8 *hash_pos = token.buf[0];
 
   digest[0] = hex_to_u32 (hash_pos +  0);
   digest[1] = hex_to_u32 (hash_pos +  8);
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m01411.pm b/tools/test_modules/m01411.pm
index f1c495e4c..361935375 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m01411.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m01411.pm
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   my $signature    = substr ($hash, 0, 9);
   my $plain_base64 = substr ($hash, 9);
 
-  return unless ($signature eq "{SSHA256}"); 
+  return unless ($signature eq "{SSHA256}");
   return unless defined $plain_base64;
 
   # base64 decode to extract salt
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m15200.pm b/tools/test_modules/m15200.pm
index 5696a7424..76c0bcbc7 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m15200.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m15200.pm
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 "guid" : "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
 "sharedKey" : "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
 "options" : {"pbkdf2_iterations":$iterations,"fee_policy":0,"html5_notifications":false,"logout_time":600000,"tx_display":0,"always_keep_local_backup":false}|;
-  
+
   unless (defined $encrypted)
   {
     $encrypted = unpack ("H*", $cipher->encrypt ($data));
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m19800.pm b/tools/test_modules/m19800.pm
index 7c1fe550c..7fa282b75 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m19800.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m19800.pm
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   );
 
   my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word);
-  
+
   # we can precompute this
   my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte ('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93');
 
@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   # and 'ke' (AES key to decrypt/encrypt the ticket)
   my $cbc         = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ('AES', 0);
   my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv);
-  
+
   # precomputed stuff
   # nfold 0x0000000155 to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte ('5b582c160a5aa80556ab55aad5402ab5');
-  
+
   # nfold 0x00000001aa to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte ('ae2c160b04ad5006ab55aad56a80355a');
-  
+
   my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
 
 
@@ -98,36 +98,36 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
     # Pad the last block with last bytes from the decrypted n-1
     my $b_padded_enc_ticket = hex2byte ($enc_timestamp) . (substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block / 2));
-    
+
     # Swap the last two blocks
     my $b_cbc_enc_ticket = (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, 0, -32) . (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -16, 16).
     (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -32, 16);
-    
+
     # Decrypt and truncate
     my $b_dec_ticket_padded = $cbc->decrypt ($b_cbc_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv);
-    
+
     my $b_cleartext_ticket = substr $b_dec_ticket_padded, 0, length ($enc_timestamp) / 2;
 
     $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex ($b_cleartext_ticket);
-    
-    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") && 
+
+    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") &&
                           (substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 36, 1) eq "Z"));
 
     if ($check_correct == 1 && defined $checksum)
     {
       my $b_checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
-      
+
       $check_correct = ($checksum eq byte2hex (substr $b_checksum, 0, 12));
     }
   }
-  
+
   if ($check_correct != 1)
   {
     # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end
     #up with false positives all the time)
     $cleartext_ticket = '68c8459f3f10c851b8827118bb459c6e301aa011180f323031'.
 '32313131363134323835355aa10502030c28a2';
-  
+
     # we have what is required to compute checksum
     $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
 
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   return unless ($algorithm eq "17");
   return unless (length ($edata) >= 88);
   return unless (length ($edata) <= 112);
-  
+
   my $checksum  = substr $edata, -24;
   my $enc_timestamp    = substr $edata, 0, -24;
 
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m19900.pm b/tools/test_modules/m19900.pm
index ce58a7c03..5b8465bbf 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m19900.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m19900.pm
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   );
 
   my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word);
-  
+
   # we can precompute this
   my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte ('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93');
 
@@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv);
 
   $b_key_bytes = $b_key_bytes . $cbc->encrypt ($b_key_bytes, $b_seed, $b_iv);
-  
+
   # precomputed stuff
   # nfold 0x0000000155 to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte ('5b582c160a5aa80556ab55aad5402ab5');
-  
+
   # nfold 0x00000001aa to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte ('ae2c160b04ad5006ab55aad56a80355a');
-  
+
   my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
 
   $b_ki = $b_ki . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ki, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
@@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   my $b_ke = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded2, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
 
   $b_ke = $b_ke . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ke, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
-  
+
   my $cleartext_ticket = '';
   my $check_correct  = 0;
-  
+
   if (defined $enc_timestamp)
   {
     # Do CTS Decryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_stealing
@@ -103,42 +103,42 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
     # Pad the last block with last bytes from the decrypted n-1
     my $b_padded_enc_ticket = hex2byte ($enc_timestamp) . (substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block / 2));
-    
+
     # Swap the last two blocks
     my $b_cbc_enc_ticket = (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, 0, -32) . (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -16, 16).
     (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -32, 16);
-    
+
     # Decrypt and truncate
     my $b_dec_ticket_padded = $cbc->decrypt ($b_cbc_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv);
-    
+
     my $b_cleartext_ticket = substr $b_dec_ticket_padded, 0, length ($enc_timestamp) / 2;
 
     $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex ($b_cleartext_ticket);
-    
-    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") && 
+
+    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") &&
                           (substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 36, 1) eq "Z"));
 
     if ($check_correct == 1 && defined $checksum)
     {
       my $b_checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
-      
+
       $check_correct = ($checksum eq byte2hex (substr $b_checksum, 0, 12));
     }
   }
-  
+
   if ($check_correct != 1)
   {
     # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end
     #up with false positives all the time)
     $cleartext_ticket = '68c8459f3f10c851b8827118bb459c6e301aa011180f323031'.
 '32313131363134323835355aa10502030c28a2';
-  
+
     # we have what is required to compute checksum
     $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
 
     $checksum = byte2hex (substr $checksum, 0, 12);
   }
-    
+
   # CTS Encrypt our new block
   my $len_cleartext_last_block = length ($cleartext_ticket) % 32;
   my $cleartext_last_block = substr $cleartext_ticket, -$len_cleartext_last_block;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   return unless ($algorithm eq "18");
   return unless (length ($edata) >= 88);
   return unless (length ($edata) <= 112);
-  
+
   my $checksum  = substr $edata, -24;
   my $enc_timestamp    = substr $edata, 0, -24;
 
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m20200.pm b/tools/test_modules/m20200.pm
index baded5035..faadae9fa 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m20200.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m20200.pm
@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
   my $hash_buf = encode_base64 ($pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($salt, $word), '');
   my $salt_buf = encode_base64 ($salt, '');
-  
+
   # replace + with .
   $hash_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
-  
+
   # remove padding =
   $hash_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
-  
+
   my $hash = sprintf ("\$pbkdf2-sha512\$%i\$%s\$%s", $iter, $salt_buf, $hash_buf);
 
   return $hash;
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m20300.pm b/tools/test_modules/m20300.pm
index f2482334e..2299739b7 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m20300.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m20300.pm
@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
   my $hash_buf = encode_base64 ($pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($salt, $word), '');
   my $salt_buf = encode_base64 ($salt, '');
-  
+
   # replace + with .
   $hash_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
-  
+
   # remove padding =
   $hash_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
-  
+
   my $hash = sprintf ("\$pbkdf2-sha256\$%i\$%s\$%s", $iter, $salt_buf, $hash_buf);
 
   return $hash;
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m20400.pm b/tools/test_modules/m20400.pm
index 3502cbcf9..be2d09773 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m20400.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m20400.pm
@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
   my $hash_buf = encode_base64 ($pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($salt, $word), '');
   my $salt_buf = encode_base64 ($salt, '');
-  
+
   # replace + with .
   $hash_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
-  
+
   # remove padding =
   $hash_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
-  
+
   my $hash = sprintf ("\$pbkdf2\$%i\$%s\$%s", $iter, $salt_buf, $hash_buf);
 
   return $hash;
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m20600.pm b/tools/test_modules/m20600.pm
index e593b5e07..a5e27b52d 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m20600.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m20600.pm
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   return unless defined $iter;
   return unless defined $salt;
   return unless defined $word;
- 
+
   my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word, $salt, $iter);
 
   return ($new_hash, $word);
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m25400.pm b/tools/test_modules/m25400.pm
index 4eb3da227..424fa3a30 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m25400.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m25400.pm
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ sub pdf_compute_encryption_key_owner
   }
   else
   {
-	$o_key = substr($o_digest, 0, 16); #length is always 128 bits or 16 bytes
+  $o_key = substr($o_digest, 0, 16); #length is always 128 bits or 16 bytes
   }
   #printf("\$o_key = %s\n", unpack ("H*", $o_key));
 
diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m25900.pm b/tools/test_modules/m25900.pm
index a161f662f..968ed2689 100644
--- a/tools/test_modules/m25900.pm
+++ b/tools/test_modules/m25900.pm
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use Crypt::PBKDF2;
 use Crypt::Mode::CBC;
 use Crypt::Mode::ECB;
 
-# Details of the protocol design can be found in ISO 22510:2019 and 
+# Details of the protocol design can be found in ISO 22510:2019 and
 # application notes published by the KNX Association.
 
 # ETS 5 allows a maximum of 20 characters in a password.
@@ -22,17 +22,17 @@ sub module_constraints { [[0, 20], [2, 2], [-1, -1], [-1, -1], [-1, -1]] }
 sub device_authentication_code
 {
   my $password = shift;
-  
+
   my $pbkdf2 = Crypt::PBKDF2->new
   (
     hasher     => Crypt::PBKDF2->hasher_from_algorithm ("HMACSHA2", 256),
     iterations => 65536,
     output_len => 16
   );
-  
-  my $device_authentication_code = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ("device-authentication-code.1.secure.ip.knx.org", 
+
+  my $device_authentication_code = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ("device-authentication-code.1.secure.ip.knx.org",
                                                     $password);
-  
+
   return $device_authentication_code;
 }
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sub block_formatting
   my $blocks_unpadded = $associated_data_length . $associated_data;
   my $pad_len = int ((length ($blocks_unpadded) + 16 - 1) / 16) * 16;
   my $blocks_padded = $blocks_unpadded . "\0" x ($pad_len - length ($blocks_unpadded));
-  
+
   return $b0 . $blocks_padded;
 }
 
@@ -56,14 +56,14 @@ sub encrypt
   my $nonce = shift;
   my $key = shift;
   my $iv = "\0" x 16;
-  
+
   my $aes_cbc = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ("AES", 0);
-  my $ciphertext = $aes_cbc->encrypt ($blocks, $key, $iv); 
+  my $ciphertext = $aes_cbc->encrypt ($blocks, $key, $iv);
   my $y_n = substr ($ciphertext, length ($ciphertext) - 16, 16);
-  
+
   my $aes_ecb = Crypt::Mode::ECB->new ("AES", 0);
   my $s_0 = $aes_ecb->encrypt ($nonce, $key);
-  
+
   return $y_n ^ $s_0;
 }
 
@@ -72,72 +72,72 @@ sub generate_session_response_mac
   my $secure_session_identifier = shift;
   my $public_value_xor          = shift;
   my $key                       = shift;
-  
+
   # Constants used for the cryptography in Session_Response frames
   my $knx_ip_header = pack ("H*", "061009520038");
   my $b0            = pack ("H*", "00000000000000000000000000000000");
   my $nonce         = pack ("H*", "0000000000000000000000000000ff00");
-  
+
   my $associated_data = $knx_ip_header . $secure_session_identifier . $public_value_xor;
-  
+
   my $blocks = block_formatting ($b0, $associated_data);
-  
+
   return encrypt ($blocks, $nonce, $key);
 }
 
 sub module_generate_hash
 {
   my $word = shift;
-  
+
   # Parameters that would be found in the Session_Request and Session_Response frames
   my $secure_session_identifier = shift;
   my $public_value_xor          = shift // random_bytes (32);
-  
+
   my $device_authentication_code = device_authentication_code ($word);
 
   my $mac = generate_session_response_mac ($secure_session_identifier,
                                            $public_value_xor,
                                            $device_authentication_code);
-  
-  my $hash = sprintf ("\$knx-ip-secure-device-authentication-code\$*%s*%s*%s", 
+
+  my $hash = sprintf ("\$knx-ip-secure-device-authentication-code\$*%s*%s*%s",
                       unpack ("H*", $secure_session_identifier),
                       unpack ("H*", $public_value_xor),
                       unpack ("H*", $mac));
-  
+
   return $hash;
 }
 
 sub module_verify_hash
 {
   my $line = shift;
-  
+
   my ($hash, $word) = split (':', $line);
-  
+
   return unless defined $hash;
   return unless defined $word;
-  
+
   my @data = split ('\*', $hash);
-  
+
   return unless scalar (@data) == 4;
-  
+
   my $signature = shift @data;
-  
+
   return unless ($signature eq "\$knx-ip-secure-device-authentication-code\$");
-  
+
   my $secure_session_identifier = pack ("H*", shift @data); #  2 Bytes expected (using the "salt" for this purpose)
   my $public_value_xor          = pack ("H*", shift @data); # 32 Bytes expected (xor of client's and server's public value)
   my $mac                       = pack ("H*", shift @data); # 16 Bytes expected
-  
+
   return unless (length ($secure_session_identifier) == 2);
   return unless (length ($public_value_xor) == 32);
   return unless (length ($mac) == 16);
-  
+
   my $word_packed = pack_if_HEX_notation ($word);
-  
-  my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed, 
-                                       $secure_session_identifier, 
+
+  my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed,
+                                       $secure_session_identifier,
                                        $public_value_xor);
-  
+
   return ($new_hash, $word);
 }