Merge pull request #3687 from matrix/fix_26610

Fixed test module and cleanup implementation of MetaMask short (26610)
pull/3691/head^2
Jens Steube 1 year ago committed by GitHub
commit 8ae790bfb5
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23

@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
typedef struct pbkdf2_sha256_tmp
{
u32 ipad[8];
u32 opad[8];
u32 ipad[8];
u32 opad[8];
u32 dgst[32];
u32 out[32];
u32 dgst[32];
u32 out[32];
} pbkdf2_sha256_tmp_t;
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ typedef struct pbkdf2_sha256_aes_gcm
u32 salt_buf[64];
u32 iv_buf[4];
u32 iv_len;
u32 ct_buf[784]; // TODO this can be smaller and would speedup the attack, only 64 bytes of ciphertext are allowed
u32 ct_buf[16];
u32 ct_len;
} pbkdf2_sha256_aes_gcm_t;
@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m26610_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (pbkdf2_sha256_tmp_t, pbkdf2_sh
AES_GCM_decrypt (key, J0, ct, 32, pt, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
const int correct = is_valid_printable_32 (pt[0])
+ is_valid_printable_32 (pt[1])
+ is_valid_printable_32 (pt[2])

@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ static const u32 DGST_POS2 = 2;
static const u32 DGST_POS3 = 3;
static const u32 DGST_SIZE = DGST_SIZE_4_4;
static const u32 HASH_CATEGORY = HASH_CATEGORY_CRYPTOCURRENCY_WALLET;
// 22610 generates a decryption key based on a password-guess and uses that to AES-GCM decrypt the data decrypts
static const char *HASH_NAME = "MetaMask Wallet (short hash, plaintext check)";
static const u64 KERN_TYPE = 26610;
static const u32 OPTI_TYPE = OPTI_TYPE_ZERO_BYTE
@ -28,7 +27,6 @@ static const u64 OPTS_TYPE = OPTS_TYPE_STOCK_MODULE
| OPTS_TYPE_DEEP_COMP_KERNEL;
static const u32 SALT_TYPE = SALT_TYPE_EMBEDDED;
static const char *ST_PASS = "hashcat1";
// hash generated using with python3 tools/metamask2hashcat.py --vault tools/2hashcat_tests/metamask2hashcat.json --shortdata
static const char *ST_HASH = "$metamask-short$jfGI3TXguhb8GPnKSXFrMzRk2NCEc131Gt5G3kZr5+s=$h+BoIf2CQ5BEjaIOShFE7g==$R95fzGt4UQ0uwrcrVYnIi4UcSlWn9wlmer+//526ZDwYAp50K82F1u1oacYcdjjhuEvbZnWk/uBG00UkgLLlOw==";
u32 module_attack_exec (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ATTACK_EXEC; }
@ -48,11 +46,11 @@ const char *module_st_pass (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig,
typedef struct pbkdf2_sha256_tmp
{
u32 ipad[8];
u32 opad[8];
u32 ipad[8];
u32 opad[8];
u32 dgst[32];
u32 out[32];
u32 dgst[32];
u32 out[32];
} pbkdf2_sha256_tmp_t;
@ -61,7 +59,7 @@ typedef struct pbkdf2_sha256_aes_gcm
u32 salt_buf[64];
u32 iv_buf[4];
u32 iv_len;
u32 ct_buf[784]; // TODO this can be smaller and would speedup the attack, only 64 bytes of ciphertext are allowed
u32 ct_buf[16];
u32 ct_len;
} pbkdf2_sha256_aes_gcm_t;
@ -135,8 +133,6 @@ int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
pbkdf2_sha256_aes_gcm_t *metamask = (pbkdf2_sha256_aes_gcm_t *) esalt_buf;
#define CT_MAX_LEN_BASE64 (((3136+16) * 8) / 6) + 3 // TODO this can be smaller and would speedup the attack, only 64 bytes of ciphertext are allowed
hc_token_t token;
memset (&token, 0, sizeof (hc_token_t));
@ -161,8 +157,8 @@ int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
| TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_BASE64A;
token.sep[3] = '$';
token.len_min[3] = 32;
token.len_max[3] = 100; // TODO this can be smaller and would speedup the attack, only 64 bytes of ciphertext are allowed
token.len_min[3] = 88;
token.len_max[3] = 88;
token.attr[3] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH
| TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_BASE64A;
@ -170,10 +166,6 @@ int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
if (rc_tokenizer != PARSER_OK) return (rc_tokenizer);
u8 tmp_buf[CT_MAX_LEN_BASE64] = { 0 };
size_t tmp_len = 0;
// iter
salt->salt_iter = 10000 - 1;
@ -183,9 +175,11 @@ int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
const u8 *salt_pos = token.buf[1];
const int salt_len = token.len[1];
u8 tmp_buf[88+1];
memset (tmp_buf, 0, sizeof (tmp_buf));
tmp_len = base64_decode (base64_to_int, salt_pos, salt_len, tmp_buf);
size_t tmp_len = base64_decode (base64_to_int, salt_pos, salt_len, tmp_buf);
if (tmp_len != 32) return (PARSER_SALT_LENGTH);
@ -231,20 +225,23 @@ int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
tmp_len = base64_decode (base64_to_int, ct_pos, ct_len, tmp_buf);
if (tmp_len != 64) return (PARSER_CT_LENGTH);
memcpy ((u8 *) metamask->ct_buf, tmp_buf, tmp_len);
u32 j = tmp_len / 4;
if ((tmp_len % 4) > 0) j++;
for (u32 i = 0; i < j; i++) metamask->ct_buf[i] = byte_swap_32 (metamask->ct_buf[i]);
for (u32 i = 0; i < j; i++)
{
metamask->ct_buf[i] = byte_swap_32 (metamask->ct_buf[i]);
}
metamask->ct_len = tmp_len;
digest[0] = (metamask->ct_buf[0]);
digest[1] = (metamask->ct_buf[1]);
digest[2] = (metamask->ct_buf[2]);
digest[3] = (metamask->ct_buf[3]);
digest[0] = metamask->ct_buf[0];
digest[1] = metamask->ct_buf[1];
digest[2] = metamask->ct_buf[2];
digest[3] = metamask->ct_buf[3];
return (PARSER_OK);
}
@ -255,40 +252,42 @@ int module_hash_encode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
// salt
#define SALT_LEN_BASE64 ((32 * 8) / 6) + 3
#define IV_LEN_BASE64 ((16 * 8) / 6) + 3
#define CT_MAX_LEN_BASE64 (((3136+16) * 8) / 6) + 3 // TODO this can be much smaller now, probably 32 ?
u8 salt_buf[44+1];
u8 salt_buf[SALT_LEN_BASE64] = { 0 };
memset (salt_buf, 0, sizeof (salt_buf));
base64_encode (int_to_base64, (const u8 *) salt->salt_buf, (const int) salt->salt_len, salt_buf);
// iv
u32 tmp_iv_buf[4] = { 0 };
u32 tmp_iv_buf[4];
tmp_iv_buf[0] = byte_swap_32 (metamask->iv_buf[0]);
tmp_iv_buf[1] = byte_swap_32 (metamask->iv_buf[1]);
tmp_iv_buf[2] = byte_swap_32 (metamask->iv_buf[2]);
tmp_iv_buf[3] = byte_swap_32 (metamask->iv_buf[3]);
u8 iv_buf[IV_LEN_BASE64+1] = { 0 };
u8 iv_buf[24+1];
memset (iv_buf, 0, sizeof (iv_buf));
base64_encode (int_to_base64, (const u8 *) tmp_iv_buf, (const int) metamask->iv_len, iv_buf);
// ct
u32 ct_len = metamask->ct_len;
u32 tmp_buf[16];
u32 j = ct_len / 4;
memset (tmp_buf, 0, sizeof (tmp_buf));
if ((ct_len % 4) > 0) j++;
u32 ct_len = metamask->ct_len;
u32 tmp_buf[784] = { 0 }; // TODO this can be smaller and would speedup the attack, only 64 bytes of ciphertext are allowed
u32 j = ct_len / 4;
for (u32 i = 0; i < j; i++) tmp_buf[i] = byte_swap_32 (metamask->ct_buf[i]);
u8 ct_buf[CT_MAX_LEN_BASE64] = { 0 };
u8 ct_buf[88+1];
memset (ct_buf, 0, sizeof (ct_buf));
base64_encode (int_to_base64, (const u8 *) tmp_buf, (const int) metamask->ct_len, ct_buf);

@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ sub module_generate_hash
my $iv = shift // random_hex_string (32);
my $ct = shift;
my $ct_min_len = 30;
my $ct_max_len = 64;
my $kdf = Crypt::PBKDF2->new
(
hasher => Crypt::PBKDF2->hasher_from_algorithm ('HMACSHA2', 256),
@ -31,34 +28,18 @@ sub module_generate_hash
output_len => 32
);
my $ct_len = 64;
my $salt_bin = pack ("H*", $salt);
my $key = $kdf->PBKDF2 ($salt_bin, $word);
my $iv_bin = pack ("H*", $iv);
my $pt;
if (defined $ct)
{
my $ct_bin = pack ("H*", $ct);
my $data_bin = $ct_bin;
my $aes = Crypt::AuthEnc::GCM->new ("AES", $key, $iv_bin);
my $pt = "[{\"type\":\"HD Key Tree\",\"data\":{\"mnemonic\":[112,97,121,109,101,110,116,32,117,112,115,101,116,32,109,101,116,97,108,32,99,104,97,112,116,101,114,32,114,117,110,32,97,100,109,105,116,32,109,101,97,115,117,114,101,32,114,101,109,105,110,100,32,115,117,112,112,108,121,32,104,111,112,101,32,101,110,101,109,121,32,104,101,100,103,101,104,111,103],\"numberOfAccounts\":1,\"hdPath\":\"m/44'/60'/0'/0\"}}]";
$pt = $aes->decrypt_add ($data_bin);
}
else
{
# generate plaintext
# TODO now the data is all ASCII 'a', would be better to have it mimic the same structure as the reference data:
# [{"type":"HD Key Tree","data":{"mnemonic":[112,97,121,109,101,110,116,32,117,112,115,101,116,32,109,101,116,97,108,32,99,104,97,112,116,101,114,32,114,117,110,32,97,100,109,105,116,32,109,101,97,115,117,114,101,32,114,101,109,105,110,100,32,115,117,112,112,108,121,32,104,111,112,101,32,101,110,101,109,121,32,104,101,100,103,101,104,111,103],"numberOfAccounts":1,"hdPath":"m/44'/60'/0'/0"}}]
# generated from tools/2hashcat_tests/metamask2hashcat-test.py
$pt = "a" x ($ct_min_len + int (rand ($ct_max_len - $ct_min_len)) + 1);
}
$pt = substr ($pt, 0, $ct_len);
my $aes = Crypt::AuthEnc::GCM->new ("AES", $key, $iv_bin);
@ -80,7 +61,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
my $hash = substr ($line, 0, $idx);
my $word = substr ($line, $idx + 1);
return unless substr ($hash, 0, 10) eq '$metamask-short$';
return unless substr ($hash, 0, 16) eq '$metamask-short$';
my (undef, $signature, $salt, $iv, $ct) = split '\$', $hash;
@ -95,12 +76,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
return unless length $salt_bin == 32;
return unless length $iv_bin == 16;
my $ct_len = length ($ct_bin);
my $ct_min_len = 30;
my $ct_max_len = 3136;
return unless ($ct_len >= $ct_min_len && $ct_len <= $ct_max_len);
return unless length $ct_bin == 64;
my $word_packed = pack_if_HEX_notation ($word);

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