minor whitespace fixes, per #2841

OpenCL/inc_ecc_secp256k1.cl

@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ DECLSPEC void point_mul_xy (u32 *x1, u32 *y1, const u32 *k, GLOBAL_AS const secp
 {
   u32 naf[SECP256K1_NAF_SIZE] = { 0 };
   int loop_start = convert_to_window_naf(naf, k);
-  
+
   // first set:
 
   const u32 multiplier = (naf[loop_start >> 3] >> ((loop_start & 7) << 2)) & 0x0f; // or use u8 ?
@@ -1973,7 +1973,7 @@ DECLSPEC void point_mul_xy (u32 *x1, u32 *y1, const u32 *k, GLOBAL_AS const secp
 
   mul_mod (z1, z2, z1); // z1^3
   mul_mod (y1, y1, z1); // y1_affine
-  
+
   // return values are already in x1 and y1
 }
 

OpenCL/m03500_a0-pure.cl

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m03500_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES ())
 
   /**
    * base
-   */ 
+   */
 
   COPY_PW (pws[gid]);
 

OpenCL/m05000_a0-optimized.cl

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * Author......: See docs/credits.txt
  * License.....: MIT
- */ 
+ */
 
 #define NEW_SIMD_CODE
 

OpenCL/m14511_a0-pure.cl

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14511_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       ctx.w0[0] = 0x41000000;
 
       ctx.len = 1;
-      
+
       sha1_update_swap (&ctx, w, w_len);
 
       sha1_final (&ctx);

OpenCL/m14512_a0-pure.cl

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14512_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);

OpenCL/m14513_a0-pure.cl

@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14513_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);

OpenCL/m14522_a0-pure.cl

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT

OpenCL/m14522_a1-pure.cl

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_mxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_sxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT

OpenCL/m14522_a3-pure.cl

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_mxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14522_sxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT

OpenCL/m14523_a0-pure.cl

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_sxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT

OpenCL/m14523_a1-pure.cl

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_sxx (KERN_ATTR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT

OpenCL/m14523_a3-pure.cl

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_mxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14523_sxx (KERN_ATTR_VECTOR_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[0],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[1],
       salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[2],
-      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3] 
+      salt_bufs[SALT_POS].salt_buf[3]
     };
 
     // CT

OpenCL/m14532_a0-pure.cl

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14532_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);

OpenCL/m14553_a0-pure.cl

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m14553_mxx (KERN_ATTR_RULES_ESALT (cryptoapi_t))
     }
 
     // key
-    
+
     u32 ukey[8] = { 0 };
 
     ukey[0] = hc_swap32_S (k0);

OpenCL/m20720_a0-pure.cl

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * License.....: MIT
  */
 
-//#define NEW_SIMD_CODE 
+//#define NEW_SIMD_CODE
 
 #ifdef KERNEL_STATIC
 #include "inc_vendor.h"

OpenCL/m24300_a3-optimized.cl

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ DECLSPEC void m24300m (u32 *w0, u32 *w1, u32 *w2, u32 *w3, const u32 pw_len, KER
     u32x wd_t = w3[1];
     u32x we_t = w3[2];
     u32x wf_t = pw_salt_len * 8;
-    
+
 
     u32x a = SHA1M_A;
     u32x b = SHA1M_B;
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ DECLSPEC void m24300s (u32 *w0, u32 *w1, u32 *w2, u32 *w3, const u32 pw_len, KER
     u32x wd_t = w3[1];
     u32x we_t = w3[2];
     u32x wf_t = pw_salt_len * 8;
-    
+
 
     u32x a = SHA1M_A;
     u32x b = SHA1M_B;
@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ DECLSPEC void m24300s (u32 *w0, u32 *w1, u32 *w2, u32 *w3, const u32 pw_len, KER
       wc_t = hc_swap32 (t3[0]);
       wd_t = hc_swap32 (t3[1]);
       we_t = hc_swap32 (t3[2]);
-      wf_t = hc_swap32 (t3[3]);     
+      wf_t = hc_swap32 (t3[3]);
 
       #undef K
       #define K SHA1C00

OpenCL/m25700_a0-optimized.cl

@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ DECLSPEC u32 MurmurHash (const u32 seed, const u32 *w, const int pw_len)
     hash ^= hash >> R;
   }
 
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 10;
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 17;
 
   #undef M

OpenCL/m25700_a1-optimized.cl

@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ DECLSPEC u32 MurmurHash (const u32 seed, const u32 *w, const int pw_len)
     hash ^= hash >> R;
   }
 
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 10;
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 17;
 
   #undef M

OpenCL/m25700_a3-optimized.cl

@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ DECLSPEC u32x MurmurHash_w0 (const u32 seed, const u32x w0, const u32 *w, const
     }
   }
 
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 10;
-	hash *= M;
+  hash *= M;
   hash ^= hash >> 17;
 
   #undef M

OpenCL/m25900-pure.cl

@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ KERNEL_FQ void m25900_comp(KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT(pbkdf2_sha256_tmp_t, blocks_t))
   aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_cbc_iv, b1, yn, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
   aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_cbc_iv, b2, yn, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
   aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_cbc_iv, b3, yn, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4);
- 
+
   u32 nonce[4];
 
   nonce[0] = 0;

src/modules/module_24300.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * Author......: See docs/credits.txt
  * License.....: MIT
- */ 
+ */
 
 #include "common.h"
 #include "types.h"
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSE
 
   if (rc_tokenizer != PARSER_OK) return (rc_tokenizer);
 
-  const u8 *hash_pos = token.buf[0]; 
+  const u8 *hash_pos = token.buf[0];
 
   digest[0] = hex_to_u32 (hash_pos +  0);
   digest[1] = hex_to_u32 (hash_pos +  8);

tools/test_modules/m01411.pm

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   my $signature    = substr ($hash, 0, 9);
   my $plain_base64 = substr ($hash, 9);
 
-  return unless ($signature eq "{SSHA256}"); 
+  return unless ($signature eq "{SSHA256}");
   return unless defined $plain_base64;
 
   # base64 decode to extract salt

tools/test_modules/m15200.pm

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 "guid" : "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
 "sharedKey" : "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
 "options" : {"pbkdf2_iterations":$iterations,"fee_policy":0,"html5_notifications":false,"logout_time":600000,"tx_display":0,"always_keep_local_backup":false}|;
-  
+
   unless (defined $encrypted)
   {
     $encrypted = unpack ("H*", $cipher->encrypt ($data));

tools/test_modules/m19800.pm

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   );
 
   my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word);
-  
+
   # we can precompute this
   my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte ('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93');
 
@@ -68,14 +68,14 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   # and 'ke' (AES key to decrypt/encrypt the ticket)
   my $cbc         = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ('AES', 0);
   my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv);
-  
+
   # precomputed stuff
   # nfold 0x0000000155 to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte ('5b582c160a5aa80556ab55aad5402ab5');
-  
+
   # nfold 0x00000001aa to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte ('ae2c160b04ad5006ab55aad56a80355a');
-  
+
   my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
 
 
@@ -98,36 +98,36 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
     # Pad the last block with last bytes from the decrypted n-1
     my $b_padded_enc_ticket = hex2byte ($enc_timestamp) . (substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block / 2));
-    
+
     # Swap the last two blocks
     my $b_cbc_enc_ticket = (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, 0, -32) . (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -16, 16).
     (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -32, 16);
-    
+
     # Decrypt and truncate
     my $b_dec_ticket_padded = $cbc->decrypt ($b_cbc_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv);
-    
+
     my $b_cleartext_ticket = substr $b_dec_ticket_padded, 0, length ($enc_timestamp) / 2;
 
     $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex ($b_cleartext_ticket);
-    
+
-    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") && 
+    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") &&
                           (substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 36, 1) eq "Z"));
 
     if ($check_correct == 1 && defined $checksum)
     {
       my $b_checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
-      
+
       $check_correct = ($checksum eq byte2hex (substr $b_checksum, 0, 12));
     }
   }
-  
+
   if ($check_correct != 1)
   {
     # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end
     #up with false positives all the time)
     $cleartext_ticket = '68c8459f3f10c851b8827118bb459c6e301aa011180f323031'.
 '32313131363134323835355aa10502030c28a2';
-  
+
     # we have what is required to compute checksum
     $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
 
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   return unless ($algorithm eq "17");
   return unless (length ($edata) >= 88);
   return unless (length ($edata) <= 112);
-  
+
   my $checksum  = substr $edata, -24;
   my $enc_timestamp    = substr $edata, 0, -24;
 

tools/test_modules/m19900.pm

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   );
 
   my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word);
-  
+
   # we can precompute this
   my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte ('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93');
 
@@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv);
 
   $b_key_bytes = $b_key_bytes . $cbc->encrypt ($b_key_bytes, $b_seed, $b_iv);
-  
+
   # precomputed stuff
   # nfold 0x0000000155 to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte ('5b582c160a5aa80556ab55aad5402ab5');
-  
+
   # nfold 0x00000001aa to 16 bytes
   my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte ('ae2c160b04ad5006ab55aad56a80355a');
-  
+
   my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
 
   $b_ki = $b_ki . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ki, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
@@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ sub module_generate_hash
   my $b_ke = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded2, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
 
   $b_ke = $b_ke . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ke, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv);
-  
+
   my $cleartext_ticket = '';
   my $check_correct  = 0;
-  
+
   if (defined $enc_timestamp)
   {
     # Do CTS Decryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_stealing
@@ -103,42 +103,42 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
     # Pad the last block with last bytes from the decrypted n-1
     my $b_padded_enc_ticket = hex2byte ($enc_timestamp) . (substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block / 2));
-    
+
     # Swap the last two blocks
     my $b_cbc_enc_ticket = (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, 0, -32) . (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -16, 16).
     (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -32, 16);
-    
+
     # Decrypt and truncate
     my $b_dec_ticket_padded = $cbc->decrypt ($b_cbc_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv);
-    
+
     my $b_cleartext_ticket = substr $b_dec_ticket_padded, 0, length ($enc_timestamp) / 2;
 
     $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex ($b_cleartext_ticket);
-    
+
-    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") && 
+    my $check_correct  = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") &&
                           (substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 36, 1) eq "Z"));
 
     if ($check_correct == 1 && defined $checksum)
     {
       my $b_checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
-      
+
       $check_correct = ($checksum eq byte2hex (substr $b_checksum, 0, 12));
     }
   }
-  
+
   if ($check_correct != 1)
   {
     # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end
     #up with false positives all the time)
     $cleartext_ticket = '68c8459f3f10c851b8827118bb459c6e301aa011180f323031'.
 '32313131363134323835355aa10502030c28a2';
-  
+
     # we have what is required to compute checksum
     $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte ($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki);
 
     $checksum = byte2hex (substr $checksum, 0, 12);
   }
-    
+
   # CTS Encrypt our new block
   my $len_cleartext_last_block = length ($cleartext_ticket) % 32;
   my $cleartext_last_block = substr $cleartext_ticket, -$len_cleartext_last_block;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   return unless ($algorithm eq "18");
   return unless (length ($edata) >= 88);
   return unless (length ($edata) <= 112);
-  
+
   my $checksum  = substr $edata, -24;
   my $enc_timestamp    = substr $edata, 0, -24;
 

tools/test_modules/m20200.pm

@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
   my $hash_buf = encode_base64 ($pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($salt, $word), '');
   my $salt_buf = encode_base64 ($salt, '');
-  
+
   # replace + with .
   $hash_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
-  
+
   # remove padding =
   $hash_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
-  
+
   my $hash = sprintf ("\$pbkdf2-sha512\$%i\$%s\$%s", $iter, $salt_buf, $hash_buf);
 
   return $hash;

tools/test_modules/m20300.pm

@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
   my $hash_buf = encode_base64 ($pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($salt, $word), '');
   my $salt_buf = encode_base64 ($salt, '');
-  
+
   # replace + with .
   $hash_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
-  
+
   # remove padding =
   $hash_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
-  
+
   my $hash = sprintf ("\$pbkdf2-sha256\$%i\$%s\$%s", $iter, $salt_buf, $hash_buf);
 
   return $hash;

tools/test_modules/m20400.pm

@@ -32,15 +32,15 @@ sub module_generate_hash
 
   my $hash_buf = encode_base64 ($pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($salt, $word), '');
   my $salt_buf = encode_base64 ($salt, '');
-  
+
   # replace + with .
   $hash_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\+/\./g;
-  
+
   # remove padding =
   $hash_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
   $salt_buf =~ s/\=+$//;
-  
+
   my $hash = sprintf ("\$pbkdf2\$%i\$%s\$%s", $iter, $salt_buf, $hash_buf);
 
   return $hash;

tools/test_modules/m20600.pm

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sub module_verify_hash
   return unless defined $iter;
   return unless defined $salt;
   return unless defined $word;
- 
+
   my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word, $salt, $iter);
 
   return ($new_hash, $word);

tools/test_modules/m25400.pm

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ sub pdf_compute_encryption_key_owner
   }
   else
   {
-	$o_key = substr($o_digest, 0, 16); #length is always 128 bits or 16 bytes
+  $o_key = substr($o_digest, 0, 16); #length is always 128 bits or 16 bytes
   }
   #printf("\$o_key = %s\n", unpack ("H*", $o_key));
 

tools/test_modules/m25900.pm

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use Crypt::PBKDF2;
 use Crypt::Mode::CBC;
 use Crypt::Mode::ECB;
 
-# Details of the protocol design can be found in ISO 22510:2019 and 
+# Details of the protocol design can be found in ISO 22510:2019 and
 # application notes published by the KNX Association.
 
 # ETS 5 allows a maximum of 20 characters in a password.
@@ -22,17 +22,17 @@ sub module_constraints { [[0, 20], [2, 2], [-1, -1], [-1, -1], [-1, -1]] }
 sub device_authentication_code
 {
   my $password = shift;
-  
+
   my $pbkdf2 = Crypt::PBKDF2->new
   (
     hasher     => Crypt::PBKDF2->hasher_from_algorithm ("HMACSHA2", 256),
     iterations => 65536,
     output_len => 16
   );
-  
+
-  my $device_authentication_code = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ("device-authentication-code.1.secure.ip.knx.org", 
+  my $device_authentication_code = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ("device-authentication-code.1.secure.ip.knx.org",
                                                     $password);
-  
+
   return $device_authentication_code;
 }
 
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ sub block_formatting
   my $blocks_unpadded = $associated_data_length . $associated_data;
   my $pad_len = int ((length ($blocks_unpadded) + 16 - 1) / 16) * 16;
   my $blocks_padded = $blocks_unpadded . "\0" x ($pad_len - length ($blocks_unpadded));
-  
+
   return $b0 . $blocks_padded;
 }
 
@@ -56,14 +56,14 @@ sub encrypt
   my $nonce = shift;
   my $key = shift;
   my $iv = "\0" x 16;
-  
+
   my $aes_cbc = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ("AES", 0);
-  my $ciphertext = $aes_cbc->encrypt ($blocks, $key, $iv); 
+  my $ciphertext = $aes_cbc->encrypt ($blocks, $key, $iv);
   my $y_n = substr ($ciphertext, length ($ciphertext) - 16, 16);
-  
+
   my $aes_ecb = Crypt::Mode::ECB->new ("AES", 0);
   my $s_0 = $aes_ecb->encrypt ($nonce, $key);
-  
+
   return $y_n ^ $s_0;
 }
 
@@ -72,72 +72,72 @@ sub generate_session_response_mac
   my $secure_session_identifier = shift;
   my $public_value_xor          = shift;
   my $key                       = shift;
-  
+
   # Constants used for the cryptography in Session_Response frames
   my $knx_ip_header = pack ("H*", "061009520038");
   my $b0            = pack ("H*", "00000000000000000000000000000000");
   my $nonce         = pack ("H*", "0000000000000000000000000000ff00");
-  
+
   my $associated_data = $knx_ip_header . $secure_session_identifier . $public_value_xor;
-  
+
   my $blocks = block_formatting ($b0, $associated_data);
-  
+
   return encrypt ($blocks, $nonce, $key);
 }
 
 sub module_generate_hash
 {
   my $word = shift;
-  
+
   # Parameters that would be found in the Session_Request and Session_Response frames
   my $secure_session_identifier = shift;
   my $public_value_xor          = shift // random_bytes (32);
-  
+
   my $device_authentication_code = device_authentication_code ($word);
 
   my $mac = generate_session_response_mac ($secure_session_identifier,
                                            $public_value_xor,
                                            $device_authentication_code);
-  
+
-  my $hash = sprintf ("\$knx-ip-secure-device-authentication-code\$*%s*%s*%s", 
+  my $hash = sprintf ("\$knx-ip-secure-device-authentication-code\$*%s*%s*%s",
                       unpack ("H*", $secure_session_identifier),
                       unpack ("H*", $public_value_xor),
                       unpack ("H*", $mac));
-  
+
   return $hash;
 }
 
 sub module_verify_hash
 {
   my $line = shift;
-  
+
   my ($hash, $word) = split (':', $line);
-  
+
   return unless defined $hash;
   return unless defined $word;
-  
+
   my @data = split ('\*', $hash);
-  
+
   return unless scalar (@data) == 4;
-  
+
   my $signature = shift @data;
-  
+
   return unless ($signature eq "\$knx-ip-secure-device-authentication-code\$");
-  
+
   my $secure_session_identifier = pack ("H*", shift @data); #  2 Bytes expected (using the "salt" for this purpose)
   my $public_value_xor          = pack ("H*", shift @data); # 32 Bytes expected (xor of client's and server's public value)
   my $mac                       = pack ("H*", shift @data); # 16 Bytes expected
-  
+
   return unless (length ($secure_session_identifier) == 2);
   return unless (length ($public_value_xor) == 32);
   return unless (length ($mac) == 16);
-  
+
   my $word_packed = pack_if_HEX_notation ($word);
-  
+
-  my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed, 
+  my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed,
-                                       $secure_session_identifier, 
+                                       $secure_session_identifier,
                                        $public_value_xor);
-  
+
   return ($new_hash, $word);
 }