diff --git a/OpenCL/m19800-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m19800-pure.cl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..83cff3ac8 --- /dev/null +++ b/OpenCL/m19800-pure.cl @@ -0,0 +1,616 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#define NEW_SIMD_CODE + +#ifdef KERNEL_STATIC +#include "inc_vendor.h" +#include "inc_types.h" +#include "inc_common.cl" +#include "inc_simd.cl" +#include "inc_hash_sha1.cl" +#include "inc_cipher_aes.cl" +#endif + +typedef struct krb5pa_17 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 enc_timestamp[32]; + u32 enc_timestamp_len; + +} krb5pa_17_t; + +typedef struct krb5pa_17_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[10]; + u32 out[10]; + +} krb5pa_17_tmp_t; + +DECLSPEC static void aes128_encrypt_cbc (const u32 *aes_ks, u32 *aes_iv, const u32 *in, u32 *out, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te4) +{ + u32 data[4]; + + data[0] = hc_swap32_S (in[0]); + data[1] = hc_swap32_S (in[1]); + data[2] = hc_swap32_S (in[2]); + data[3] = hc_swap32_S (in[3]); + + data[0] ^= aes_iv[0]; + data[1] ^= aes_iv[1]; + data[2] ^= aes_iv[2]; + data[3] ^= aes_iv[3]; + + aes128_encrypt (aes_ks, data, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + aes_iv[0] = out[0]; + aes_iv[1] = out[1]; + aes_iv[2] = out[2]; + aes_iv[3] = out[3]; + + out[0] = hc_swap32_S (out[0]); + out[1] = hc_swap32_S (out[1]); + out[2] = hc_swap32_S (out[2]); + out[3] = hc_swap32_S (out[3]); +} + +DECLSPEC static void aes128_decrypt_cbc (const u32 *ks1, const u32 *in, u32 *out, u32 *essiv, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td4) +{ + aes128_decrypt (ks1, in, out, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + out[0] ^= essiv[0]; + out[1] ^= essiv[1]; + out[2] ^= essiv[2]; + out[3] ^= essiv[3]; + + essiv[0] = in[0]; + essiv[1] = in[1]; + essiv[2] = in[2]; + essiv[3] = in[3]; +} + +DECLSPEC static void hmac_sha1_run_V (u32x *w0, u32x *w1, u32x *w2, u32x *w3, u32x *ipad, u32x *opad, u32x *digest) +{ + digest[0] = ipad[0]; + digest[1] = ipad[1]; + digest[2] = ipad[2]; + digest[3] = ipad[3]; + digest[4] = ipad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); + + w0[0] = digest[0]; + w0[1] = digest[1]; + w0[2] = digest[2]; + w0[3] = digest[3]; + w1[0] = digest[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + digest[0] = opad[0]; + digest[1] = opad[1]; + digest[2] = opad[2]; + digest[3] = opad[3]; + digest[4] = opad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m19800_init (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5pa_17_tmp_t, krb5pa_17_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if (gid >= gid_max) return; + + /** + * main + */ + + /* initialize hmac-sha1 for pbkdf2(password, account, 4096, account_len) */ + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + sha1_hmac_init_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, pws[gid].i, pws[gid].pw_len); + + tmps[gid].ipad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].ipad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].ipad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].ipad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].ipad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].opad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].opad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].opad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].opad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].opad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[4]; + + sha1_hmac_update_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, esalt_bufs[digests_offset].account_info, esalt_bufs[digests_offset].account_info_len); + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 1; i < 4; i += 5, j += 1) + { + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx2 = sha1_hmac_ctx; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + w0[0] = j; + w0[1] = 0; + w0[2] = 0; + w0[3] = 0; + w1[0] = 0; + w1[1] = 0; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx2, w0, w1, w2, w3, 4); + + sha1_hmac_final (&sha1_hmac_ctx2); + + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].out[i + 0] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 1] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 2] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 3] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 4] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4]; + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m19800_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5pa_17_tmp_t, krb5pa_17_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if ((gid * VECT_SIZE) >= gid_max) return; + + u32x ipad[5]; + u32x opad[5]; + + ipad[0] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 0); + ipad[1] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 1); + ipad[2] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 2); + ipad[3] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 3); + ipad[4] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 4); + + opad[0] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 0); + opad[1] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 1); + opad[2] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 2); + opad[3] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 3); + opad[4] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 4); + + for (u32 i = 0; i < 4; i += 5) + { + u32x dgst[5]; + u32x out[5]; + + dgst[0] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0); + dgst[1] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1); + dgst[2] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2); + dgst[3] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3); + dgst[4] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4); + + out[0] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0); + out[1] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1); + out[2] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2); + out[3] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3); + out[4] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4); + + for (u32 j = 0; j < loop_cnt; j++) + { + u32x w0[4]; + u32x w1[4]; + u32x w2[4]; + u32x w3[4]; + + w0[0] = dgst[0]; + w0[1] = dgst[1]; + w0[2] = dgst[2]; + w0[3] = dgst[3]; + w1[0] = dgst[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + hmac_sha1_run_V (w0, w1, w2, w3, ipad, opad, dgst); + + out[0] ^= dgst[0]; + out[1] ^= dgst[1]; + out[2] ^= dgst[2]; + out[3] ^= dgst[3]; + out[4] ^= dgst[4]; + } + + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0, dgst[0]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1, dgst[1]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2, dgst[2]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3, dgst[3]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4, dgst[4]); + + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0, out[0]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1, out[1]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2, out[2]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3, out[3]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4, out[4]); + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m19800_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5pa_17_tmp_t, krb5pa_17_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + const u64 lid = get_local_id (0); + const u64 lsz = get_local_size (0); + + /** + * aes shared + */ + + #ifdef REAL_SHM + + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td0[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td1[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td2[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td3[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td4[256]; + + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te0[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te1[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te2[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te3[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te4[256]; + + for (u32 i = lid; i < 256; i += lsz) + { + s_td0[i] = td0[i]; + s_td1[i] = td1[i]; + s_td2[i] = td2[i]; + s_td3[i] = td3[i]; + s_td4[i] = td4[i]; + + s_te0[i] = te0[i]; + s_te1[i] = te1[i]; + s_te2[i] = te2[i]; + s_te3[i] = te3[i]; + s_te4[i] = te4[i]; + } + + barrier (CLK_LOCAL_MEM_FENCE); + + #else + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td0 = td0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td1 = td1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td2 = td2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td3 = td3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td4 = td4; + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te0 = te0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te1 = te1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te2 = te2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te3 = te3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te4 = te4; + + #endif + + if (gid >= gid_max) return; + + /* + at this point, the output ('seed') will be used to generate AES keys: + + key_bytes = derive(seed, 'kerberos'.encode(), seedsize) + + 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ke' and 'ki' + 'ke' will be the AES key to decrypt the ticket + 'ki' will be the key to compute the final HMAC + */ + + u32 nfolded[4]; + + // we can precompute _nfold('kerberos', 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x6b657262; + nfolded[1] = 0x65726f73; + nfolded[2] = 0x7b9b5b2b; + nfolded[3] = 0x93132b93; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'seed' as key along with a null IV + u32 aes_key[4]; + + aes_key[0] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[0]); + aes_key[1] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[1]); + aes_key[2] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[2]); + aes_key[3] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[3]); + + u32 aes_iv[4]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + u32 aes_ks[44]; + + aes128_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, aes_key, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + u32 key_bytes[4]; + + u32 out[4]; + aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + key_bytes[0] = hc_swap32_S (out[0]); + key_bytes[1] = hc_swap32_S (out[1]); + key_bytes[2] = hc_swap32_S (out[2]); + key_bytes[3] = hc_swap32_S (out[3]); + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes128_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, key_bytes, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + /* we will now compute 'ke' */ + + u32 ke[4]; + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 1, 0xAA), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0xae2c160b; + nfolded[1] = 0x04ad5006; + nfolded[2] = 0xab55aad5; + nfolded[3] = 0x6a80355a; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ke[0] = out[0]; + ke[1] = out[1]; + ke[2] = out[2]; + ke[3] = out[3]; + + // Decode the CTS mode encryption by decrypting c_n-1 and swapping it with c_n + u32 enc_blocks[12]; + + u32 decrypted_block[4]; + + // c_0 + enc_blocks[0] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[0]; + enc_blocks[1] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[1]; + enc_blocks[2] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[2]; + enc_blocks[3] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[3]; + + // c_1 aka c_n-1 since there are guaranteed to be exactly 3 blocks + enc_blocks[4] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[4]; + enc_blocks[5] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[5]; + enc_blocks[6] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[6]; + enc_blocks[7] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[7]; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + u32 aes_cts_decrypt_ks[44]; + + AES128_set_decrypt_key (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, ke, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3); + + // Our first decryption is the last block (currently in c_n-1) using the first portion of (c_n) as our IV, this allows us to get plaintext in one crypto operation + aes_iv[0] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[8]; + aes_iv[1] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[9]; + aes_iv[2] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[10]; + aes_iv[3] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[11]; + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + // Move as much code as possible after this branch to avoid unnecessary computation on misses + if (((w0[0] & 0xf0f0f0f0) == 0x30303030) && ((w0[1] & 0xffff0000) == 0x5aa10000)) + { + // Decrypt c_n-1 without an IV for the padding blocks on c_n + aes128_decrypt (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = decrypted_block[0]; + w0[1] = decrypted_block[1]; + w0[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + w0[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + int enc_timestamp_len = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp_len; + int last_word_position = enc_timestamp_len / 4; + + // New c_1, join c_n with result of the decrypted c_n-1 + int last_block_iter; + for (last_block_iter = 4; last_block_iter < 8; last_block_iter++) + { + if (last_word_position > last_block_iter + 4) + { + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4]; + } + else if (last_word_position == last_block_iter + 4) + { + // Handle case when the split lands in the middle of a WORD + switch (enc_timestamp_len % 4) + { + case 1: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = (esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4] & 0x000000ff) | (w0[last_block_iter - 4] & 0xffffff00); + break; + case 2: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = (esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4] & 0x0000ffff) | (w0[last_block_iter - 4] & 0xffff0000); + break; + case 3: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = (esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4] & 0x00ffffff) | (w0[last_block_iter - 4] & 0xff000000); + break; + default: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = w0[last_block_iter - 4]; + } + } + else + { + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = w0[last_block_iter - 4]; + } + } + + // c_2 aka c_n which is now equal to the old c_n-1 + enc_blocks[8] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[4]; + enc_blocks[9] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[5]; + enc_blocks[10] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[6]; + enc_blocks[11] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[7]; + // Go ahead and decrypt all blocks now as a normal AES CBC operation + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes128_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + /* we will now compute 'ki', having 'key_bytes' */ + + u32 ki[8]; + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 1, 0x55), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x5b582c16; + nfolded[1] = 0x0a5aa805; + nfolded[2] = 0x56ab55aa; + nfolded[3] = 0xd5402ab5; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes128_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, key_bytes, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + aes128_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ki[0] = out[0]; + ki[1] = out[1]; + ki[2] = out[2]; + ki[3] = out[3]; + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + /* + hmac message = plaintext + hmac key = ki + */ + + u32 k0[4]; + u32 k1[4]; + u32 k2[4]; + u32 k3[4]; + + k0[0] = ki[0]; + k0[1] = ki[1]; + k0[2] = ki[2]; + k0[3] = ki[3]; + + k1[0] = 0; + k1[1] = 0; + k1[2] = 0; + k1[3] = 0; + + k2[0] = 0; + k2[1] = 0; + k2[2] = 0; + k2[3] = 0; + + k3[0] = 0; + k3[1] = 0; + k3[2] = 0; + k3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_init_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, k0, k1, k2, k3); + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, enc_timestamp_len); + + sha1_hmac_final(&sha1_hmac_ctx); + + // Compare checksum + if(sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0] == esalt_bufs[digests_offset].checksum[0] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1] == esalt_bufs[digests_offset].checksum[1] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2] == esalt_bufs[digests_offset].checksum[2]) + { + if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digests_offset]) == 0) + { + #define il_pos 0 + mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, 0, digests_offset + 0, gid, il_pos, 0, 0); + } + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/OpenCL/m19900-pure.cl b/OpenCL/m19900-pure.cl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..26de425b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/OpenCL/m19900-pure.cl @@ -0,0 +1,657 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#define NEW_SIMD_CODE + +#ifdef KERNEL_STATIC +#include "inc_vendor.h" +#include "inc_types.h" +#include "inc_common.cl" +#include "inc_simd.cl" +#include "inc_hash_sha1.cl" +#include "inc_cipher_aes.cl" +#endif + +typedef struct krb5pa_18 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 enc_timestamp[32]; + u32 enc_timestamp_len; + +} krb5pa_18_t; + +typedef struct krb5pa_18_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[16]; + u32 out[16]; + +} krb5pa_18_tmp_t; + +DECLSPEC static void aes256_encrypt_cbc (const u32 *aes_ks, u32 *aes_iv, const u32 *in, u32 *out, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_te4) +{ + u32 data[4]; + + data[0] = hc_swap32_S (in[0]); + data[1] = hc_swap32_S (in[1]); + data[2] = hc_swap32_S (in[2]); + data[3] = hc_swap32_S (in[3]); + + data[0] ^= aes_iv[0]; + data[1] ^= aes_iv[1]; + data[2] ^= aes_iv[2]; + data[3] ^= aes_iv[3]; + + aes256_encrypt (aes_ks, data, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + aes_iv[0] = out[0]; + aes_iv[1] = out[1]; + aes_iv[2] = out[2]; + aes_iv[3] = out[3]; + + out[0] = hc_swap32_S (out[0]); + out[1] = hc_swap32_S (out[1]); + out[2] = hc_swap32_S (out[2]); + out[3] = hc_swap32_S (out[3]); +} + +DECLSPEC static void aes256_decrypt_cbc (const u32 *ks1, const u32 *in, u32 *out, u32 *essiv, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td0, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td1, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td2, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td3, SHM_TYPE u32 *s_td4) +{ + aes256_decrypt (ks1, in, out, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + out[0] ^= essiv[0]; + out[1] ^= essiv[1]; + out[2] ^= essiv[2]; + out[3] ^= essiv[3]; + + essiv[0] = in[0]; + essiv[1] = in[1]; + essiv[2] = in[2]; + essiv[3] = in[3]; +} + +DECLSPEC static void hmac_sha1_run_V (u32x *w0, u32x *w1, u32x *w2, u32x *w3, u32x *ipad, u32x *opad, u32x *digest) +{ + digest[0] = ipad[0]; + digest[1] = ipad[1]; + digest[2] = ipad[2]; + digest[3] = ipad[3]; + digest[4] = ipad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); + + w0[0] = digest[0]; + w0[1] = digest[1]; + w0[2] = digest[2]; + w0[3] = digest[3]; + w1[0] = digest[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + digest[0] = opad[0]; + digest[1] = opad[1]; + digest[2] = opad[2]; + digest[3] = opad[3]; + digest[4] = opad[4]; + + sha1_transform_vector (w0, w1, w2, w3, digest); +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m19900_init (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5pa_18_tmp_t, krb5pa_18_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if (gid >= gid_max) return; + + /** + * main + */ + + /* initialize hmac-sha1 for pbkdf2(password, account, 4096, account_len) */ + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + sha1_hmac_init_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, pws[gid].i, pws[gid].pw_len); + + tmps[gid].ipad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].ipad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].ipad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].ipad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].ipad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.ipad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].opad[0] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].opad[1] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].opad[2] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].opad[3] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].opad[4] = sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[4]; + + sha1_hmac_update_global_swap (&sha1_hmac_ctx, esalt_bufs[digests_offset].account_info, esalt_bufs[digests_offset].account_info_len); + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 1; i < 8; i += 5, j += 1) + { + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx2 = sha1_hmac_ctx; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + w0[0] = j; + w0[1] = 0; + w0[2] = 0; + w0[3] = 0; + w1[0] = 0; + w1[1] = 0; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx2, w0, w1, w2, w3, 4); + + sha1_hmac_final (&sha1_hmac_ctx2); + + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[0]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[1]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[2]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[3]; + tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4] = sha1_hmac_ctx2.opad.h[4]; + + tmps[gid].out[i + 0] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 0]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 1] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 1]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 2] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 2]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 3] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 3]; + tmps[gid].out[i + 4] = tmps[gid].dgst[i + 4]; + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m19900_loop (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5pa_18_tmp_t, krb5pa_18_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + + if ((gid * VECT_SIZE) >= gid_max) return; + + u32x ipad[5]; + u32x opad[5]; + + ipad[0] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 0); + ipad[1] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 1); + ipad[2] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 2); + ipad[3] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 3); + ipad[4] = packv (tmps, ipad, gid, 4); + + opad[0] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 0); + opad[1] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 1); + opad[2] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 2); + opad[3] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 3); + opad[4] = packv (tmps, opad, gid, 4); + + for (u32 i = 0; i < 8; i += 5) + { + u32x dgst[5]; + u32x out[5]; + + dgst[0] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0); + dgst[1] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1); + dgst[2] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2); + dgst[3] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3); + dgst[4] = packv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4); + + out[0] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0); + out[1] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1); + out[2] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2); + out[3] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3); + out[4] = packv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4); + + for (u32 j = 0; j < loop_cnt; j++) + { + u32x w0[4]; + u32x w1[4]; + u32x w2[4]; + u32x w3[4]; + + w0[0] = dgst[0]; + w0[1] = dgst[1]; + w0[2] = dgst[2]; + w0[3] = dgst[3]; + w1[0] = dgst[4]; + w1[1] = 0x80000000; + w1[2] = 0; + w1[3] = 0; + w2[0] = 0; + w2[1] = 0; + w2[2] = 0; + w2[3] = 0; + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = (64 + 20) * 8; + + hmac_sha1_run_V (w0, w1, w2, w3, ipad, opad, dgst); + + out[0] ^= dgst[0]; + out[1] ^= dgst[1]; + out[2] ^= dgst[2]; + out[3] ^= dgst[3]; + out[4] ^= dgst[4]; + } + + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 0, dgst[0]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 1, dgst[1]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 2, dgst[2]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 3, dgst[3]); + unpackv (tmps, dgst, gid, i + 4, dgst[4]); + + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 0, out[0]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 1, out[1]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 2, out[2]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 3, out[3]); + unpackv (tmps, out, gid, i + 4, out[4]); + } +} + +KERNEL_FQ void m19900_comp (KERN_ATTR_TMPS_ESALT (krb5pa_18_tmp_t, krb5pa_18_t)) +{ + /** + * base + */ + + const u64 gid = get_global_id (0); + const u64 lid = get_local_id (0); + const u64 lsz = get_local_size (0); + + /** + * aes shared + */ + + #ifdef REAL_SHM + + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td0[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td1[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td2[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td3[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_td4[256]; + + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te0[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te1[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te2[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te3[256]; + LOCAL_AS u32 s_te4[256]; + + for (u32 i = lid; i < 256; i += lsz) + { + s_td0[i] = td0[i]; + s_td1[i] = td1[i]; + s_td2[i] = td2[i]; + s_td3[i] = td3[i]; + s_td4[i] = td4[i]; + + s_te0[i] = te0[i]; + s_te1[i] = te1[i]; + s_te2[i] = te2[i]; + s_te3[i] = te3[i]; + s_te4[i] = te4[i]; + } + + barrier (CLK_LOCAL_MEM_FENCE); + + #else + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td0 = td0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td1 = td1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td2 = td2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td3 = td3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_td4 = td4; + + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te0 = te0; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te1 = te1; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te2 = te2; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te3 = te3; + CONSTANT_AS u32a *s_te4 = te4; + + #endif + + if (gid >= gid_max) return; + + /* + at this point, the output ('seed') will be used to generate AES keys: + + key_bytes = derive(seed, 'kerberos'.encode(), seedsize) + + 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ke' and 'ki' + 'ke' will be the AES key to decrypt the ticket + 'ki' will be the key to compute the final HMAC + */ + + u32 nfolded[4]; + + // we can precompute _nfold('kerberos', 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x6b657262; + nfolded[1] = 0x65726f73; + nfolded[2] = 0x7b9b5b2b; + nfolded[3] = 0x93132b93; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'seed' as key along with a null IV + u32 aes_key[8]; + + aes_key[0] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[0]); + aes_key[1] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[1]); + aes_key[2] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[2]); + aes_key[3] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[3]); + aes_key[4] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[4]); + aes_key[5] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[5]); + aes_key[6] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[6]); + aes_key[7] = hc_swap32_S (tmps[gid].out[7]); + + u32 aes_iv[4]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + u32 aes_ks[60]; + + aes256_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, aes_key, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + u32 key_bytes[8]; + + u32 out[4]; + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + key_bytes[0] = hc_swap32_S (out[0]); + key_bytes[1] = hc_swap32_S (out[1]); + key_bytes[2] = hc_swap32_S (out[2]); + key_bytes[3] = hc_swap32_S (out[3]); + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, out, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + key_bytes[4] = hc_swap32_S (out[0]); + key_bytes[5] = hc_swap32_S (out[1]); + key_bytes[6] = hc_swap32_S (out[2]); + key_bytes[7] = hc_swap32_S (out[3]); + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes256_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, key_bytes, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + /* we will now compute 'ke' */ + + u32 ke[8]; + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 1, 0xAA), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0xae2c160b; + nfolded[1] = 0x04ad5006; + nfolded[2] = 0xab55aad5; + nfolded[3] = 0x6a80355a; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ke[0] = out[0]; + ke[1] = out[1]; + ke[2] = out[2]; + ke[3] = out[3]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, out, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ke[4] = out[0]; + ke[5] = out[1]; + ke[6] = out[2]; + ke[7] = out[3]; + + // Decode the CTS mode encryption by decrypting c_n-1 and swapping it with c_n + u32 enc_blocks[12]; + + u32 decrypted_block[4]; + + // c_0 + enc_blocks[0] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[0]; + enc_blocks[1] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[1]; + enc_blocks[2] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[2]; + enc_blocks[3] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[3]; + + // c_1 aka c_n-1 since there are guaranteed to be exactly 3 blocks + enc_blocks[4] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[4]; + enc_blocks[5] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[5]; + enc_blocks[6] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[6]; + enc_blocks[7] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[7]; + + u32 w0[4]; + u32 w1[4]; + u32 w2[4]; + u32 w3[4]; + + u32 aes_cts_decrypt_ks[60]; + + AES256_set_decrypt_key (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, ke, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3); + + // Our first decryption is the last block (currently in c_n-1) using the first portion of (c_n) as our IV, this allows us to get plaintext in one crypto operation + aes_iv[0] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[8]; + aes_iv[1] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[9]; + aes_iv[2] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[10]; + aes_iv[3] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[11]; + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + // Move as much code as possible after this branch to avoid unnecessary computation on misses + if (((w0[0] & 0xf0f0f0f0) == 0x30303030) && ((w0[1] & 0xffff0000) == 0x5aa10000)) + { + // Decrypt c_n-1 without an IV for the padding blocks on c_n + aes256_decrypt (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = decrypted_block[0]; + w0[1] = decrypted_block[1]; + w0[2] = decrypted_block[2]; + w0[3] = decrypted_block[3]; + + int enc_timestamp_len = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp_len; + int last_word_position = enc_timestamp_len / 4; + + // New c_1, join c_n with result of the decrypted c_n-1 + int last_block_iter; + for (last_block_iter = 4; last_block_iter < 8; last_block_iter++) + { + if (last_word_position > last_block_iter + 4) + { + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4]; + } + else if (last_word_position == last_block_iter + 4) + { + // Handle case when the split lands in the middle of a WORD + switch (enc_timestamp_len % 4) + { + case 1: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = (esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4] & 0x000000ff) | (w0[last_block_iter - 4] & 0xffffff00); + break; + case 2: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = (esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4] & 0x0000ffff) | (w0[last_block_iter - 4] & 0xffff0000); + break; + case 3: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = (esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[last_block_iter + 4] & 0x00ffffff) | (w0[last_block_iter - 4] & 0xff000000); + break; + default: + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = w0[last_block_iter - 4]; + } + } + else + { + enc_blocks[last_block_iter] = w0[last_block_iter - 4]; + } + } + + // c_2 aka c_n which is now equal to the old c_n-1 + enc_blocks[8] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[4]; + enc_blocks[9] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[5]; + enc_blocks[10] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[6]; + enc_blocks[11] = esalt_bufs[digests_offset].enc_timestamp[7]; + + // Go ahead and decrypt all blocks now as a normal AES CBC operation + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w0[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w0[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w0[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w0[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 4, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w1[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w1[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w1[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w1[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + aes256_decrypt_cbc (aes_cts_decrypt_ks, enc_blocks + 8, decrypted_block, aes_iv, s_td0, s_td1, s_td2, s_td3, s_td4); + + w2[0] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[0]); + w2[1] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[1]); + w2[2] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[2]); + w2[3] = hc_swap32_S (decrypted_block[3]); + + w3[0] = 0; + w3[1] = 0; + w3[2] = 0; + w3[3] = 0; + + /* we will now compute 'ki', having 'key_bytes' */ + + u32 ki[8]; + + // we can precompute _nfold(pack('>IB', 1, 0x55), 16) + nfolded[0] = 0x5b582c16; + nfolded[1] = 0x0a5aa805; + nfolded[2] = 0x56ab55aa; + nfolded[3] = 0xd5402ab5; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + // then aes_cbc encrypt this nfolded value with 'key_bytes' as key along with a null IV + aes256_set_encrypt_key (aes_ks, key_bytes, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3); + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, nfolded, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ki[0] = out[0]; + ki[1] = out[1]; + ki[2] = out[2]; + ki[3] = out[3]; + + aes_iv[0] = 0; + aes_iv[1] = 0; + aes_iv[2] = 0; + aes_iv[3] = 0; + + aes256_encrypt_cbc (aes_ks, aes_iv, out, out, s_te0, s_te1, s_te2, s_te3, s_te4); + + ki[4] = out[0]; + ki[5] = out[1]; + ki[6] = out[2]; + ki[7] = out[3]; + + sha1_hmac_ctx_t sha1_hmac_ctx; + + /* + hmac message = plaintext + hmac key = ki + */ + + u32 k0[4]; + u32 k1[4]; + u32 k2[4]; + u32 k3[4]; + + k0[0] = ki[0]; + k0[1] = ki[1]; + k0[2] = ki[2]; + k0[3] = ki[3]; + + k1[0] = ki[4]; + k1[1] = ki[5]; + k1[2] = ki[6]; + k1[3] = ki[7]; + + k2[0] = 0; + k2[1] = 0; + k2[2] = 0; + k2[3] = 0; + + k3[0] = 0; + k3[1] = 0; + k3[2] = 0; + k3[3] = 0; + + sha1_hmac_init_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, k0, k1, k2, k3); + + sha1_hmac_update_64 (&sha1_hmac_ctx, w0, w1, w2, w3, enc_timestamp_len); + + sha1_hmac_final(&sha1_hmac_ctx); + + // Compare checksum + if(sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[0] == esalt_bufs[digests_offset].checksum[0] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[1] == esalt_bufs[digests_offset].checksum[1] + && sha1_hmac_ctx.opad.h[2] == esalt_bufs[digests_offset].checksum[2]) + { + if (atomic_inc (&hashes_shown[digests_offset]) == 0) + { + #define il_pos 0 + mark_hash (plains_buf, d_return_buf, salt_pos, digests_cnt, 0, digests_offset + 0, gid, il_pos, 0, 0); + } + } + } +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/credits.txt b/docs/credits.txt index e8eff3b83..1401406ac 100644 --- a/docs/credits.txt +++ b/docs/credits.txt @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Gabriele "matrix" Gristina (@gm4tr1x) Jean-Christophe "Fist0urs" Delaunay (@Fist0urs) * Kerberos TGS Rep enctype 23 kernel module +* Kerberos TGS Rep enctype 17/18 kernel module * AxCrypt kernel module * KeePass kernel module * DPAPImk v1 and v2 kernel module @@ -61,5 +62,8 @@ Rick "Minga" Redman and KoreLogic (@CrackMeIfYouCan) * For running the "Crack Me If You Can" password cracking contest, first of its kind * For pushing password cracking techniques forward +Brandon Chalk (@brandoncasaba) +* Kerberos Pre-Auth 17/18 kernel module, ported from @Fist0urs TGS kernel modules + !!! All the package maintainer of hashcat !!! diff --git a/src/modules/module_19800.c b/src/modules/module_19800.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9282fd135 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/modules/module_19800.c @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "types.h" +#include "modules.h" +#include "bitops.h" +#include "convert.h" +#include "shared.h" + +static const u32 ATTACK_EXEC = ATTACK_EXEC_OUTSIDE_KERNEL; +static const u32 DGST_POS0 = 0; +static const u32 DGST_POS1 = 1; +static const u32 DGST_POS2 = 2; +static const u32 DGST_POS3 = 3; +static const u32 DGST_SIZE = DGST_SIZE_4_4; +static const u32 HASH_CATEGORY = HASH_CATEGORY_NETWORK_PROTOCOL; +static const char *HASH_NAME = "Kerberos 5 Pre-Auth etype 17 (AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96)"; +static const u64 KERN_TYPE = 19800; +static const u32 OPTI_TYPE = OPTI_TYPE_ZERO_BYTE + | OPTI_TYPE_NOT_ITERATED + | OPTI_TYPE_SLOW_HASH_SIMD_LOOP; +static const u64 OPTS_TYPE = OPTS_TYPE_PT_GENERATE_LE; +static const u32 SALT_TYPE = SALT_TYPE_EMBEDDED; +static const char *ST_PASS = "hashcat"; +static const char *ST_HASH = "$krb5pa$17$hashcat$HASHCATDOMAIN.COM$a17776abe5383236c58582f515843e029ecbff43706d177651b7b6cdb2713b17597ddb35b1c9c470c281589fd1d51cca125414d19e40e333"; + +u32 module_attack_exec (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ATTACK_EXEC; } +u32 module_dgst_pos0 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS0; } +u32 module_dgst_pos1 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS1; } +u32 module_dgst_pos2 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS2; } +u32 module_dgst_pos3 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS3; } +u32 module_dgst_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_SIZE; } +u32 module_hash_category (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_CATEGORY; } +const char *module_hash_name (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_NAME; } +u64 module_kern_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return KERN_TYPE; } +u32 module_opti_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTI_TYPE; } +u64 module_opts_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTS_TYPE; } +u32 module_salt_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return SALT_TYPE; } +const char *module_st_hash (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_HASH; } +const char *module_st_pass (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_PASS; } + +typedef struct krb5pa_17 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 enc_timestamp[32]; + u32 enc_timestamp_len; + +} krb5pa_17_t; + +typedef struct krb5pa_17_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[10]; + u32 out[10]; + +} krb5pa_17_tmp_t; + +static const char *SIGNATURE_KRB5PA = "$krb5pa$17$"; + +u64 module_tmp_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 tmp_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5pa_17_tmp_t); + + return tmp_size; +} + +u64 module_esalt_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 esalt_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5pa_17_t); + + return esalt_size; +} + +int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED hashinfo_t *hash_info, const char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_len) +{ + u32 *digest = (u32 *) digest_buf; + + krb5pa_17_t *krb5pa = (krb5pa_17_t *) esalt_buf; + + token_t token; + + token.signatures_cnt = 1; + token.signatures_buf[0] = SIGNATURE_KRB5PA; + + token.len[0] = 11; + token.attr[0] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_SIGNATURE; + + /** + * $krb5pa$17$*user*realm*$enc_timestamp+checksum + */ + + // assume no signature found + if (line_len < 11) return (PARSER_SALT_LENGTH); + + // assume $krb5pa$17$user$realm$enc_timestamp+checksum + token.token_cnt = 4; + + token.sep[1] = '$'; + token.len_min[1] = 1; + token.len_max[1] = 512; + token.attr[1] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + token.sep[2] = '$'; + token.len_min[2] = 1; + token.len_max[2] = 512; + token.attr[2] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + token.sep[3] = '$'; + token.len_min[3] = 104; + token.len_max[3] = 112; + token.attr[3] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + + const int rc_tokenizer = input_tokenizer ((const u8 *) line_buf, line_len, &token); + + if (rc_tokenizer != PARSER_OK) return (rc_tokenizer); + + const u8 *user_pos; + const u8 *domain_pos; + const u8 *data_pos; + const u8 *checksum_pos; + + int user_len; + int domain_len; + int data_len; + int account_info_len; + + user_pos = token.buf[1]; + user_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy(krb5pa->user, user_pos, user_len); + + domain_pos = token.buf[2]; + domain_len = token.len[2]; + + memcpy(krb5pa->domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + + data_pos = token.buf[3]; + data_len = token.len[3]; + + account_info_len = token.len[2] + token.len[1]; + + u8 *account_info_ptr = (u8 *) krb5pa->account_info; + + // domain must be uppercase + u8 domain[128]; + memcpy(domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + uppercase(domain, domain_len); + + memcpy(account_info_ptr, domain, domain_len); + memcpy(account_info_ptr + domain_len, user_pos, user_len); + + krb5pa->account_info_len = account_info_len; + + // Split checksum + checksum_pos = data_pos + data_len - 24; + data_len = data_len - 24; + + // hmac-sha1 is reduced to 12 bytes + krb5pa->checksum[0] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 0)); + krb5pa->checksum[1] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 8)); + krb5pa->checksum[2] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 16)); + + u8 *edata_ptr = (u8 *) krb5pa->enc_timestamp; + + for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i += 2) + { + const u8 p0 = data_pos[i + 0]; + const u8 p1 = data_pos[i + 1]; + + *edata_ptr++ = hex_convert (p1) << 0 + | hex_convert (p0) << 4; + } + + krb5pa->enc_timestamp_len = data_len / 2; + + salt->salt_buf[0] = krb5pa->checksum[0]; + salt->salt_buf[1] = krb5pa->checksum[1]; + salt->salt_buf[2] = krb5pa->checksum[2]; + + salt->salt_iter = 4096 - 1; + + digest[0] = krb5pa->checksum[0]; + digest[1] = krb5pa->checksum[1]; + digest[2] = krb5pa->checksum[2]; + digest[3] = 0; + + return (PARSER_OK); +} + +int module_hash_encode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const hashinfo_t *hash_info, char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_size) +{ + const krb5pa_17_t *krb5pa = (const krb5pa_17_t *) esalt_buf; + + char data[32 * 4 * 2] = { 0 }; + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 0; i < krb5pa->enc_timestamp_len; i += 1, j += 2) + { + u8 *ptr_enc_timestamp = (u8 *) krb5pa->enc_timestamp; + + sprintf (data + j, "%02x", ptr_enc_timestamp[i]); + } + + const int line_len = snprintf (line_buf, line_size, "%s%s$%s$%s%08x%08x%08x", + SIGNATURE_KRB5PA, + (char *) krb5pa->user, + (char *) krb5pa->domain, + data, + krb5pa->checksum[0], + krb5pa->checksum[1], + krb5pa->checksum[2]); + + return line_len; +} + +void module_init (module_ctx_t *module_ctx) +{ + module_ctx->module_context_size = MODULE_CONTEXT_SIZE_CURRENT; + module_ctx->module_interface_version = MODULE_INTERFACE_VERSION_CURRENT; + + module_ctx->module_attack_exec = module_attack_exec; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_esalt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_hook_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_mask = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_build_plain_postprocess = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_deep_comp_kernel = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos0 = module_dgst_pos0; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos1 = module_dgst_pos1; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos2 = module_dgst_pos2; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos3 = module_dgst_pos3; + module_ctx->module_dgst_size = module_dgst_size; + module_ctx->module_dictstat_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_esalt_size = module_esalt_size; + module_ctx->module_extra_buffer_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_extra_tmp_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_forced_outfile_format = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_count = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_parse = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_save = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_zero_hash = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode = module_hash_decode; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_status = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode = module_hash_encode; + module_ctx->module_hash_init_selftest = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_mode = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_category = module_hash_category; + module_ctx->module_hash_name = module_hash_name; + module_ctx->module_hlfmt_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook12 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook23 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_salt_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_build_options = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_cache_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kern_type = module_kern_type; + module_ctx->module_kern_type_dynamic = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_opti_type = module_opti_type; + module_ctx->module_opts_type = module_opts_type; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_nocomp = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_custom_check = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_keep_all_hashes = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pwdump_column = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_type = module_salt_type; + module_ctx->module_separator = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_st_hash = module_st_hash; + module_ctx->module_st_pass = module_st_pass; + module_ctx->module_tmp_size = module_tmp_size; + module_ctx->module_unstable_warning = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_warmup_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/modules/module_19900.c b/src/modules/module_19900.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e8ed15ccf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/modules/module_19900.c @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +/** + * Author......: See docs/credits.txt + * License.....: MIT + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "types.h" +#include "modules.h" +#include "bitops.h" +#include "convert.h" +#include "shared.h" + +static const u32 ATTACK_EXEC = ATTACK_EXEC_OUTSIDE_KERNEL; +static const u32 DGST_POS0 = 0; +static const u32 DGST_POS1 = 1; +static const u32 DGST_POS2 = 2; +static const u32 DGST_POS3 = 3; +static const u32 DGST_SIZE = DGST_SIZE_4_4; +static const u32 HASH_CATEGORY = HASH_CATEGORY_NETWORK_PROTOCOL; +static const char *HASH_NAME = "Kerberos 5 Pre-Auth etype 18 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96)"; +static const u64 KERN_TYPE = 19900; +static const u32 OPTI_TYPE = OPTI_TYPE_ZERO_BYTE + | OPTI_TYPE_NOT_ITERATED + | OPTI_TYPE_SLOW_HASH_SIMD_LOOP; +static const u64 OPTS_TYPE = OPTS_TYPE_PT_GENERATE_LE; +static const u32 SALT_TYPE = SALT_TYPE_EMBEDDED; +static const char *ST_PASS = "hashcat"; +static const char *ST_HASH = "$krb5pa$18$hashcat$HASHCATDOMAIN.COM$96c289009b05181bfd32062962740b1b1ce5f74eb12e0266cde74e81094661addab08c0c1a178882c91a0ed89ae4e0e68d2820b9cce69770"; + +u32 module_attack_exec (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ATTACK_EXEC; } +u32 module_dgst_pos0 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS0; } +u32 module_dgst_pos1 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS1; } +u32 module_dgst_pos2 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS2; } +u32 module_dgst_pos3 (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_POS3; } +u32 module_dgst_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return DGST_SIZE; } +u32 module_hash_category (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_CATEGORY; } +const char *module_hash_name (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return HASH_NAME; } +u64 module_kern_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return KERN_TYPE; } +u32 module_opti_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTI_TYPE; } +u64 module_opts_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return OPTS_TYPE; } +u32 module_salt_type (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return SALT_TYPE; } +const char *module_st_hash (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_HASH; } +const char *module_st_pass (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) { return ST_PASS; } + +typedef struct krb5pa_18 +{ + u32 user[128]; + u32 domain[128]; + u32 account_info[512]; + u32 account_info_len; + + u32 checksum[3]; + u32 enc_timestamp[32]; + u32 enc_timestamp_len; + +} krb5pa_18_t; + +typedef struct krb5pa_18_tmp +{ + u32 ipad[5]; + u32 opad[5]; + u32 dgst[16]; + u32 out[16]; + +} krb5pa_18_tmp_t; + +static const char *SIGNATURE_KRB5PA = "$krb5pa$18$"; + +u64 module_tmp_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 tmp_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5pa_18_tmp_t); + + return tmp_size; +} + +u64 module_esalt_size (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_t *user_options, MAYBE_UNUSED const user_options_extra_t *user_options_extra) +{ + const u64 esalt_size = (const u64) sizeof (krb5pa_18_t); + + return esalt_size; +} + +int module_hash_decode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED hashinfo_t *hash_info, const char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_len) +{ + u32 *digest = (u32 *) digest_buf; + + krb5pa_18_t *krb5pa = (krb5pa_18_t *) esalt_buf; + + token_t token; + + token.signatures_cnt = 1; + token.signatures_buf[0] = SIGNATURE_KRB5PA; + + token.len[0] = 11; + token.attr[0] = TOKEN_ATTR_FIXED_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_SIGNATURE; + + /** + * $krb5pa$18$*user*realm*$enc_timestamp+checksum + */ + + // assume no signature found + if (line_len < 11) return (PARSER_SALT_LENGTH); + + // assume $krb5pa$18$user$realm$enc_timestamp+checksum + token.token_cnt = 4; + + token.sep[1] = '$'; + token.len_min[1] = 1; + token.len_max[1] = 512; + token.attr[1] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + token.sep[2] = '$'; + token.len_min[2] = 1; + token.len_max[2] = 512; + token.attr[2] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH; + + token.sep[3] = '$'; + token.len_min[3] = 104; + token.len_max[3] = 112; + token.attr[3] = TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_LENGTH + | TOKEN_ATTR_VERIFY_HEX; + + const int rc_tokenizer = input_tokenizer ((const u8 *) line_buf, line_len, &token); + + if (rc_tokenizer != PARSER_OK) return (rc_tokenizer); + + const u8 *user_pos; + const u8 *domain_pos; + const u8 *data_pos; + const u8 *checksum_pos; + + int user_len; + int domain_len; + int data_len; + int account_info_len; + + user_pos = token.buf[1]; + user_len = token.len[1]; + + memcpy(krb5pa->user, user_pos, user_len); + + domain_pos = token.buf[2]; + domain_len = token.len[2]; + + memcpy(krb5pa->domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + + data_pos = token.buf[3]; + data_len = token.len[3]; + + account_info_len = token.len[2] + token.len[1]; + + u8 *account_info_ptr = (u8 *) krb5pa->account_info; + + // domain must be uppercase + u8 domain[128]; + memcpy(domain, domain_pos, domain_len); + uppercase(domain, domain_len); + + memcpy(account_info_ptr, domain, domain_len); + memcpy(account_info_ptr + domain_len, user_pos, user_len); + + krb5pa->account_info_len = account_info_len; + + // Split checksum + checksum_pos = data_pos + data_len - 24; + data_len = data_len - 24; + + // hmac-sha1 is reduced to 12 bytes + krb5pa->checksum[0] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 0)); + krb5pa->checksum[1] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 8)); + krb5pa->checksum[2] = byte_swap_32 (hex_to_u32 (checksum_pos + 16)); + + u8 *edata_ptr = (u8 *) krb5pa->enc_timestamp; + + for (int i = 0; i < data_len; i += 2) + { + const u8 p0 = data_pos[i + 0]; + const u8 p1 = data_pos[i + 1]; + + *edata_ptr++ = hex_convert (p1) << 0 + | hex_convert (p0) << 4; + } + + krb5pa->enc_timestamp_len = data_len / 2; + + salt->salt_buf[0] = krb5pa->checksum[0]; + salt->salt_buf[1] = krb5pa->checksum[1]; + salt->salt_buf[2] = krb5pa->checksum[2]; + + salt->salt_iter = 4096 - 1; + + digest[0] = krb5pa->checksum[0]; + digest[1] = krb5pa->checksum[1]; + digest[2] = krb5pa->checksum[2]; + digest[3] = 0; + + return (PARSER_OK); +} + +int module_hash_encode (MAYBE_UNUSED const hashconfig_t *hashconfig, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *digest_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const salt_t *salt, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *esalt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const void *hook_salt_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const hashinfo_t *hash_info, char *line_buf, MAYBE_UNUSED const int line_size) +{ + const krb5pa_18_t *krb5pa = (const krb5pa_18_t *) esalt_buf; + + char data[32 * 4 * 2] = { 0 }; + + for (u32 i = 0, j = 0; i < krb5pa->enc_timestamp_len; i += 1, j += 2) + { + u8 *ptr_enc_timestamp = (u8 *) krb5pa->enc_timestamp; + + sprintf (data + j, "%02x", ptr_enc_timestamp[i]); + } + + const int line_len = snprintf (line_buf, line_size, "%s%s$%s$%s%08x%08x%08x", + SIGNATURE_KRB5PA, + (char *) krb5pa->user, + (char *) krb5pa->domain, + data, + krb5pa->checksum[0], + krb5pa->checksum[1], + krb5pa->checksum[2]); + + return line_len; +} + +void module_init (module_ctx_t *module_ctx) +{ + module_ctx->module_context_size = MODULE_CONTEXT_SIZE_CURRENT; + module_ctx->module_interface_version = MODULE_INTERFACE_VERSION_CURRENT; + + module_ctx->module_attack_exec = module_attack_exec; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_esalt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_hook_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_mask = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_benchmark_salt = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_build_plain_postprocess = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_deep_comp_kernel = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos0 = module_dgst_pos0; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos1 = module_dgst_pos1; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos2 = module_dgst_pos2; + module_ctx->module_dgst_pos3 = module_dgst_pos3; + module_ctx->module_dgst_size = module_dgst_size; + module_ctx->module_dictstat_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_esalt_size = module_esalt_size; + module_ctx->module_extra_buffer_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_extra_tmp_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_forced_outfile_format = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_count = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_parse = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_binary_save = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode_zero_hash = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_decode = module_hash_decode; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_status = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode_potfile = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_encode = module_hash_encode; + module_ctx->module_hash_init_selftest = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_mode = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hash_category = module_hash_category; + module_ctx->module_hash_name = module_hash_name; + module_ctx->module_hlfmt_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook12 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook23 = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_salt_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_hook_size = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_build_options = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_jit_cache_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_accel_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_loops_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kernel_threads_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_kern_type = module_kern_type; + module_ctx->module_kern_type_dynamic = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_opti_type = module_opti_type; + module_ctx->module_opts_type = module_opts_type; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_outfile_check_nocomp = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_custom_check = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_potfile_keep_all_hashes = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pwdump_column = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_pw_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_max = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_min = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_salt_type = module_salt_type; + module_ctx->module_separator = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_st_hash = module_st_hash; + module_ctx->module_st_pass = module_st_pass; + module_ctx->module_tmp_size = module_tmp_size; + module_ctx->module_unstable_warning = MODULE_DEFAULT; + module_ctx->module_warmup_disable = MODULE_DEFAULT; +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m19800.pm b/tools/test_modules/m19800.pm new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7dcc32566 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/test_modules/m19800.pm @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +## +## Author......: See docs/credits.txt +## License.....: MIT +## + +use strict; +use warnings; + +use Digest::SHA qw (hmac_sha1); +use Crypt::Mode::CBC; +use Crypt::PBKDF2; +use Encode; +use POSIX qw (strftime); + +sub byte2hex +{ + my $input = shift; + return unpack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub hex2byte +{ + my $input = shift; + return pack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub pad +{ + my $n = shift; + my $size = shift; + + return (~$n + 1) & ($size - 1); +} + +sub module_constraints { [[0, 256], [16, 16], [-1, -1], [-1, -1], [-1, -1]] } + +sub module_generate_hash +{ + my $word = shift; + my $salt = shift; + my $user = shift // "user"; + my $realm = shift // "realm"; + my $checksum = shift; + my $enc_timestamp = shift; + + my $mysalt = uc $realm; + $mysalt = $mysalt . $user; + + # first we generate the 'seed' + my $iter = 4096; + my $pbkdf2 = Crypt::PBKDF2->new + ( + hash_class => 'HMACSHA1', + iterations => $iter, + output_len => 16 + ); + + my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word); + + # we can precompute this + my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93'); + + my $b_iv = hex2byte('0' x 32); + + # 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ki' (for final hmac-sha1) + # and 'ke' (AES key to decrypt/encrypt the ticket) + my $cbc = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ('AES', 0); + my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv); + + # precomputed stuff + # nfold 0x0000000155 to 16 bytes + my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte('5b582c160a5aa80556ab55aad5402ab5'); + + # nfold 0x00000001aa to 16 bytes + my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte('ae2c160b04ad5006ab55aad56a80355a'); + + my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + + my $b_ke = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded2, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + my $cleartext_ticket = ''; + my $check_correct = 0; + + if (defined $enc_timestamp) + { + # Do CTS Decryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_stealing + # Decrypt n-1 block + my $len_last_block = length($enc_timestamp) % 32; + + my $len_last_2_blocks = $len_last_block + 32; + + my $b_n_1_block = hex2byte (substr($enc_timestamp, -$len_last_2_blocks, 32)); + + my $b_n_1_decrypted = $cbc->decrypt ($b_n_1_block, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + # Pad the last block with last bytes from the decrypted n-1 + my $b_padded_enc_ticket = hex2byte($enc_timestamp).(substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block/2)); + + # Swap the last two blocks + my $b_cbc_enc_ticket = (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, 0, -32).(substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -16, 16). + (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -32, 16); + + # Decrypt and truncate + my $b_dec_ticket_padded = $cbc->decrypt ($b_cbc_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_cleartext_ticket = substr $b_dec_ticket_padded, 0, length($enc_timestamp)/2; + + $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex($b_cleartext_ticket); + + my $check_correct = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") && + (substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 36, 1) eq "Z")); + + if ($check_correct == 1 && defined $checksum) + { + my $b_checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki); + + $check_correct = ($checksum eq byte2hex(substr $b_checksum, 0, 12)); + } + } + + if ($check_correct != 1) + { + # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end + #up with false positives all the time) + $cleartext_ticket = '68c8459f3f10c851b8827118bb459c6e301aa011180f323031'. +'32313131363134323835355aa10502030c28a2'; + + # we have what is required to compute checksum + $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki); + + $checksum = byte2hex(substr $checksum, 0, 12); + } + + # CTS Encrypt our new block + my $len_cleartext_last_block = length($cleartext_ticket)%32; + my $cleartext_last_block = substr $cleartext_ticket, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $padding = pad(length($cleartext_ticket), 32); + + my $b_cleartext_last_block_padded = hex2byte($cleartext_last_block . '0' x $padding); + + # we will encrypt until n-1 block (included) + my $truncated_cleartext_ticket = substr $cleartext_ticket, 0, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $b_truncated_enc_ticket = $cbc->encrypt (hex2byte($truncated_cleartext_ticket), $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block= substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, -16; + + my $b_enc_last_block = substr $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block, 0, $len_cleartext_last_block/2; + + # we now craft the new n-1 block + my $tmp = $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block ^ $b_cleartext_last_block_padded; + + $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block = $cbc->encrypt ($tmp, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + $tmp = substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, 0, -16; + + $enc_timestamp = $tmp . $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block . $b_enc_last_block; + + my $tmp_hash = sprintf ('$krb5pa$17$%s$%s$%s%s', $user, $realm, unpack ("H*", $enc_timestamp), $checksum); + + return $tmp_hash; +} + +sub module_verify_hash +{ + my $line = shift; + + my ($hash, $word) = split (':', $line); + + return unless defined $hash; + return unless defined $word; + + my @data = split ('\$', $hash); + + return unless scalar @data == 6; + + shift @data; + + my $signature = shift @data; + my $algorithm = shift @data; + my $user = shift @data; + my $realm = shift @data; + my $edata = shift @data; + + + return unless ($signature eq "krb5pa"); + return unless ($algorithm eq "17"); + return unless (length ($edata) >= 88); + return unless (length ($edata) <= 112); + + my $checksum = substr $edata, -24; + my $enc_timestamp = substr $edata, 0, -24; + + my $word_packed = pack_if_HEX_notation ($word); + + my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed, undef, $user, $realm, $checksum, $enc_timestamp); + + return ($new_hash, $word); +} + +1; diff --git a/tools/test_modules/m19900.pm b/tools/test_modules/m19900.pm new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b95dc9743 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/test_modules/m19900.pm @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env perl + +## +## Author......: See docs/credits.txt +## License.....: MIT +## + +use strict; +use warnings; + +use Digest::SHA qw (hmac_sha1); +use Crypt::Mode::CBC; +use Crypt::PBKDF2; +use Encode; +use POSIX qw (strftime); + +sub byte2hex +{ + my $input = shift; + return unpack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub hex2byte +{ + my $input = shift; + return pack ("H*", $input); +} + +sub pad +{ + my $n = shift; + my $size = shift; + + return (~$n + 1) & ($size - 1); +} + +sub module_constraints { [[0, 256], [16, 16], [-1, -1], [-1, -1], [-1, -1]] } + +sub module_generate_hash +{ + my $word = shift; + my $salt = shift; + my $user = shift // "user"; + my $realm = shift // "realm"; + my $checksum = shift; + my $enc_timestamp = shift; + + my $mysalt = uc $realm; + $mysalt = $mysalt . $user; + + # first we generate the 'seed' + my $iter = 4096; + my $pbkdf2 = Crypt::PBKDF2->new + ( + hash_class => 'HMACSHA1', + iterations => $iter, + output_len => 32 + ); + + my $b_seed = $pbkdf2->PBKDF2 ($mysalt, $word); + + # we can precompute this + my $b_kerberos_nfolded = hex2byte('6b65726265726f737b9b5b2b93132b93'); + + my $b_iv = hex2byte('0' x 32); + + # 'key_bytes' will be the AES key used to generate 'ki' (for final hmac-sha1) + # and 'ke' (AES key to decrypt/encrypt the ticket) + my $cbc = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new ('AES', 0); + my $b_key_bytes = $cbc->encrypt ($b_kerberos_nfolded, $b_seed, $b_iv); + + $b_key_bytes = $b_key_bytes . $cbc->encrypt ($b_key_bytes, $b_seed, $b_iv); + + # precomputed stuff + # nfold 0x0000000155 to 16 bytes + my $b_nfolded1 = hex2byte('5b582c160a5aa80556ab55aad5402ab5'); + + # nfold 0x00000001aa to 16 bytes + my $b_nfolded2 = hex2byte('ae2c160b04ad5006ab55aad56a80355a'); + + my $b_ki = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded1, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + $b_ki = $b_ki . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ki, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + my $b_ke = $cbc->encrypt ($b_nfolded2, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + $b_ke = $b_ke . $cbc->encrypt ($b_ke, $b_key_bytes, $b_iv); + + my $cleartext_ticket = ''; + my $check_correct = 0; + + if (defined $enc_timestamp) + { + # Do CTS Decryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_stealing + # Decrypt n-1 block + my $len_last_block = length($enc_timestamp) % 32; + + my $len_last_2_blocks = $len_last_block + 32; + + my $b_n_1_block = hex2byte (substr($enc_timestamp, -$len_last_2_blocks, 32)); + + my $b_n_1_decrypted = $cbc->decrypt ($b_n_1_block, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + # Pad the last block with last bytes from the decrypted n-1 + my $b_padded_enc_ticket = hex2byte($enc_timestamp).(substr $b_n_1_decrypted, -(16 - $len_last_block/2)); + + # Swap the last two blocks + my $b_cbc_enc_ticket = (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, 0, -32).(substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -16, 16). + (substr $b_padded_enc_ticket, -32, 16); + + # Decrypt and truncate + my $b_dec_ticket_padded = $cbc->decrypt ($b_cbc_enc_ticket, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_cleartext_ticket = substr $b_dec_ticket_padded, 0, length($enc_timestamp)/2; + + $cleartext_ticket = byte2hex($b_cleartext_ticket); + + my $check_correct = ((substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 22, 2) eq "20") && + (substr ($b_cleartext_ticket, 36, 1) eq "Z")); + + if ($check_correct == 1 && defined $checksum) + { + my $b_checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki); + + $check_correct = ($checksum eq byte2hex(substr $b_checksum, 0, 12)); + } + } + + if ($check_correct != 1) + { + # fake/wrong ticket (otherwise if we just decrypt/encrypt we end + #up with false positives all the time) + $cleartext_ticket = '68c8459f3f10c851b8827118bb459c6e301aa011180f323031'. +'32313131363134323835355aa10502030c28a2'; + + # we have what is required to compute checksum + $checksum = hmac_sha1 (hex2byte($cleartext_ticket), $b_ki); + + $checksum = byte2hex(substr $checksum, 0, 12); + } + + # CTS Encrypt our new block + my $len_cleartext_last_block = length($cleartext_ticket)%32; + my $cleartext_last_block = substr $cleartext_ticket, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $padding = pad(length($cleartext_ticket), 32); + + my $b_cleartext_last_block_padded = hex2byte($cleartext_last_block . '0' x $padding); + + # we will encrypt until n-1 block (included) + my $truncated_cleartext_ticket = substr $cleartext_ticket, 0, -$len_cleartext_last_block; + + my $b_truncated_enc_ticket = $cbc->encrypt (hex2byte($truncated_cleartext_ticket), $b_ke, $b_iv); + + my $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block= substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, -16; + + my $b_enc_last_block = substr $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block, 0, $len_cleartext_last_block/2; + + # we now craft the new n-1 block + my $tmp = $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block ^ $b_cleartext_last_block_padded; + + $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block = $cbc->encrypt ($tmp, $b_ke, $b_iv); + + $tmp = substr $b_truncated_enc_ticket, 0, -16; + + $enc_timestamp = $tmp . $b_enc_ticket_n_1_block . $b_enc_last_block; + + my $tmp_hash = sprintf ('$krb5pa$18$%s$%s$%s%s', $user, $realm, unpack ("H*", $enc_timestamp), $checksum); + + return $tmp_hash; +} + +sub module_verify_hash +{ + my $line = shift; + + my ($hash, $word) = split (':', $line); + + return unless defined $hash; + return unless defined $word; + + my @data = split ('\$', $hash); + + return unless scalar @data == 6; + + shift @data; + + my $signature = shift @data; + my $algorithm = shift @data; + my $user = shift @data; + my $realm = shift @data; + my $edata = shift @data; + + return unless ($signature eq "krb5pa"); + return unless ($algorithm eq "18"); + return unless (length ($edata) >= 88); + return unless (length ($edata) <= 112); + + my $checksum = substr $edata, -24; + my $enc_timestamp = substr $edata, 0, -24; + + my $word_packed = pack_if_HEX_notation ($word); + + my $new_hash = module_generate_hash ($word_packed, undef, $user, $realm, $checksum, $enc_timestamp); + + return ($new_hash, $word); +} + +1;