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hashcat/deps/unrar/extinfo.cpp

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#include "rar.hpp"
#include "hardlinks.cpp"
#include "win32stm.cpp"
#ifdef _WIN_ALL
#include "win32acl.cpp"
#include "win32lnk.cpp"
#endif
#ifdef _UNIX
#include "uowners.cpp"
#ifdef SAVE_LINKS
#include "ulinks.cpp"
#endif
#endif
// RAR2 service header extra records.
#ifndef SFX_MODULE
void SetExtraInfo20(CommandData *Cmd,Archive &Arc,wchar *Name)
{
if (Cmd->Test)
return;
switch(Arc.SubBlockHead.SubType)
{
#ifdef _UNIX
case UO_HEAD:
if (Cmd->ProcessOwners)
ExtractUnixOwner20(Arc,Name);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WIN_ALL
case NTACL_HEAD:
if (Cmd->ProcessOwners)
ExtractACL20(Arc,Name);
break;
case STREAM_HEAD:
ExtractStreams20(Arc,Name);
break;
#endif
}
}
#endif
// RAR3 and RAR5 service header extra records.
void SetExtraInfo(CommandData *Cmd,Archive &Arc,wchar *Name)
{
#ifdef _UNIX
if (!Cmd->Test && Cmd->ProcessOwners && Arc.Format==RARFMT15 &&
Arc.SubHead.CmpName(SUBHEAD_TYPE_UOWNER))
ExtractUnixOwner30(Arc,Name);
#endif
#ifdef _WIN_ALL
if (!Cmd->Test && Cmd->ProcessOwners && Arc.SubHead.CmpName(SUBHEAD_TYPE_ACL))
ExtractACL(Arc,Name);
if (Arc.SubHead.CmpName(SUBHEAD_TYPE_STREAM))
ExtractStreams(Arc,Name,Cmd->Test);
#endif
}
// Extra data stored directly in file header.
void SetFileHeaderExtra(CommandData *Cmd,Archive &Arc,wchar *Name)
{
#ifdef _UNIX
if (Cmd->ProcessOwners && Arc.Format==RARFMT50 && Arc.FileHead.UnixOwnerSet)
SetUnixOwner(Arc,Name);
#endif
}
// Calculate a number of path components except \. and \..
static int CalcAllowedDepth(const wchar *Name)
{
int AllowedDepth=0;
while (*Name!=0)
{
if (IsPathDiv(Name[0]) && Name[1]!=0 && !IsPathDiv(Name[1]))
{
bool Dot=Name[1]=='.' && (IsPathDiv(Name[2]) || Name[2]==0);
bool Dot2=Name[1]=='.' && Name[2]=='.' && (IsPathDiv(Name[3]) || Name[3]==0);
if (!Dot && !Dot2)
AllowedDepth++;
}
Name++;
}
return AllowedDepth;
}
// Check if all existing path components are directories and not links.
static bool LinkInPath(const wchar *Name)
{
wchar Path[NM];
if (wcslen(Name)>=ASIZE(Path))
return true; // It should not be that long, skip.
wcsncpyz(Path,Name,ASIZE(Path));
for (wchar *s=Path+wcslen(Path)-1;s>Path;s--)
if (IsPathDiv(*s))
{
*s=0;
FindData FD;
if (FindFile::FastFind(Path,&FD,true) && (FD.IsLink || !FD.IsDir))
return true;
}
return false;
}
// Delete symbolic links in file path, if any, and replace them by directories.
// Prevents extracting files outside of destination folder with symlink chains.
bool LinksToDirs(const wchar *SrcName,const wchar *SkipPart,std::wstring &LastChecked)
{
// Unlike Unix, Windows doesn't expand lnk1 in symlink targets like
// "lnk1/../dir", but converts the path to "dir". In Unix we need to call
// this function to prevent placing unpacked files outside of destination
// folder if previously we unpacked "dir/lnk1" -> "..",
// "dir/lnk2" -> "lnk1/.." and "dir/lnk2/anypath/poc.txt".
// We may still need this function to prevent abusing symlink chains
// in link source path if we remove detection of such chains
// in IsRelativeSymlinkSafe. This function seems to make other symlink
// related safety checks redundant, but for now we prefer to keep them too.
//
// 2022.12.01: the performance impact is minimized after adding the check
// against the previous path and enabling this verification only after
// extracting a symlink with ".." in target. So we enabled it for Windows
// as well for extra safety.
//#ifdef _UNIX
wchar Path[NM];
if (wcslen(SrcName)>=ASIZE(Path))
return false; // It should not be that long, skip.
wcsncpyz(Path,SrcName,ASIZE(Path));
size_t SkipLength=wcslen(SkipPart);
if (SkipLength>0 && wcsncmp(Path,SkipPart,SkipLength)!=0)
SkipLength=0; // Parameter validation, not really needed now.
// Do not check parts already checked in previous path to improve performance.
for (uint I=0;Path[I]!=0 && I<LastChecked.size() && Path[I]==LastChecked[I];I++)
if (IsPathDiv(Path[I]) && I>SkipLength)
SkipLength=I;
wchar *Name=Path;
if (SkipLength>0)
{
// Avoid converting symlinks in destination path part specified by user.
Name+=SkipLength;
while (IsPathDiv(*Name))
Name++;
}
for (wchar *s=Path+wcslen(Path)-1;s>Name;s--)
if (IsPathDiv(*s))
{
*s=0;
FindData FD;
if (FindFile::FastFind(Path,&FD,true) && FD.IsLink)
#ifdef _WIN_ALL
if (!DelDir(Path))
#else
if (!DelFile(Path))
#endif
return false; // Couldn't delete the symlink to replace it with directory.
}
LastChecked=SrcName;
//#endif
return true;
}
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bool IsRelativeSymlinkSafe(CommandData *Cmd,const wchar *SrcName,const wchar *PrepSrcName,const wchar *TargetName)
{
// Catch root dir based /path/file paths also as stuff like \\?\.
// Do not check PrepSrcName here, it can be root based if destination path
// is a root based.
if (IsFullRootPath(SrcName) || IsFullRootPath(TargetName))
return false;
// Number of ".." in link target.
int UpLevels=0;
for (int Pos=0;*TargetName!=0;Pos++)
{
bool Dot2=TargetName[0]=='.' && TargetName[1]=='.' &&
(IsPathDiv(TargetName[2]) || TargetName[2]==0) &&
(Pos==0 || IsPathDiv(*(TargetName-1)));
if (Dot2)
UpLevels++;
TargetName++;
}
// If link target includes "..", it must not have another links in its
// source path, because they can bypass our safety check. For example,
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// suppose we extracted "lnk1" -> "." first and "lnk1/lnk2" -> ".." next
// or "dir/lnk1" -> ".." first, "dir/lnk1/lnk2" -> ".." next and
// file "dir/lnk1/lnk2/poc.txt" last.
// Do not confuse with link chains in target, this is in link source path.
// It is important for Windows too, though this check can be omitted
// if LinksToDirs is invoked in Windows as well.
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if (UpLevels>0 && LinkInPath(PrepSrcName))
return false;
// We could check just prepared src name, but for extra safety
// we check both original (as from archive header) and prepared
// (after applying the destination path and -ep switches) names.
int AllowedDepth=CalcAllowedDepth(SrcName); // Original name depth.
// Remove the destination path from prepared name if any. We should not
// count the destination path depth, because the link target must point
// inside of this path, not outside of it.
size_t ExtrPathLength=wcslen(Cmd->ExtrPath);
if (ExtrPathLength>0 && wcsncmp(PrepSrcName,Cmd->ExtrPath,ExtrPathLength)==0)
{
PrepSrcName+=ExtrPathLength;
while (IsPathDiv(*PrepSrcName))
PrepSrcName++;
}
int PrepAllowedDepth=CalcAllowedDepth(PrepSrcName);
return AllowedDepth>=UpLevels && PrepAllowedDepth>=UpLevels;
}
bool ExtractSymlink(CommandData *Cmd,ComprDataIO &DataIO,Archive &Arc,const wchar *LinkName,bool &UpLink)
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{
// Returning true in Uplink indicates that link target might include ".."
// and enables additional checks. It is ok to falsely return true here,
// as it implies only the minor performance penalty. But we shall always
// return true for links with ".." in target for security reason.
UpLink=true; // Assume the target might include potentially unsafe "..".
#if defined(SAVE_LINKS) && defined(_UNIX) || defined(_WIN_ALL)
if (Arc.Format==RARFMT50) // For RAR5 archives we can check RedirName for both Unix and Windows.
UpLink=wcsstr(Arc.FileHead.RedirName,L"..")!=NULL;
#endif
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#if defined(SAVE_LINKS) && defined(_UNIX)
// For RAR 3.x archives we process links even in test mode to skip link data.
if (Arc.Format==RARFMT15)
return ExtractUnixLink30(Cmd,DataIO,Arc,LinkName,UpLink);
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if (Arc.Format==RARFMT50)
return ExtractUnixLink50(Cmd,LinkName,&Arc.FileHead);
#elif defined(_WIN_ALL)
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// RAR 5.0 archives store link information in file header, so there is
// no need to additionally test it if we do not create a file.
if (Arc.Format==RARFMT50)
return CreateReparsePoint(Cmd,LinkName,&Arc.FileHead);
#endif
return false;
}