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668 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
[[tx_fees]]
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== Transaction Fees
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The digital signature we saw Alice create in <<c_signatures>> only
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proves that she knows her private key and that she committed to a
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transaction that pays Bob. She can create another signature that
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instead commits to a transaction paying Carol--a transaction that spends
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the same output (bitcoins) that she used to pay Bob. Those two
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transactions((("conflicting transactions")))((("transactions", "conflicts in"))) are now _conflicting transactions_ because only one
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transaction spending a particular output can be included in the valid
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blockchain with the most proof of work--the blockchain that full nodes
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use to determine which keys control which bitcoins.
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To protect himself against conflicting transactions, it would be wise
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for Bob to wait until the transaction from Alice is included in the
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blockchain to a sufficient depth before he considers the money he
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received as his to spend (see <<confirmations>>).
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For Alice's transaction to be included in the
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blockchain, it must be included in a _block_ of transactions. There are
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a limited number of((("blocks", "transactions in")))((("transactions", "in blocks", secondary-sortas="blocks"))) blocks produced in a given amount of time and each
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block only has a limited amount of space. Only the miner who creates
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that block gets to choose which transactions to include. Miners may
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select transactions by any criteria they want, including refusing to
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include any transactions at all.
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[NOTE]
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====
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When we((("transactions", "coinbase")))((("coinbase transactions"))) say "transactions" in this chapter, we refer to every
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transaction in a block except for the first transaction. The first
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transaction in a block is a _coinbase transaction_, described in
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<<coinbase_transactions>>, which allows the miner of the block to
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collect their reward for producing the block. Unlike other
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transactions, a coinbase transaction doesn't spend the output of a
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previous transaction and is also an exception to several other rules
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that apply to other transactions. Coinbase transactions don't pay
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transaction fees, don't need to be fee bumped, aren't subject to
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transaction pinning, and are largely uninteresting to the following
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discussion about fees--so we're going to ignore them in this chapter.
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====
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The criterion that almost all miners use to select which transactions to
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include in their blocks is to maximize their revenue. Bitcoin was
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specifically designed to accommodate this by providing a mechanism that
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allows a transaction to give money to the miner who includes that
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transaction in a block. We call that mechanism _transaction fees_,
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although it's not a fee in the usual sense of that word. It's not an
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amount set by the protocol or by any particular miner--it's much more
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like a bid in an auction. The good being purchased is the portion of
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limited space in a block that a transaction will consume. Miners choose
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the set of transactions whose bids will allow them to earn the greatest
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revenue.
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In this chapter, we'll explore various aspects of those
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bids--transaction fees--and how they influence the creation and
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management of Bitcoin transactions.
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=== Who Pays the Transaction Fee?
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Most ((("transaction fees", "responsibility for", id="fees-responsibility")))((("payments", "transaction fees", see="transaction fees")))((("fees", see="transaction fees")))payment systems involve some sort of fee for transacting, but
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often this fee is hidden from typical buyers. For example, a merchant
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may advertise the same item for the same price whether you pay with cash
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or a credit card even though their payment processor may charge them
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a higher fee for credit transactions than their bank charges them for
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cash deposits.
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In Bitcoin, every spend of bitcoins must be authenticated (typically
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with a signature), so it's not possible for a transaction to pay a fee
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without the permission of the spender. It is possible for the receiver
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of a transaction to pay a fee in a different transaction--and we'll see
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that in use later--but if we want a single transaction to pay its own
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fee, that fee needs to be something agreed upon by the spender. It
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can't be hidden.
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Bitcoin transactions are designed so that it doesn't take any extra
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space in a transaction for a spender to commit to the fee it pays. That
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means that, even though it's possible to pay the fee in a different
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transaction, it's most efficient (and thus cheapest) to pay the fee in a
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single transaction.
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In Bitcoin,
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the fee is a bid and the amount paid contributes to determining how long
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it will take the transaction to confirm. Both spenders and receivers of
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a payment typically have an interest in having it confirming quickly, so
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normally allowing only spenders to choose fees can sometimes be a
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problem; we'll look at a solution to that problem in <<cpfp>>. However,
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in many common payment flows, the parties with the highest desire to see a
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transaction confirm quickly--that is, the parties who'd be the most
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willing to pay higher fees--are the spenders.
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For those reasons, both technical and practical, it is customary in
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Bitcoin for spenders to pay transaction fees. There are exceptions,
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such as for merchants that accept unconfirmed transactions and in
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protocols that don't immediately broadcast transactions after they are
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signed (preventing the spender from being able to choose an appropriate
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fee for the current market). We'll explore those exceptions((("transaction fees", "responsibility for", startref="fees-responsibility"))) later.
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=== Fees and Fee Rates
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Each ((("transaction fees", "fee rates", id="fees-rates")))((("fee rates", id="fee-rate")))transaction only pays a single fee--it doesn't matter how large the
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transaction is. However, the larger transactions become, the fewer of
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them a miner will be able to fit in a block. For that reason, miners
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evaluate transactions the same way you might comparison shop between
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several equivalent items at the market: they divide the price by the
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quantity.
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Whereas you might divide the cost of several different bags of rice by
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each bag's weight to find the lowest price per weight (best deal), miners
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divide the fee of a transaction by its size (also called its weight) to
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find the highest fee per weight (most revenue). In Bitcoin, we use the
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term _fee rate_ for a transaction's size divided by weight. Due to
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changes in Bitcoin over the years, fee rate can be expressed in
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different units:
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- BTC/Bytes (a legacy unit rarely used anymore)
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- BTC/Kilobytes (a legacy unit rarely used anymore)
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- BTC/Vbytes (rarely used)
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- BTC/Kilo-vbyte (used mainly in Bitcoin Core)
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- Satoshi/Vbyte (most commonly used today)
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- Satoshi/Weight (also commonly used today)
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We recommend either the sat/vbyte or sat/weight units for displaying
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fee rates.
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[WARNING]
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====
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Be careful ((("absurd fees")))((("excessive fees")))((("transaction fees", "overpaying")))((("overpaying transaction fees")))accepting input for fee rates. If a user copies and pastes a
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fee rate printed in one denominator into a field using a different
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enumerator, they could overpay fees by 1,000 times. If they instead
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switch the enumerator, they could theoretically overpay by 100,000,000
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times. Wallets should make it hard for the user to pay an excessive
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fee rate and may want to prompt the user to confirm any fee rate that was
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not generated by the wallet itself using a trusted data source.
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An excessive fee, also called an _absurd fee_, is any fee rate that's
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significantly higher than the amount that fee rate estimators currently
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expect is necessary to get a transaction confirmed in the next block.
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Note that wallets should not entirely prevent users from choosing an
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excessive fee rate--they should only make using such a fee rate hard to do
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by accident. There are legitimate reasons for users to overpay fees on
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rare occasions.
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====
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=== Estimating Appropriate Fee Rates
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We've ((("estimating fee rates", id="estimate-fee-rate")))established that you can pay a lower fee rate if you're willing to
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wait longer for your transaction to be confirmed, with the exception
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that paying too low of a fee rate could result in your transaction never
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confirming. Because fee rates are bids in an open auction for block
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space, it's not possible to perfectly predict what fee rate you need to
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pay to get your transaction confirmed by a certain time. However, we
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can generate a rough estimate based on what fee rates other transactions
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have paid in the recent past.
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A full node can record three pieces of information about each
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transactions it sees: the time (block height) when it first received
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that transaction, the block height when that transaction was confirmed,
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and the fee rate paid by that transaction. By grouping together
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transactions that arrived at similar heights, were confirmed at similar
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heights, and which paid similar fees, we can calculate how many blocks it
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took to confirm transactions paying a certain fee rate. We can then
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assume that a transaction paying a similar fee rate now will take a
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similar number of blocks to confirm. Bitcoin Core includes a fee rate
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estimator that uses these principles, which can be called using the
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`estimatesmartfee` RPC with a parameter specifying how many blocks
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you're willing to wait before the transaction is highly likely to
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confirm (for example, 144 blocks is about 1 day):
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----
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$ bitcoin-cli -named estimatesmartfee conf_target=144
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{
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"feerate": 0.00006570,
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"blocks": 144
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}
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----
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Many web-based services also provide fee estimation as an API. For a
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current list, see https://oreil.ly/TB6IN.
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As mentioned, fee rate estimation can never be perfect. One common
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problem is that the fundamental demand might change, adjusting the
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equilibrium and either increasing prices (fees) to new heights or
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decreasing them toward the minimum.
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If fee rates go down, then a transaction
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that previously paid a normal fee rate might now be paying a high fee
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rate and it will be confirmed earlier than expected. There's no way to
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lower the fee rate on a transaction you've already sent, so you're stuck
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paying a higher fee rate. But, when fee rates go up, there's a need for
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methods to be able to increase the fee rates on those transactions,
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which is called _fee bumping_. There are two commonly used types of((("transaction fees", "fee rates", startref="fees-rates")))((("fee rates", startref="fee-rate")))((("estimating fee rates", startref="estimate-fee-rate"))) fee
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bumping in Bitcoin, replace by fee (RBF) and child pays for parent
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(CPFP).
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[[rbf]]
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=== Replace By Fee (RBF) Fee Bumping
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To((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "RBF (replace by fee)", id="transaction-fees-bump-rbf")))((("fee bumping", "RBF (replace by fee)", id="fee-bump-rbf")))((("RBF (replace by fee) fee bumping", id="rbf-ch9"))) increase the fee of a transaction using RBF fee bumping, you create
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a conflicting version of the transaction that pays a higher fee. Two
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or more transactions are considered((("conflicting transactions")))((("transactions", "conflicts in"))) to be _conflicting transactions_ if
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only one of them can be included in a valid blockchain, forcing a miner
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to choose only one of them. Conflicts occur when two or more transactions
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each try to spend one of the same UTXOs, i.e., they each include an input
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that has the same outpoint (reference to the output of a previous
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transaction).
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To prevent someone from consuming large amounts of bandwidth by creating
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an unlimited number of conflicting transactions and sending them through
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the network of relaying full nodes, Bitcoin Core and other full nodes
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that support transaction replacement require each replacement
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transaction to pay a higher fee rate than the transaction being
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replaced. Bitcoin Core also currently requires the replacement
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transaction to pay a higher total fee than the original transaction, but
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this requirement has undesired side effects and developers have been
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looking for ways to remove it at the time of writing.
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Bitcoin Core((("Bitcoin Core", "RBF variants", id="bitcoin-core-rbf"))) currently supports two variations of RBF:
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Opt-in RBF::
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An unconfirmed transaction can signal to miners and full nodes that
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the creator of the transaction wants to allow it to be replaced by a
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higher fee rate version. This signal and the rules for using it
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are specified in BIP125. As of this writing, this has been enabled by
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default in Bitcoin Core for several years.
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Full RBF::
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Any unconfirmed transaction can be replaced by a higher fee rate
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version. As of this writing, this can be optionally enabled in
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Bitcoin Core (but it is disabled by default).
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.Why Are There Two Variants of RBF?
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****
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The reason for the two different versions of RBF is that full RBF has
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been controversial. Early versions of Bitcoin allowed transaction
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replacement but this behavior was disabled for several releases. During
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that time, a miner or full node using the software now called Bitcoin
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Core would not replace the first version of an unconfirmed transaction
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they received with any different version. Some merchants came to expect
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this behavior: they assumed that any valid unconfirmed transaction which
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paid an appropriate fee rate would eventually become a confirmed
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transaction, so they provided their goods or services shortly after
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receiving such an unconfirmed transaction.
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However, there's no way for the Bitcoin protocol to guarantee that any
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unconfirmed transaction will eventually be confirmed. As mentioned
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earlier in this chapter, every miner gets to choose for themselves which
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transactions they will try to confirm--including which versions of those
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transactions. Bitcoin Core is open source software, so anyone with a
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copy of its source code can add (or remove) transaction replacement.
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Even if Bitcoin Core wasn't open source, Bitcoin is an open protocol
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that can be reimplemented from scratch by a sufficiently competent
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programmer, allowing the reimplementor to include or not include
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transaction replacement.
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Transaction replacement breaks the assumption of some merchants that
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every reasonable unconfirmed transaction will eventually be confirmed.
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An alternative version of a transaction can pay the same outputs as the
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original, but it isn't required to pay any of those outputs. If the
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first version of an unconfirmed transaction pays a merchant, the second
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version might not pay them. If the merchant provided goods or services
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based on the first version, but the second version gets confirmed, then
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the merchant will not receive payment for its costs.
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Some merchants, and people supporting them, requested that transaction
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replacement not be reenabled in Bitcoin Core. Other people pointed out
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that transaction replacement provides benefits, including the ability to
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fee bump transactions that initially paid too low of a fee rate.
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Eventually, developers working on Bitcoin Core implemented a compromise:
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instead of allowing every unconfirmed transaction to be replaced (full
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RBF), they only programmed Bitcoin Core to allow replacement of
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transactions that signaled they wanted to allow replacement (opt-in RBF).
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Merchants can check the transactions they receive for the opt-in
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signal and treat those transactions differently than those without the
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signal.
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This doesn't change the fundamental concern: anyone can still alter
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their copy of Bitcoin Core, or create a reimplementation, to allow full
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RBF--and some developers even did this, but seemingly few people used
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their software.
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After several years, developers working on Bitcoin Core changed the
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compromise slightly. In addition to keeping opt-in RBF by default, they
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added an option that allows users to enable full RBF. If enough mining
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hash rate and relaying full nodes enable this option, it will be
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possible for any unconfirmed transaction to eventually be replaced by a
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version paying a higher fee rate. As of this writing, it's not clear
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whether or not that has happened ((("Bitcoin Core", "RBF variants", startref="bitcoin-core-rbf")))yet.
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****
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As a user, if you plan to use RBF fee bumping, you will first need to
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choose a wallet that supports it, such as one of the wallets listed as
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having "Sending support" on
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https://oreil.ly/IhMzx.
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As a developer, if you plan to implement RBF fee bumping, you will first
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need to decided whether to perform opt-in RBF or full RBF. At the time
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of writing, opt-in RBF is the only method that's sure to work. Even if
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full RBF becomes reliable, there will likely be several years where
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replacements of opt-in transactions get confirmed slightly faster than
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full-RBF replacements. If you choose opt-in RBF, your wallet will need
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to implement the signaling specified in BIP125, which is a simple
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modification to any one of the sequence fields in a transaction (see
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<<sequence>>). If you choose full RBF, you don't need to include any
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signaling in your transactions. Everything else related to RBF is the
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same for both approaches.
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When you need to fee bump a transaction, you will simply create a new
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transaction that spends at least one of the same UTXOs as the original
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transaction you want to replace. You will likely want to keep the
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same outputs in the transaction that pay the receiver (or receivers).
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You may pay the increased fee by reducing the value of your change
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output or by adding additional inputs to the transaction. Developers
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should provide users with a fee-bumping interface that does all of this
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work for them and simply asks them (or suggests to them) how much the
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fee rate should be increased.
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[WARNING]
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====
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Be very careful when creating more than one replacement of the same
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transaction. You must ensure than all versions of the transactions
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conflict with each other. If they aren't all conflicts, it may be
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possible for multiple separate transactions to confirm, leading you to
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overpay the receivers. For example:
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- Transaction version 0 includes input _A_.
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- Transaction version 1 includes inputs _A_ and _B_ (e.g., you had to add
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input _B_ to pay the extra fees)
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- Transaction version 2 includes inputs _B_ and _C_ (e.g., you had to add input
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_C_ to pay the extra fees but _C_ was large enough that you no longer
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need input _A_).
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In this scenario, any miner who saved version 0 of the transaction
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will be able to confirm both it and version 2 of the transaction. If
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both versions pay the same receivers, they'll be paid twice (and the
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miner will receive transaction fees from two separate transactions).
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A simple method to avoid this problem is to ensure the replacement
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transaction always includes all of the same inputs as the previous
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version of the transaction.
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====
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The advantage of RBF fee bumping over other types of fee bumping is that
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it can be very efficient at using block space. Often, a replacement
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transaction is the same size as the transaction it replaces. Even when
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it's larger, it's often the same size as the transaction the user would
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have created if they had paid the increased fee rate in the first place.
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The fundamental disadvantage of RBF fee bumping is that it can normally
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only be performed by the creator of the transaction--the person or
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people who were required to provide signatures or other authentication
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data for the transaction. An exception to this is transactions that
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were designed to allow additional inputs to be added by using sighash
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flags (see <<sighash_types>>), but that presents its own challenges. In
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general, if you're the receiver of an unconfirmed transaction and you
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want to make it confirm faster (or at all), you can't use an RBF fee
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bump; you need some other method.
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There are additional problems ((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "RBF (replace by fee)", startref="transaction-fees-bump-rbf")))((("fee bumping", "RBF (replace by fee)", startref="fee-bump-rbf")))((("RBF (replace by fee) fee bumping", startref="rbf-ch9")))with RBF that we'll explore in <<transaction_pinning>>.
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[[cpfp]]
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=== Child Pays for Parent (CPFP) Fee Bumping
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Anyone ((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "CPFP (child pays for parent)", id="transaction-fees-bump-cpfp")))((("fee bumping", "CPFP (child pays for parent)", id="fee-bump-cpfp")))((("CPFP (child pays for parent) fee bumping", id="cpfp")))who receives the output of an unconfirmed transaction can
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incentivize miners to confirm that transaction by spending that output.
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The transaction you want to get confirmed is called the _parent
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transaction_. A transaction that spends an output of the parent
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transaction is called a _child transaction_.
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As we learned in <<outpoints>>, every input in a confirmed transaction
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must reference the unspent output of a transaction that appears earlier
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in the blockchain (whether earlier in the same block or in a previous
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block). That means a miner who wants to confirm a child transaction
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must also ensure that its parent transaction is confirmed. If the
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parent transaction hasn't been confirmed yet but the child transaction
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pays a high enough fee, the miner can consider whether it would be
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profitable to confirm both of them in the same block.
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To evaluate the profitability of mining both a parent and child
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transaction, the miner looks at them as a _package of transactions_ with
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an aggregate size and aggregate fees, from which the fees can be divided
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by the size to calculate((("package fee rate"))) a _package fee rate_. The miner can then sort
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all of the individual transactions and transaction packages they know
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about by fee rate and include the highest-revenue ones in the block
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they're attempting to mine, up to the maximum size (weight) allowed to
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be included in a block. To find even more packages that might be
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profitable to mine, the miner can evaluate packages across multiple
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generations (e.g., an unconfirmed parent transaction being combined with
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both its child and grandchild). This is ((("ancestor fee rate mining")))called _ancestor fee rate
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mining_.
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Bitcoin Core has implemented ancestor fee rate mining for many years,
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and it's believed that almost all miners use it at the time of writing.
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That means it's practical for wallets to use this feature to fee bump an
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incoming transaction by using a child transaction to pay for its parent
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(CPFP).
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CPFP has several advantages over RBF. Anyone who receives an output
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from a transaction can use CPFP--that includes both the receivers of
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payments and the spender (if the spender included a change output). It
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also doesn't require replacing the original transaction, which makes it
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less disruptive to some merchants than RBF.
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The primary disadvantage of CPFP compared to RBF is that CPFP typically
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uses more block space. In RBF, a fee bump transaction is often the same
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size as the transaction it replaces. In CPFP, a fee bump adds a whole
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separate transaction. Using extra block space requires paying extra
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fees beyond the cost of the fee bump.
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There are several challenges with CPFP, some of which we'll explore in
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<<transaction_pinning>>. One other problem that we
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specifically need to mention is the minimum relay fee rate problem,
|
||
which is addressed by ((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "CPFP (child pays for parent)", startref="transaction-fees-bump-cpfp")))((("fee bumping", "CPFP (child pays for parent)", startref="fee-bump-cpfp")))((("CPFP (child pays for parent) fee bumping", startref="cpfp")))package relay.
|
||
|
||
=== Package Relay
|
||
|
||
Early versions((("transaction fees", "package relay", id="transaction-fee-package-relay")))((("package relay", id="package-relay"))) of Bitcoin Core didn't place any limits on the number of
|
||
unconfirmed transactions they stored for later relay and mining in their
|
||
mempools (see <<mempool>>). Of course, computers have physical limits, whether
|
||
it's the memory (RAM) or disk space--it's not possible for a full node
|
||
to store an unlimited number of unconfirmed transactions. Later
|
||
versions of Bitcoin Core limited the size of the mempool to hold about
|
||
one day's worth of transactions, storing only the transactions or packages
|
||
with the highest fee rate.
|
||
|
||
That works extremely well for most things, but it creates a dependency
|
||
problem. In order to calculate the fee rate for a transaction package,
|
||
we need both the parent and descendant transactions--but if the parent
|
||
transaction doesn't pay a high enough fee rate, it won't be kept in a
|
||
node's mempool. If a node receives a child transaction without having
|
||
access to its parent, it can't do anything with that transaction.
|
||
|
||
The solution to this problem is the ability to relay transactions as a
|
||
package, called _package relay_, allowing the receiving node to evaluate
|
||
the fee rate of the entire package before operating on any individual
|
||
transaction. As of this writing, developers working on Bitcoin Core
|
||
have made significant progress on implementing package relay and a
|
||
limited early version of it may be available by the time this book is
|
||
published.
|
||
|
||
Package relay is especially important for protocols based on
|
||
time-sensitive presigned transactions, such as Lightning Network. In
|
||
non-cooperative cases, some presigned transactions can't be fee bumped
|
||
using RBF, forcing them to depend on CPFP. In those protocols, some
|
||
transactions may also be created long before they need to be broadcast,
|
||
making it effectively impossible to estimate an appropriate fee rate.
|
||
If a presigned transaction pays a fee rate below the amount necessary to
|
||
get into a node's mempool, there's no way to fee bump it with a child.
|
||
If that prevents the transaction from confirming in time, an honest user
|
||
might lose money. Package relay is the solution for this ((("transaction fees", "package relay", startref="transaction-fee-package-relay")))((("package relay", startref="package-relay")))critical
|
||
problem.
|
||
|
||
[[transaction_pinning]]
|
||
=== Transaction Pinning
|
||
|
||
Although((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "transaction pinning", id="transaction-fee-bump-pin")))((("fee bumping", "transaction pinning", id="fee-bump-pin")))((("transaction pinning", id="transaction-pin")))((("RBF (replace by fee) fee bumping", "transaction pinning", id="rbf-pin")))((("CPFP (child pays for parent) fee bumping", "transaction pinning", id="cpfp-pin"))) both RBF and CPFP fee bumping work in the basic cases we
|
||
described, there are rules related to both
|
||
methods that are designed to prevent denial-of-service attacks on miners
|
||
and relaying full nodes. An unfortunate side effect of those rules
|
||
is that they can sometimes prevent someone from being able to use fee
|
||
bumping. Making it impossible or difficult to fee bump a transaction is
|
||
called _transaction pinning_.
|
||
|
||
One of the major denial of service concerns revolves around the effect of
|
||
transaction relationships. Whenever the output of a transaction is
|
||
spent, that transaction's identifier (txid) is referenced by the child
|
||
transaction. However, when a transaction is replaced, the replacement
|
||
has a different txid. If that replacement transaction gets confirmed,
|
||
none of its descendants can be included in the same blockchain. It's
|
||
possible to re-create and re-sign the descendant transactions, but that's
|
||
not guaranteed to happen. This has related but divergent implications
|
||
for RBF and CPFP:
|
||
|
||
- In the context of RBF, when Bitcoin Core accepts a replacement
|
||
transaction, it keeps things simple by forgetting about the original
|
||
transaction and all descendant transactions that depended on that
|
||
original. To ensure that it's more profitable for miners to accept
|
||
replacements, Bitcoin Core only accepts a replacement transaction if it
|
||
pays more fees than all the transactions that will be forgotten.
|
||
+
|
||
The downside of this approach is that Alice can create a small
|
||
transaction that pays Bob. Bob can then use his output to create a
|
||
large child transaction. If Alice then wants to replace her original
|
||
transaction, she needs to pay a fee that's larger than what both she and
|
||
Bob originally paid. For example, if Alice's original transaction was
|
||
about 100 vbytes and Bob's transaction was about 100,000 vbytes, and
|
||
they both used the same fee rate, Alice now needs to pay more than 1,000
|
||
times as much as she originally paid in order to RBF fee bump her
|
||
transaction.
|
||
|
||
- In the context of CPFP, any time the node considers including a
|
||
package in a block, it must remove the transactions in that package
|
||
from any other package it wants to consider for the same block. For
|
||
example, if a child transaction pays for 25 ancestors, and each of
|
||
those ancestors has 25 other children, then including the package in
|
||
the block requires updating approximately 625 packages (25^2^).
|
||
Similarly, if a transaction with 25 descendants is removed from a
|
||
node's mempool (such as for being included in a block), and each of
|
||
those descendants has 25 other ancestors, another 625 packages need to
|
||
be updated. Each time we double our parameter (e.g., from 25 to 50),
|
||
we quadruple the amount of work our node needs to perform.
|
||
+
|
||
Additionally, a transaction and all of its descendants is not
|
||
useful to keep in a mempool long term if an alternative version of
|
||
that transaction is mined--none of those transactions can now be
|
||
confirmed unless there's a rare blockchain reorganization. Bitcoin
|
||
Core will remove from its mempool every transaction that can no longer
|
||
be confirmed on the current blockchain. At it's worst, that can
|
||
waste an enormous amount of your node's bandwidth and possibly be used
|
||
to prevent transactions from propagating correctly.
|
||
+
|
||
To prevent these problems, and other related
|
||
problems, Bitcoin Core limits a parent transaction to having a maximum
|
||
of 25 ancestors or descendants in its mempool and limits the
|
||
total size of all those transactions to 100,000 vbytes. The downside
|
||
of this approach is that users are prevented from creating CPFP fee
|
||
bumps if a transaction already has too many descendants (or if it and
|
||
its descendants are too large).
|
||
|
||
Transaction pinning can happen by accident, but it also represents a
|
||
serious vulnerability for multiparty time-sensitive protocols such as
|
||
Lightning Network. If your counterparty can prevent one of your
|
||
transactions from confirming by a deadline, they may be able to steal
|
||
money from you.
|
||
|
||
Protocol developers have been working on mitigating problems with
|
||
transaction pinning for several years. One partial solution is
|
||
described in <<cpfp_carve_out>>. Several other solutions have been
|
||
proposed, and at least one solution is being actively ((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "transaction pinning", startref="transaction-fee-bump-pin")))((("fee bumping", "transaction pinning", startref="fee-bump-pin")))((("transaction pinning", startref="transaction-pin")))((("RBF (replace by fee) fee bumping", "transaction pinning", startref="rbf-pin")))((("CPFP (child pays for parent) fee bumping", "transaction pinning", startref="cpfp-pin")))developed as of
|
||
this writing—https://oreil.ly/300dv[ephemeral anchors].
|
||
|
||
[[cpfp_carve_out]]
|
||
=== CPFP Carve Out and Anchor Outputs
|
||
|
||
In 2018, ((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "CPFP carve outs", id="transaction-fee-bump-carveout")))((("fee bumping", "CPFP carve outs", id="fee-bump-carveout")))((("carve outs (CPFP)", id="carveout")))((("CPFP (child pays for parent) fee bumping", "carve outs", id="cpfp-carveout")))developers working on Lightning Network (LN) had a problem.
|
||
Their protocol uses transactions that require signatures from two
|
||
different parties. Neither party wants to trust the other, so they sign
|
||
transactions at a point in the protocol when trust isn't needed,
|
||
allowing either of them to broadcast one of those transactions at a
|
||
later time when the other party may not want to (or be able to) fulfill
|
||
its obligations. The problem with this approach is that the
|
||
transactions might need to be broadcast at an unknown time, far in the future, beyond any
|
||
reasonable ability to estimate an appropriate fee rate for the
|
||
transactions.
|
||
|
||
In theory, the developers could have designed their transactions to
|
||
allow fee bumping with either RBF (using special sighash flags) or CPFP,
|
||
but both of those protocols are vulnerable to transaction pinning.
|
||
Given that the involved transactions are time sensitive, allowing a
|
||
counterparty to use transaction pinning to delay confirmation of a
|
||
transaction can easily lead to a repeatable exploit that malicious
|
||
parties could use to steal money from honest parties.
|
||
|
||
LN developer Matt Corallo proposed a solution: give the rules for CPFP
|
||
fee bumping a special exception, called _CPFP carve out_. The normal
|
||
rules for CPFP forbid the inclusion of an additional descendant if it
|
||
would cause a parent transaction to have 26 or more descendants or if it
|
||
would cause a parent and all of its descendants to exceed 100,000 vbytes
|
||
in size. Under the rules of CPFP carve out, a single additional
|
||
transaction up to 1,000 vbytes in size can be added to a package even if
|
||
it would exceed the other limits as long as it is a direct child of an
|
||
unconfirmed transaction with no unconfirmed ancestors.
|
||
|
||
For example, Bob and Mallory both co-sign a transaction with two
|
||
outputs, one to each of them. Mallory broadcasts that transaction and
|
||
uses her output to attach either 25 child transactions or any smaller
|
||
number of child transactions equaling 100,000 vbytes in size. Without
|
||
carve-out, Bob would be unable to attach another child transaction to
|
||
his output for CPFP fee bumping. With carve-out, he can spend one of
|
||
the two outputs in the transaction, the one that belongs to him, as long
|
||
as his child transaction is less than 1,000 vbytes in size (which should
|
||
be more than enough space).
|
||
|
||
It's not allowed to use CPFP carve-out more than once, so it only works
|
||
for two-party protocols. There have been proposals to extend it to
|
||
protocols involving more participants, but there hasn't been much demand
|
||
for that and developers are focused on building more generic solutions
|
||
to transaction pinning attacks.
|
||
|
||
As of this writing, most popular LN implementations use a transaction
|
||
template called _anchor outputs_, which is designed to be used ((("anchor outputs (CPFP)")))((("transaction fees", "fee bumping", "CPFP carve outs", startref="transaction-fee-bump-carveout")))((("fee bumping", "CPFP carve outs", startref="fee-bump-carveout")))((("carve outs (CPFP)", startref="carveout")))((("CPFP (child pays for parent) fee bumping", "carve outs", startref="cpfp-carveout")))with CPFP
|
||
carve out.
|
||
|
||
=== Adding Fees to Transactions
|
||
|
||
The data((("transaction fees", "change outputs and")))((("change output", "transaction fees and")))((("outputs", "transaction fees and")))((("inputs", "transaction fees and"))) structure of transactions does not have a field for fees.
|
||
Instead, fees are implied as the difference between the sum of inputs
|
||
and the sum of outputs. Any excess amount that remains after all outputs
|
||
have been deducted from all inputs is the fee that is collected by the
|
||
miners:
|
||
|
||
[[tx_fee_equation]]
|
||
.Transaction fees are implied, as the excess of inputs minus outputs:
|
||
----
|
||
Fees = Sum(Inputs) – Sum(Outputs)
|
||
----
|
||
|
||
This is a somewhat confusing element of transactions and an important
|
||
point to understand, because if you are constructing your own
|
||
transactions you must ensure you do not inadvertently include a very
|
||
large fee by underspending the inputs. That means that you must account
|
||
for all inputs, if necessary by creating change, or you will end up
|
||
giving the miners a very big tip!
|
||
|
||
For example, if you spend a 20-bitcoin UTXO to make a 1-bitcoin
|
||
payment, you must include a 19-bitcoin change output back to your
|
||
wallet. Otherwise, the 19-bitcoin "leftover" will be counted as a
|
||
transaction fee and will be collected by the miner who mines your
|
||
transaction in a block. Although you will receive priority processing
|
||
and make a miner very happy, this is probably not what you intended.
|
||
|
||
[WARNING]
|
||
====
|
||
If you forget to add a
|
||
change output in a manually constructed transaction, you will be paying
|
||
the change as a transaction fee. "Keep the change!" might not be what
|
||
you intended.
|
||
====
|
||
|
||
[[fee_sniping]]
|
||
=== Timelock Defense Against Fee Sniping
|
||
|
||
Fee sniping ((("transaction fees", "fee sniping", id="transaction-fee-sniping")))((("fee sniping", id="fee-snipe")))((("timelocks", "fee sniping and", id="timelock-fee-snipe")))((("lock time", "fee sniping and", id="lock-time-fee-snipe")))is a theoretical
|
||
attack scenario, where miners attempting to rewrite past blocks "snipe"
|
||
higher-fee transactions from future blocks to maximize their
|
||
profitability.
|
||
|
||
For example, let's say the highest block in existence is block
|
||
#100,000. If instead of attempting to mine block #100,001 to extend the
|
||
chain, some miners attempt to remine #100,000. These miners can choose
|
||
to include any valid transaction (that hasn't been mined yet) in their
|
||
candidate block #100,000. They don't have to remine the block with the
|
||
same transactions. In fact, they have the incentive to select the most
|
||
profitable (highest fee per kB) transactions to include in their block.
|
||
They can include any transactions that were in the "old" block
|
||
#100,000, as well as any transactions from the current mempool.
|
||
Essentially they have the option to pull transactions from the "present"
|
||
into the rewritten "past" when they re-create block #100,000.
|
||
|
||
Today, this attack is not very lucrative, because the block subsidy is much
|
||
higher than total fees per block. But at some point in the future,
|
||
transaction fees will be the majority of the reward (or even the
|
||
entirety of the reward). At that time, this scenario becomes inevitable.
|
||
|
||
Several wallets discourage fee sniping by creating transactions with a
|
||
lock time that limits those transactions to being included in the next
|
||
block or any later block. In our
|
||
scenario, our wallet would set lock time to 100,001 on any
|
||
transaction it created. Under normal circumstances, this lock time has
|
||
no effect—the transactions could only be included in block
|
||
#100,001 anyway; it's the next block.
|
||
|
||
But under a reorganization attack, the miners would not be able to pull
|
||
high-fee transactions from the mempool, because all those transactions
|
||
would be timelocked to block #100,001. They can only remine #100,000
|
||
with whatever transactions were valid at that time, essentially gaining
|
||
no new fees.
|
||
|
||
This does not entirely prevent fee sniping, but it does make it less
|
||
profitable in some cases and so can help preserve the stability of the
|
||
Bitcoin network as the block subsidy declines. We recommend all wallets
|
||
implement anti fee sniping when it doesn't interfere with the wallet's
|
||
other uses of the lock time field.
|
||
|
||
As Bitcoin continues to mature, and as the subsidy continues to decline,
|
||
fees become more and more important to Bitcoin users, both in their
|
||
day-to-day use for getting transactions confirmed quickly and in
|
||
providing an incentive for miners to continue securing((("transaction fees", "fee sniping", startref="transaction-fee-sniping")))((("fee sniping", startref="fee-snipe")))((("timelocks", "fee sniping and", startref="timelock-fee-snipe")))((("lock time", "fee sniping and", startref="lock-time-fee-snipe"))) Bitcoin
|
||
transactions with new proof of work.
|