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Edited ch08.asciidoc with Atlas code editor
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@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ image::images/mbc2_0807.png["SPVSynchronization"]
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Because SPV nodes need to retrieve specific transactions in order to selectively verify them, they also create a privacy risk. Unlike full blockchain nodes, which collect all transactions within each block, the SPV node's requests for specific data can inadvertently reveal the addresses in their wallet. For example, a third party monitoring a network could keep track of all the transactions requested by a wallet on an SPV node and use those to associate bitcoin addresses with the user of that wallet, destroying the user's privacy.
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Shortly after the introduction of SPV/lightweight nodes, the bitcoin developers added a feature called _bloom filters_ to address the privacy risks of SPV nodes. Bloom filters allow SPV nodes to receive a subset of the transactions without revealing precisely which addresses they are interested in, through a filtering mechanism that uses probabilities rather than fixed patterns.((("", startref="BNspvnodes08")))((("", startref="BNospv08")))((("", startref="simple08")))
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Shortly after the introduction of SPV/lightweight nodes, the bitcoin developers added a feature called _bloom filters_ to address the privacy risks of SPV nodes. Bloom filters allow SPV nodes to receive a subset of the transactions without revealing precisely which addresses they are interested in, through a filtering mechanism that uses probabilities rather than fixed patterns.((("", startref="BNspvnodes08")))((("", startref="simple08")))
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[[bloom_filters]]
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=== Bloom Filters
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@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ The network protocol and bloom filter mechanism for SPV nodes is defined in http
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Nodes that implement SPV have weaker privacy than a full node. A full node receives all transactions and therefore reveals no information about whether it is using some address in its wallet. An SPV node receives a filtered list of transactions related to the addresses that are in its wallet. As a result, it reduces the privacy of the owner.
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Bloom filters are a way to reduce the loss of privacy. Without them, an SPV node would have to explicitly list the addresses it was interested in, creating a serious breach of privacy. However, even with bloom filters, an adversary monitoring the traffic of an SPV client or connected to it directly as a node in the P2P network can collect enough information over time to learn the addresses in the wallet of the SPV client.
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Bloom filters are a way to reduce the loss of privacy. Without them, an SPV node would have to explicitly list the addresses it was interested in, creating a serious breach of privacy. However, even with bloom filters, an adversary monitoring the traffic of an SPV client or connected to it directly as a node in the P2P network can collect enough information over time to learn the addresses in the wallet of the SPV client.((("", startref="BNospv08")))
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=== Encrypted and Authenticated Connections
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