qc2 continued check

ch03_bitcoin-core.adoc

@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ $ bitcoind -printtoconsole
 2023-01-28T03:43:39Z [http] starting 4 worker threads
 2023-01-28T03:43:39Z Using wallet directory /lotsofspace/bitcoin/wallets
 2023-01-28T03:43:39Z init message: Verifying wallet(s)…
-2023-01-28T03:43:39Z Using BerkeleyDB version Berkeley DB 4.8.30: (April  9, 2010)
+2023-01-28T03:43:39Z Using BerkeleyDB version Berkeley DB 4.8.30
 2023-01-28T03:43:39Z Using /16 prefix for IP bucketing
 2023-01-28T03:43:39Z init message: Loading P2P addresses…
 2023-01-28T03:43:39Z Loaded 63866 addresses from peers.dat  114ms

ch08_signatures.adoc

@@ -53,7 +53,12 @@ subset of the data in the transaction, ((("commitment hash")))called the _commit
 <<sighash_types>>). The
 signing key is the user's private key. The result is the signature:
 
-latexmath:[\(Sig = F_{sig}(F_{hash}(m), x)\)]
+[latexmath]
+++++
+\begin{equation}
+\(Sig = F_{sig}(F_{hash}(m), x)\)
+\end{equation}
+++++
 
 where:
 
@@ -867,8 +872,15 @@ coordinate of the nonce _K_.
 From there, the algorithm calculates the _s_ value of the signature.  Like we did with schnorr signatures, operations involving
 integers are modulus p:
 
+[latexmath]
+++++
+\begin{equation}
+s = k^-1^ (Hash(m) + x × R)
+\end{equation}
+++++
 _s_ = __k__^-1^ (__Hash__(__m__) + __x__ × __R__)
 
+
 where:
 
 * _k_ is the private nonce

ch10_network.adoc

@@ -1143,6 +1143,8 @@ lightweight client to download an 80-byte block header, a (usually)
 small coinbase transaction, and the filter for that block to receive
 strong evidence that the filter ((("Bitcoin network", "compact block filters", startref="bitcoin-network-compact-filter")))((("compact block filters", startref="compact-block-filter")))((("blocks", "compact block filters", startref="block-compact-filter")))was accurate.
 
+
+[role="less_space pagebreak-before"]
 === Lightweight Clients and Privacy
 
 Lightweight clients ((("Bitcoin network", "lightweight clients", "privacy")))((("lightweight clients", "privacy")))((("privacy", "lightweight clients")))have weaker privacy than a full node. A full