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Merge branch 'chapter/Chapter8' into develop

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Andreas M. Antonopoulos 2014-07-31 17:22:39 -04:00
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ The process of new coin generation is called mining, because the reward is desig
Bitcoin miners also earn fees from transactions. Every transaction may include a transaction fee, in the form of a surplus of bitcoin between the transaction's inputs and outputs. The winning bitcoin miner gets to "keep the change" on the transactions included in the winning block. Today the fees represent 0.5% or less of a bitcoin miner's income, the vast majority coming from the newly minted bitcoins. However, as the reward decreases over time and the number of transactions per block increases, a greater proportion of bitcoin mining earnings will come from fees. After 2140 all bitcoin miner earnings will be in the form of transaction fees.
The word "mining" is somewhat misleading. By evoking the extraction of precious metals, it focuses our attention on the reward for mining, the new bitcoins in each block. While mining is incentivized by this reward, the primary purpose of mining is not the reward or the generation of new coins. If you view mining only as the process by which coins are created you are mistaking the means (incentives) as a goal of the process. Mining is the main process of the de-centralized clearinghouse, by which transactions are validated and cleared. Mining secures the bitcoin system and enables the emergence of network-wide consensus without a central authority. Mining is the invention that makes bitcoin special, a de-centralized security mechanism that is the basis for peer-to-peer digital cash. The reward of newly minted coins and transaction fees is an incentive scheme that aligns the actions of miners with the security of the network, while simultaneously implementing the monetary supply, the means not the end.
The word "mining" is somewhat misleading. By evoking the extraction of precious metals, it focuses our attention on the reward for mining, the new bitcoins in each block. While mining is incentivized by this reward, the primary purpose of mining is not the reward or the generation of new coins. If you view mining only as the process by which coins are created you are mistaking the means (incentives) as a goal of the process. Mining is the main process of the de-centralized clearinghouse, by which transactions are validated and cleared. Mining secures the bitcoin system and enables the emergence of network-wide consensus without a central authority. Mining is the invention that makes bitcoin special, a de-centralized security mechanism that is the basis for peer-to-peer digital cash. The reward of newly minted coins and transaction fees is an incentive scheme that aligns the actions of miners with the security of the network, while simultaneously implementing the monetary supply.
In this chapter, we will first examine mining as a monetary supply mechanism and then look at the most important function of mining, the de-centralized emergent consensus mechanism that underpins bitcoin's security.
@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ The finite and diminishing issuance creates a fixed monetary supply that resists
===== Deflationary Money
The most important and debated consequence of a fixed and diminishing monetary issuance is that the currency will tend to be inherently _deflationary_. Deflation is the phenomenon of appreciation of value due to a mismatch in supply and demand that drives up the value (and exchange rate) of a currency. The opposite of inflation, price deflation means that your money has more purchasing power over time.
The most important and debated consequence of a fixed and diminishing monetary issuance is that the currency will tend to be inherently _deflationary_. Deflation is the phenomenon of appreciation of value due to a mismatch in supply and demand that drives up the value (and exchange rate) of a currency. The opposite of inflation, price deflation means that the money has more purchasing power over time.
Many economists argue that a deflationary economy is a disaster that should be avoided at all costs. That is because in a period of rapid deflation, the incentives for regular people are to hoard the money and not spend it, hoping that prices will fall. Such a phenomenon unfolded during Japan's "Lost Decade", when a complete collapse of demand pushed the currency into a deflationary spiral.
Many economists argue that a deflationary economy is a disaster that should be avoided at all costs. That is because in a period of rapid deflation people will tend to hoard money instead of spending it, hoping that prices will fall. Such a phenomenon unfolded during Japan's "Lost Decade", when a complete collapse of demand pushed the currency into a deflationary spiral.
Bitcoin experts argue that deflation is not bad *per se*. Rather, we associate deflation with a collapse in demand because that is the only example of deflation we have to study. In a fiat currency with the possibility of unlimited printing, it is very difficult to enter a deflationary spiral unless there is a complete collapse in demand and an unwillingness to print money. Deflation in bitcoin is not caused by a collapse in demand, but by predictably constrained supply.
Bitcoin experts argue that deflation is not bad *per se*. Rather, deflation is associated with a collapse in demand because that is the only example of deflation we have to study. In a fiat currency with the possibility of unlimited printing, it is very difficult to enter a deflationary spiral unless there is a complete collapse in demand and an unwillingness to print money. Deflation in bitcoin is not caused by a collapse in demand, but by a predictably constrained supply.
In practice, it has become evident that the hoarding instinct caused by a deflationary currency can be overcome by discounting from vendors, until the discount overcomes the hoarding instinct of the buyer. Since the seller is also motivated to hoard, the discount becomes the equilibrium price at which the two hoarding instincts are matched. With discounts of 30% on the bitcoin price, most bitcoin retailers are not experiencing difficulty overcoming the hoarding instinct and generating revenue. It remains to be seen whether the deflationary aspect of the currency is really a problem when it is not driven by rapid economic retraction.
@ -53,9 +53,10 @@ Bitcoin's de-centralized consensus emerges from the interplay of four processes
In the next few sections we will examine these processes and how they interact to create the emergent property of network-wide consensus that allows any bitcoin node to assemble its own copy of the authoritative, trusted, public, global ledger.
[[tx_verification]]
=== Independent Verification of Transactions
In the previous chapter we saw how wallet software creates transactions by collecting UTXO, providing the appropriate unlocking scripts and then constructing new outputs assigned to a new owner. The resulting transaction is then sent to the neighboring nodes in the bitcoin network so that it may be propagated across the entire bitcoin network.
In a previous chapter we saw how wallet software creates transactions by collecting UTXO, providing the appropriate unlocking scripts and then constructing new outputs assigned to a new owner. The resulting transaction is then sent to the neighboring nodes in the bitcoin network so that it may be propagated across the entire bitcoin network.
However, before forwarding transactions to its neighbors, every bitcoin node that receives a transaction will first verify the transaction. This ensures that only valid transactions are propagated across the network, while invalid transactions are discarded at the first node that encounters them.
@ -94,13 +95,13 @@ Jing's node is listening for new blocks, propagated on the bitcoin network, as d
After validating transactions, a bitcoin node will add them to the _memory pool_, or _transaction pool_, where transactions await until they can be included (mined) into a block. Jing's node collects, validates and relays new transactions just like any other node. Unlike other nodes, however, Jing's node will then aggregate these transactions into a _candidate block_.
Let's follow the blocks that were created during the time Alice bought a cup of coffee from Bob's Cafe (see <<cup_of_coffee>>). Alice's transaction was included in block 277316. For the purpose of demonstrating the concepts in this chapter let's assume that block was mined by Jing's mining system and follow Alice's transaction as it becomes part of this new block.
Let's follow the blocks that were created during the time Alice bought a cup of coffee from Bob's Cafe (see <<cup_of_coffee>>). Alice's transaction was included in block 277,316. For the purpose of demonstrating the concepts in this chapter let's assume that block was mined by Jing's mining system and follow Alice's transaction as it becomes part of this new block.
Jing's mining node maintains a local copy of the blockchain, the list of all blocks created since the beginning of the bitcoin system in 2009. By the time Alice buys the cup of coffee, Jing's node has assembled a chain of 277,314 blocks. Jing's node is listening for transactions, trying to mine a new block and also listening for blocks discovered by other nodes. As Jing's node is mining, it receives block 277,315 through the bitcoin network. The arrival of this block signifies the end of the competition for block 277,315 and the beginning of the competition to create block 277,316.
During the previous 10 minutes, while Jing's node was searching for a solution to block 277,315, it was also collecting transactions in preparation for the next block. By now it has collected a few hundred transactions in the memory pool. Upon receiving block 277,315 and validating it, Jing's node will also check all the transactions in the memory pool and remove any that were included in block 277,315. Whatever transaction remain in the memory pool are unconfirmed and are waiting to be recorded in a new block.
Jing's node immediately constructs a new empty block, a candidate for block 277,316. This block is called a candidate block because it is not yet a valid block, as it does not contain a valid proof-of-work. The block becomes valid only if the miner succeeds in finding a solution to the proof-of-work algorithm.
Jing's node immediately constructs a new empty block, a candidate for block 277,316. This block is called a candidate block because it is not yet a valid block, as it does not contain a valid proof-of-work. The block becomes valid only if the miner succeeds in finding a solution to the Proof-of-Work algorithm.
==== Transaction Age, Fees and Priority
@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ In block 277,316 we see that the coinbase (see <<generation_tx_example>>), which
The first byte, +03+ instructs the script execution engine to push the next 3 bytes onto the script stack (see <<tx_script_ops_table_pushdata>>). The next 3 bytes, +0x443b04+, are the block height encoded in little-endian format (backwards, least significant bit first). Reverse the order of the bytes and the result is +0x043b44+ which is 277,316 in decimal.
The next few hexadecimal digits (+03858402062+) are used to encode an extra _nonce_, or random value, used to find a suitable proof-of-work solution. This is discussed in more detail in the next section on <<mining>>
The next few hexadecimal digits (+03858402062+) are used to encode an extra _nonce_, or random value, used to find a suitable Proof-of-Work solution. This is discussed in more detail in the next section on <<mining>>
The final part of the coinbase data (+2f503253482f+) is the ASCII-encoded string "/P2SH/", which indicates that mining node that mined this block supports the Pay-to-Script-Hash (P2SH) improvement defined in BIP0016. The introduction of the P2SH capability required a "vote" by miners to endorse either BIP0016 or BIP0017. Those endorsing the BIP0016 implementation were to include "/P2SH/" in their coinbase data. Those endorsing the BIP0017 implementation of P2SH were to include the string "p2sh/CHV" in their coinbase data. The BIP0016 was elected as the winner, and many miners continued including the string "/P2SH/" in their coinbase to indicate support for this feature.
@ -331,8 +332,8 @@ To construct the block header, the mining node needs to fill in six fields:
| 32 bytes | Previous Block Hash | A reference to the hash of the previous (parent) block in the chain
| 32 bytes | Merkle Root | A hash of the root of the Merkle-Tree of this block's transactions
| 4 bytes | Timestamp | The approximate creation time of this block (seconds from Unix Epoch)
| 4 bytes | Difficulty Target | The proof-of-work algorithm difficulty target for this block
| 4 bytes | Nonce | A counter used for the proof-of-work algorithm
| 4 bytes | Difficulty Target | The Proof-of-Work algorithm difficulty target for this block
| 4 bytes | Nonce | A counter used for the Proof-of-Work algorithm
|=======
At the time block 277,316 was mined, the version number describing the block structure is version "2", which is encoded in little-endian format in 4 bytes as +0x02000000+.
@ -343,7 +344,7 @@ The next step is to summarize all the transactions with a Merkle Tree, in order
The mining node will then add a 4-byte timestamp, encoded as a Unix "Epoch" timestamp, which is based on the number of seconds elapsed from January 1st, 1970, midnight UTC/GMT. The time +1388185914+ is equal to Friday, 27 Dec 2013, 23:11:54 UTC/GMT.
The node then fills in the difficulty target, which defines the required proof-of-work difficulty to make this a valid block. The difficulty is stored in the block as a "difficulty bits" metric, which is a mantissa-exponent encoding of the target. The encoding has a one-byte exponent, followed by a 3 byte mantissa (coefficient). In block 277,316, for example, the difficulty bits value is +0x1903a30c+. The first part +0x19+ is a hexadecimal exponent, while the next part +0x03a30c+ is the coefficient. The concept of a difficulty target is explained in <<difficulty_target>> and the "difficulty bits" representation is explained in <<difficulty_bits>>.
The node then fills in the difficulty target, which defines the required Proof-of-Work difficulty to make this a valid block. The difficulty is stored in the block as a "difficulty bits" metric, which is a mantissa-exponent encoding of the target. The encoding has a one-byte exponent, followed by a 3 byte mantissa (coefficient). In block 277,316, for example, the difficulty bits value is +0x1903a30c+. The first part +0x19+ is a hexadecimal exponent, while the next part +0x03a30c+ is the coefficient. The concept of a difficulty target is explained in <<difficulty_target>> and the "difficulty bits" representation is explained in <<difficulty_bits>>.
The final field is the nonce, which is initialized to zero.
@ -432,9 +433,9 @@ To give a simple analogy, imagine a game where players throw a pair of dice repe
In the example above, the winning "nonce" is 13 and this result can be confirmed by anyone independently. Anyone can add the number 13 as a suffix to the phrase "I am Satoshi Nakamoto" and compute the hash, verifying that it is less than the target. The successful result is also proof-of-work, as it proves we did the work to find that nonce. While it only takes one hash computation to verify, it took us 13 hash computations to find a nonce that worked. If we had a lower target (higher difficulty) it would take many more hash computations to find a suitable nonce, but only one hash computation for anyone to verify. Furthermore, by knowing the target, anyone can estimate the difficulty using statistics and therefore know how much work was needed to find such a nonce.
Bitcoin's proof-of-work is very similar to the problem above. The miner constructs a candidate block filled with transactions. Next, the miner will calculate the hash of this block's header and see if it is smaller than the current _target_. If the hash is not less than the target, the miner will modify the nonce (usually just incrementing it by one) and try again. At the current difficulty in the bitcoin network, miners have to try quadrillions of times before finding a nonce that results in a low enough block header hash.
Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work is very similar to the problem above. The miner constructs a candidate block filled with transactions. Next, the miner calculates the hash of this block's header and see if it is smaller than the current _target_. If the hash is not less than the target, the miner will modify the nonce (usually just incrementing it by one) and try again. At the current difficulty in the bitcoin network, miners have to try quadrillions of times before finding a nonce that results in a low enough block header hash.
A very simplified proof-of-work algorithm is implemented in Python here:
A very simplified Proof-of-Work algorithm is implemented in Python here:
((("proof of work")))
[[pow_example1]]
.Simplified Proof-Of-Work Implementation
@ -448,7 +449,7 @@ include::code/proof-of-work-example.py[]
Running the code above, you can set the desired difficulty (in bits, how many of the leading bits must be zero) and see how long it takes for your computer to find a solution. In the following examples, you can see how it works on an average laptop:
[[pow_example_outputs]]
.Running the proof-of-work example for various difficulties
.Running the Proof-of-Work example for various difficulties
====
[source, bash]
----
@ -536,43 +537,114 @@ target = 0x03a30c * 2^(0x08 * (0x19 - 0x03))^
=> target = 0x0000000000000003A30C00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
==== Difficulty Target and Re-Targetting
Bitcoin is tuned to generate blocks approximately every 10 minutes. This is achieved by automatically adjusting the target difficulty to account for increases and decreases in the available computing power on the network. This process occurs automatically and on every full node independently. Each node recalculates the expected difficulty every 2106 blocks, based on the time it took to hash the previous 2106 blocks. In simple terms: If the network is finding blocks faster than every 10 minutes, the difficulty increases. If block discovery is slower than expected, the difficulty will decrease.
As we saw above the target determines the difficulty and therefore affects how long it takes to find a solution to the Proof-of-Work algorithm. This leads to the obvious questions: Why is the difficulty adjustable, who adjusts it and how?
{miners that are on mining pools get the difficulty (do not calculate difficulty independently) they are given the difficulty from the mining pool so they don't have to calculate the difficulty themselves and they are actually given a lower difficulty target. There are essentially two classifications of miners today - pool miners and solo miners. Solo miners run a full node and compete on their own. Whereas pool miners collaborate with one another and compete against the network as a team, while sharing the reward. The reason miners join pools - solo miners need an enormous amount of hashing power in order to have even the slimmest chance of finding a solution to a block which will make their earnings erratic. By participating in a pool, miners get smaller shares but a more regular share of rewards, reducing uncertainty. Solo mining is becoming obsolete, as the difficulty increases the likelihood of a solo miner finding a solution is more like winning the lottery.}
Bitcoin's blocks are generated every 10 minutes, on average. This is bitcoin's heartbeat and underpins the frequency of currency issuance and the speed of transaction settlement. It has to remain constant not just over the short term, but over a period of many decades. Over this time, it is expected that computer power will continue to increase at a rapid pace. Furthermore, the number of participants in mining and the computers they use will also constantly change. To keep the block generation time at 10 minutes, the difficulty of mining must be adjusted to account for these changes. In fact, difficulty is a dynamic parameter that will be periodically adjusted to meet a 10-minute block target. In simple terms, the difficulty target is set to whatever mining power will result in a 10-minute block interval.
{ASIC miners do not run full nodes. Full nodes independently calculate the difficulty using the same equation on the same block, arriving at the same result for the new difficulty. Retargeting the difficulty at block heights that are multiples of 2106 from the genesis block. The equation for retargeting difficulty measures the time it took to find the last 2106 blocks, compares that to the expected time of 21,060 minutes (based upon a desired 10 minute block time), the difference is calculated as a percentage and a corresponding percentage adjustment is made to the difficulty. To avoid extreme volatility in the difficulty, the retargeting adjustment cannot exceed {X%} per retargeting. The difficulty will only be retargeted up or down by maximum of {X%} per cycle. If the required difficulty adjustment is greater than the maximum it will be reflected in the next retargeting adjustment as the imbalance will persist through the next 2106 blocks. Large discrepancies between hashing power and difficulty may take several cycles to even out. This leads to a potential problem which has been observed in alt coins, where very large changes in difficulty can cause hashing power to collapse leading to excessively long block times. If the aggregate network hashing power collapses due to the departure of many miners simultaneously, the remaining hashing power may be insufficient to meet the difficulty target leading to excessively long block intervals. Since retargeting is not a function of time but rather block number, a large hashing deficit can mean the next cycle is very far in the future. Usually this is caused for two reasons - scenario one - entry for a brief period of a lot of hashing which temporarily increases the difficulty, followed by the departure of that hashing, resulting in a collapse of block solutions. Essentially a hashing pump and dump. Usually a deliberate attack. This is not a concern in bitcoin because new hashing power introduced into the network will not effect the average enough to cause a major change in difficulty. The other scenario in which hashing power can collapse is a crash in bitcoin price, making mining unprofitable. (If the miner cannot pay their electricity bill, the miner will leave the network.) This is a weakness of the protocol, as an insurmountable hashing deficit could occur with a precipitous collapse in price and corresponding reduction in available hashing power. The network would be unable to recover because ... }
How then is such an adjustment made in a completely de-centralized network? Difficulty re-targeting occurs automatically and on every full node independently. Every 2016 blocks, all nodes re-target the Proof-of-Work difficulty. The equation for retargeting difficulty measures the time it took to find the last 2016 blocks and compares that to the expected time of 20160 minutes (two weeks based upon a desired 10 minute block time). The ratio between the actual timespan and desired timespan is calculated and a corresponding adjustment (up or down) is made to the difficulty. In simple terms: If the network is finding blocks faster than every 10 minutes, the difficulty increases. If block discovery is slower than expected, the difficulty decreases.
The equation can be summarized as:
New Difficulty = Old Difficulty * (Actual Time of Last 2016 Blocks / 20160 minutes)
Here's the code used in the Bitcoin Core client
[[retarget_difficulty_code]]
.Re-targeting the Proof-of-Work difficulty - +GetNextWorkRequired()+ in +pow.cpp+, line 43
====
[source,cpp]
----
// Go back by what we want to be 14 days worth of blocks
const CBlockIndex* pindexFirst = pindexLast;
for (int i = 0; pindexFirst && i < Params().Interval()-1; i++)
pindexFirst = pindexFirst->pprev;
assert(pindexFirst);
// Limit adjustment step
int64_t nActualTimespan = pindexLast->GetBlockTime() - pindexFirst->GetBlockTime();
LogPrintf(" nActualTimespan = %d before bounds\n", nActualTimespan);
if (nActualTimespan < Params().TargetTimespan()/4)
nActualTimespan = Params().TargetTimespan()/4;
if (nActualTimespan > Params().TargetTimespan()*4)
nActualTimespan = Params().TargetTimespan()*4;
// Retarget
uint256 bnNew;
uint256 bnOld;
bnNew.SetCompact(pindexLast->nBits);
bnOld = bnNew;
bnNew *= nActualTimespan;
bnNew /= Params().TargetTimespan();
if (bnNew > Params().ProofOfWorkLimit())
bnNew = Params().ProofOfWorkLimit();
----
====
The parameters Interval (2016 blocks) and TargetTimespan (two weeks as 1,209,600 seconds) are defined in +chainparams.cpp+
To avoid extreme volatility in the difficulty, the retargeting adjustment must be less than a factor of four (4) per cycle. If the required difficulty adjustment is greater than a factor of four, it will be adjusted by the maximum and not more. Any further adjustment will be accomplished in the next retargeting period as the imbalance will persist through the next 2016 blocks. Therefore, large discrepancies between hashing power and difficulty may take several 2016 block cycles to balance out.
[TIP]
====
The difficulty of finding a bitcoin block is approximately '10 minutes of processing' for the entire network, based on the time it took to find the previous 2106 blocks, adjusted every 2106 blocks.
The difficulty of finding a bitcoin block is approximately '10 minutes of processing' for the entire network, based on the time it took to find the previous 2016 blocks, adjusted every 2016 blocks.
====
Note that the target difficulty is independent of the number of transactions or the value of transactions. This means that the amount of hashing power and therefore electricity expended to secure bitcoin is also entirely independent of the number of transactions. Bitcoin can scale up, achieve broader adoption and remain secure without any increase in hashing power from today's level. The increase in hashing power represents market forces as new miners enter the market to compete for the reward. As long as enough hashing power is under the control of miners acting honestly in pursuit of the reward, it is enough to prevent "takeover" attacks and therefore it is enough to secure bitcoin.
The target difficulty is closely related to the cost of electricity and the exchange rate of bitcoin vis-a-vis the currency used to pay for electricity. High performance mining systems are about as efficient as possible with the current generation of silicon fabrication, converting electricity into hashing computation at the highest rate possible. The primary influence on the mining market is the price of one kilowatt-hour in bitcoin, as that determines the profitability of mining and therefore the incentives to enter or exit the mining market.
The target difficulty is closely related to the cost of electricity and the exchange rate of bitcoin vis-a-vis the currency used to pay for electricity. High performance mining systems are about as efficient as possible with the current generation of silicon fabrication, converting electricity into hashing computation at the highest rate possible. The primary influence on the mining market is the price of one kilowatt-hour in bitcoin, as that determines the profitability of mining and therefore the incentives to enter or exit the mining market.
=== Selecting the Highest-Difficulty Chain
=== Successfully Mining the Block
As we saw earlier, Jing's node has constructed a candidate block and prepared it for mining. Jing has several hardware mining rigs with Application Specific Integrated Circuits, where hundreds of thousands of integrated circuits run the SHA-256 algorithm in parallel at incredible speeds. These specialized machines are connected to his mining node over USB. Next, the mining node running on Jing's desktop transmits the block header to his mining hardware, which start testing trillions of nonces per second.
Almost eleven minutes after starting to mine block 277,316, one of the hardware mining machines finds a solution and sends it back to the mining node. The nonce 4,215,469,401 when inserted into the block header produces a block hash of +0000000000000002a7bbd25a417c0374cc55261021e8a9ca74442b01284f0569+, which is less than the target of +0000000000000003A30C00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000+.
Immediately, Jing's mining node transmits the block to all its peers. They receive, validate and then propagate the new block. As the block ripples out across the network, each node adds it to its own copy of the blockchain, extending it to a new height of 277,316 blocks. As mining nodes receive and validate the block, they abandon their efforts to find a block at the same height and immediately start computing the next block in the chain.
In the next section we'll look at the process each node uses to validate a block and select the longest chain, creating the consensus that forms the de-centralized blockchain.
=== Validating a New Block
The third step in bitcoin's consensus mechanism is independent validation of each new block by every node on the network. As the newly solved block moves across the network, each node performs a series of tests to validate it before propagating it to its peers. This ensures that only valid blocks are propagated on the network. The independent validation also ensures that miners who act honestly get their blocks incorporated in the blockchain, thus earning the reward. Those miners who act dishonestly have their blocks rejected and not only lose the reward but also waste the effort expended to find a Proof-of-Work solution, thus incurring the cost of electricity without compensation.
When a node receives a new block, it will validate the block by checking it against a long list of criteria. These criteria can be seen in the Bitcoin Core client in the functions +CheckBlock+ and +CheckBlockHeader+. These criteria include:
* Check the syntactic validity of the block data structure
* Check the Proof-of-Work, by checking the block header hash is less than the target difficulty
* Check the block timestamp is less than two hours in the future (allowing for time errors)
* Check the block size is within acceptable limits
* Check the first transaction (and only the first) is a coinbase generation transaction
* Validate all transactions within the block, using the transaction checklist discussed in <<tx_verification>>
The independent validation of each new block by every node on the network ensures that the miners can't cheat. In previous sections we saw how the miners get to write a transaction that awards them the new bitcoins created within the block and claim the transaction fees. Why does the miner not write themselves a transaction for a thousand bitcoin instead of the correct reward? Because that would make the block invalid, which would result in it being rejected and therefore that transaction would never become part of the ledger. The miner has to construct a perfect block, based on the shared rules that all nodes follow and mine it with a correct solution to the Proof-of-Work. To do so they expend a lot of electricity in mining and if they cheat all the electricity and effort is wasted. This is why independent validation is a key component of decentralized consensus.
=== Assembling and Selecting Chains of Blocks
The final step in bitcoin's de-centralized consensus mechanism is the assembly of blocks into chains and the selection of the chain with the most Proof-of-Work. Once a node has validated a new block, it will then attempt to assemble a chain, by connecting the block to the existing blockchain.
Nodes maintain three sets of blocks: those connected to the main blockchain, those that form branches off the main blockchain (secondary chains) and finally blocks that do not have a known parent in the known chains (orphans). Invalid blocks are rejected as soon as any one of the validation criteria fails and are therefore not included in any chain.
The "main chain" at any time is whichever chain of blocks has the most cumulative difficulty associated with it. Under most circumstances this is also the chain with the most blocks in it, unless there are two equal length chains and one has more proof-of-work. The main chain will also have branches with blocks that are "siblings" to the blocks on the main chain. These blocks are valid but not part of the main chain. They are kept for future reference, in case one of those chains is extended to exceeds the main chain in difficulty. In the next section (<<forks>>), we will see how secondary chains occur as a result of an almost simultaneous mining of blocks at the same height.
When a new block is received, a node will try to slot it into the existing blockchain. The node will look at the block's "previous block hash" field, which is the reference to the new block's parent. Then the node will attempt to find that parent in the existing blockchain. Most of the time, the parent will be the "tip" of the main chain, meaning this new block extends the main chain. For example, the new block 277,316 has a reference to the hash of its parent block 277,315. Most nodes that receive 277,316 will already have block 277,315 as the tip of their main chain and will therefore link the new block and extend that chain.
Sometimes, as we will see in <<forks>>, the new block extends a chain that is not the main chain. In that case, the node will attach the new block to the secondary chain it extends and then compare the difficulty of the secondary chain to the main chain. If the secondary chain has more cumulative difficulty than the main chain, the node will _reconverge_ on the secondary chain, meaning it will select the secondary chain as its new main chain, making the old main chain a secondary chain.
If a block is received and no parent is found in the existing chains, then that block is considered an "orphan". Orphan blocks are put into a temporary pool where they will stay until their parent is received. Once the parent is received and linked into the existing chains, the orphan can be pulled out of the orphan pool and linked to the parent, making it part of a chain. Orphan blocks usually occur when two blocks that were mined within a short time of each other are received in reverse order (child before parent).
By selecting the greatest-difficulty chain, all nodes eventually achieve network-wide consensus. Temporary discrepancies between chains are resolved eventually as more Proof-of-Work is added, extending one of the possible chains. Mining nodes "vote" with their mining power by choosing which chain to extend by mining the next block. When they find a new block and extend the chain, the new block itself represents their vote.
In the next section we will look at how discrepancies between competing chains (forks) are resolved by the independent selection of the longest difficulty chain.
[[forks]]
==== Blockchain Forks
{Discuss chain selection: As new blocks are found they are added to the chain. Each full node constructs a chain and calculates the cumulative difficulty of that chain. As blocks are constructed and propagated across the network,}
{create a graphic showing propagating transaction}
{Because the blockchain is a decentralized data structure, different copies of it are not always consistent. Blocks may arrive at different nodes at different times, causing them to have a different perspective o ft the blockchain. To resolve this, each node always selects and attempts to extend the chain of blocks that represents the most Proof-of-Work, also known as the longest chain or greatest cumulative difficulty chain, by adding the difficulty recorded in each block for a chain a node can calculate the total amount of PoW that has been expended to create that chain. As long as all nodes select the longest, i.e. the longest cumulative difficulty chain, the global bitcoin network eventually converges to a consistent state. Forks occur as temporary inconsistencies between versions of the blockchain, which are resolved by the eventual reconvergence.}
{Bitcoin's _consensus mechanism_, which creates the is comprised of the independent validation of transactions by every node, the cumulative work of the miners, and the network convergence upon the greatest difficulty chain. The interplay of these three processes manifests the emergent property of consensus that allows for a global decentralized public ledger without a central authority. which creates one global public ledger, emerges as a property of (1) the selection of the greatest difficulty chain. This chapter is about the emergent property of consensus. This consensus is created by the interplay of three processes - (1) ,2,3. The emergent property of network-wide consensus is what establishes a trusted decentralized global public ledger. Satohsi's invention was not proof of work, elliptic curve cryptography. Satoshi's invention was how the interplay of these processes creates emergent consensus in a decentralized network without the need for a centralized trusted authority.}
Because the blockchain is a decentralized data structure, different copies of it are not always consistent. Blocks may arrive at different nodes at different times, causing them to have a different perspective of the blockchain. To resolve this, each node always selects and attempts to extend the chain of blocks that represents the most Proof-of-Work, also known as the longest chain or greatest cumulative difficulty chain. By summing the difficulty recorded in each block in a chain, a node can calculate the total amount of Proof-of-Work that has been expended to create that chain. As long as all nodes select the longest cumulative difficulty chain, the global bitcoin network eventually converges to a consistent state. Forks occur as temporary inconsistencies between versions of the blockchain, which are resolved by eventual re-convergence as more blocks are added to one of the forks.
[[fork1]]
.Visualization of a blockchain fork event - Before the Fork
@ -586,7 +658,7 @@ A "fork" occurs whenever there are two candidate blocks competing to form the lo
.Visualization of a blockchain fork event - Two blocks found simultaneously
image::images/GlobalFork2.png["globalfork2"]
Let's assume for example that a miner in Canada finds a proof-of-work solution for block "A" that extends the blockchain from height 315000 to height 315001, building on top of parent block "P". Almost simultaneously, an Australian miner who was also extending block "P", finds a solution for block "B", their candidate block. Now, there are two possible candidates for block height 315001, one we call "A", originating in Canada and one we call "B", originating in Australia. Both blocks are valid, both blocks contain a valid solution to the proof of work, both blocks extend the same parent. Both blocks likely contain most of the same transactions, with only perhaps a few differences in the order of transactions.
Let's assume for example that a miner in Canada finds a Proof-of-Work solution for block "A" that extends the blockchain from height 315000 to height 315001, building on top of parent block "P". Almost simultaneously, an Australian miner who was also extending block "P", finds a solution for block "B", their candidate block. Now, there are two possible candidates for block height 315001, one we call "A", originating in Canada and one we call "B", originating in Australia. Both blocks are valid, both blocks contain a valid solution to the proof of work, both blocks extend the same parent. Both blocks likely contain most of the same transactions, with only perhaps a few differences in the order of transactions.
[[fork2]]
.Visualization of a blockchain fork event - Two blocks propagate, splitting the network
@ -623,7 +695,13 @@ As of version 0.9, Bitcoin Core's +alertnotify+ option will send alerts whenever
image::images/BlockChainWithForks.png["chainforks"]
{ balance between confirmation time and fork frequency }
=== Mining Pools
{miners that are on mining pools get the difficulty (do not calculate difficulty independently) they are given the difficulty from the mining pool so they don't have to calculate the difficulty themselves and they are actually given a lower difficulty target. There are essentially two classifications of miners today - pool miners and solo miners. Solo miners run a full node and compete on their own. Whereas pool miners collaborate with one another and compete against the network as a team, while sharing the reward. The reason miners join pools - solo miners need an enormous amount of hashing power in order to have even the slimmest chance of finding a solution to a block which will make their earnings erratic. By participating in a pool, miners get smaller shares but a more regular share of rewards, reducing uncertainty. Solo mining is becoming obsolete, as the difficulty increases the likelihood of a solo miner finding a solution is more like winning the lottery.}
==== Managed Pools
==== P2Pool
=== Consensus Attacks