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Edited ch14_applications.adoc with Atlas code editor

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clenser 2023-10-19 18:17:10 +00:00
parent 5e2cdf38e5
commit c8ff99ad73

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@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ image::images/mbc3_1403.png["Emma's payment channel with Fabian, showing the com
==== Making Trustless Channels ==== Making Trustless Channels
The channel we just described works, but only if both The channel ((("payment channels", "trustless channels", id="payment-channel-trustless")))((("trustless channels", id="trustless-channel")))((("timelocks", "trustless channels", id="timelock-trustless")))we just described works, but only if both
parties cooperate, without any failures or attempts to cheat. Let's look parties cooperate, without any failures or attempts to cheat. Let's look
at some of the scenarios that break this channel and see what is needed at some of the scenarios that break this channel and see what is needed
to fix those: to fix those:
@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ settlement transaction they can close the channel and redeem their
balance immediately. Worst case, one of the parties can be petty, refuse balance immediately. Worst case, one of the parties can be petty, refuse
to cooperate, and force the other party to do a unilateral close with to cooperate, and force the other party to do a unilateral close with
the most recent commitment transaction. But if they do that, they have the most recent commitment transaction. But if they do that, they have
to wait for their funds too. to wait for their funds ((("payment channels", "trustless channels", startref="payment-channel-trustless")))((("trustless channels", startref="trustless-channel")))((("timelocks", "trustless channels", startref="timelock-trustless")))too.
==== Asymmetric Revocable Commitments ==== Asymmetric Revocable Commitments