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@ -1132,16 +1132,15 @@ the best possible privacy should still use their own full node.
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=== SPV Clients and Privacy
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Clients that implement SPV have weaker privacy than a full node. A full
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node receives all transactions and therefore reveals no information
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node downloads all transactions and therefore reveals no information
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about whether it is using some address in its wallet. An SPV client
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receives a filtered list of transactions related to the addresses that
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are in its wallet. As a result, it reduces the privacy of the owner.
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only downloads transactions that are related to its wallet in some way.
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Bloom filters are a way to reduce the loss of privacy. Without them, an
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Bloom filters and compact block filters are a way to reduce the loss of privacy. Without them, an
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SPV client would have to explicitly list the addresses it was interested
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in, creating a serious breach of privacy. However, even with bloom
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in, creating a serious breach of privacy. However, even with
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filters, an adversary monitoring the traffic of an SPV client or
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connected to it directly as a node in the P2P network can collect enough
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connected to it directly as a node in the P2P network may be able to collect enough
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information over time to learn the addresses in the wallet of the SPV
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client.
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