@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ The minority chain, mining under the old rules with only 20% of the hashing powe
==== Contentious Hard Forks
((("forks", "changing consensus rules", "contentious hard forks")))This is the dawn of consensus software development. Just as open source development changed both the methods and products of software and created new methodologies, new tools, and new communities in its wake, consensus software development also represents a new frontier in computer science. Out of the debates, experiments, and tribulations of the bitcoin development roadmap, we will see new development tools, practices, methodologies, and communities emerge.
((("forks", "changing consensus rules", "contentious hard forks")))((("hard forks")))This is the dawn of consensus software development. Just as open source development changed both the methods and products of software and created new methodologies, new tools, and new communities in its wake, consensus software development also represents a new frontier in computer science. Out of the debates, experiments, and tribulations of the bitcoin development roadmap, we will see new development tools, practices, methodologies, and communities emerge.
Hard forks are seen as risky because they force a minority to either upgrade or remain on a minority chain. The risk of splitting the entire system into two competing systems is seen by many as an unacceptable risk. As a result, many developers are reluctant to use the hard fork mechanism to implement upgrades to the consensus rules, unless there is near unanimous support from the entire network. Any hard fork proposals that do not have near-unanimous support are considered too "contentious" to attempt without risking a partition of the system.
@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ Soft forks can be implemented in a number of ways—the term does not defin
===== Soft forks redefining NOP opcodes
((("opcodes", "redefinition by soft forks")))A number of soft forks have been implemented in bitcoin, based on the re-interpretation of NOP opcodes. Bitcoin Script had ten opcodes reserved for future use, NOP1 through NOP10, respectively. Under the consensus rules, the presence of these opcodes in a script is interpreted as a null-potent operator, meaning they have no effect. Execution continues after the NOP opcode as if it wasn't there.
((("opcodes", "redefinition by soft forks")))((("soft forks", "redefinition of NOP codes")))A number of soft forks have been implemented in bitcoin, based on the re-interpretation of NOP opcodes. Bitcoin Script had ten opcodes reserved for future use, NOP1 through NOP10, respectively. Under the consensus rules, the presence of these opcodes in a script is interpreted as a null-potent operator, meaning they have no effect. Execution continues after the NOP opcode as if it wasn't there.
A soft fork therefore can modify the semantics of a NOP code to give it new meaning. For example, BIP-65 (+CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY+) reinterpreted the NOP2 opcode. Clients implementing BIP-65 interpret NOP2 as +OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY+ and impose an absolute locktime consensus rule on UTXO that contain this opcode in their locking scripts. This change is a soft fork because a transaction that is valid under BIP-65 is also valid on any client that is not implementing (ignorant of) BIP-65. To the old clients, the script contains an NOP code, which is ignored.
@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ It is likely that there are other, yet to be discovered, mechanisms by which upg
==== Criticisms of Soft Forks
((("forks", "changing consensus rules", "soft fork drawbacks")))Soft forks based on the NOP opcodes are relatively uncontroversial. The NOP opcodes were placed in Bitcoin Script with the explicit goal of allowing non-disruptive upgrades.
((("forks", "changing consensus rules", "soft fork drawbacks")))((("soft forks", "drawbacks of")))Soft forks based on the NOP opcodes are relatively uncontroversial. The NOP opcodes were placed in Bitcoin Script with the explicit goal of allowing non-disruptive upgrades.
However, many developers are concerned that other methods of soft fork upgrades make unacceptable trade-offs. Common criticisms of soft fork changes include:
@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ Irreversible upgrades:: Because soft forks create transactions with additional c
[[softforksignaling]]
=== Soft Fork Signaling with Block Version
((("mining and consensus", "changing consensus rules", "signaling and activation")))((("forks", "changing consensus rules", "soft fork activation")))Since soft forks allow unmodified clients to continue to operate within consensus, the mechanism for "activating" a soft fork is through miners signaling readiness: A majority of miners must agree that they are ready and willing to enforce the new consensus rules. To coordinate their actions, there is a signaling mechanism that allows them to show their support for a consensus rule change. This mechanism was introduced with the activation of BIP-34 in March 2013 and replaced by the activation of BIP-9 in July 2016.
((("mining and consensus", "changing consensus rules", "signaling and activation")))((("forks", "changing consensus rules", "soft fork activation")))((("soft forks", "activation")))Since soft forks allow unmodified clients to continue to operate within consensus, the mechanism for "activating" a soft fork is through miners signaling readiness: A majority of miners must agree that they are ready and willing to enforce the new consensus rules. To coordinate their actions, there is a signaling mechanism that allows them to show their support for a consensus rule change. This mechanism was introduced with the activation of BIP-34 in March 2013 and replaced by the activation of BIP-9 in July 2016.
==== BIP-34 Signaling and Activation
@ -1080,6 +1080,6 @@ The standard is defined in https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0009.
((("mining and consensus", "consensus software development")))((("development environment", "consensus software development")))Consensus software development continues to evolve and there is much discussion on the various mechanisms for changing the consensus rules. By its very nature, bitcoin sets a very high bar on coordination and consensus for changes. As a decentralized system, it has no "authority" that can impose its will on the participants of the network. Power is diffused between multiple constituencies such as miners, core developers, wallet developers, exchanges, merchants, and end users. Decisions cannot be made unilaterally by any of these constituencies. For example, while miners can theoretically change the rules by simple majority (51%), they are constrained by the consent of the other constituencies. If they act unilaterally, the rest of the participants may simply refuse to follow them, keeping the economic activity on a minority chain. Without economic activity (transactions, merchants, wallets, exchanges), the miners will be mining a worthless coin with empty blocks. This diffusion of power means that all the participants must coordinate, or no changes can be made. Status quo is the stable state of this system with only a few changes possible if there is strong consensus by a very large majority. The 95% threshold for soft forks is reflective of this reality.
It is important to recognize that there is no perfect solution for consensus development. Both hard forks and soft forks involve trade-offs. For some types of changes, soft forks may be a better choice, for others hard forks may be a better choice. There is no perfect choice; both carry risks. The one constant characteristic of consensus software development is that change is difficult and consensus forces compromise.
((("hard forks")))It is important to recognize that there is no perfect solution for consensus development. Both hard forks and soft forks involve trade-offs. For some types of changes, soft forks may be a better choice, for others hard forks may be a better choice. There is no perfect choice; both carry risks. The one constant characteristic of consensus software development is that change is difficult and consensus forces compromise.
Some see this as a weakness of consensus systems. In time, you may come to see it as I do, as the system's greatest strength.
judymcconville@roadrunner.com
7 years ago