Edited ch06.asciidoc with Atlas code editor

ch06.asciidoc

@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ The math of ECDSA is complex and difficult to understand. There are a number of
 
 This is not just a theoretical possibility. We have seen this issue lead to exposure of private keys in a few different implementations of transaction signing algorithms in bitcoin. People have had funds stolen because of inadvertent re-use of a _k_ value. The most common reason for re-use of a _k_ value is an improperly initialized random-number generator.
 
-To avoid this vulnerability, the industry best practice is to not generate _k_ with a random-number generator seeded with entropy, but instead to use a deterministic-random process seeded with the transaction data itself. That ensures that each transaction produces a different _k_. The industry-standard algorithm for deterministic initialization of _k_ is defined in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979[RFC 6979] published by the Internet Engineering Task Force.
+((("warnings and cautions", "random number generation")))To avoid this vulnerability, the industry best practice is to not generate _k_ with a random-number generator seeded with entropy, but instead to use a deterministic-random process seeded with the transaction data itself. That ensures that each transaction produces a different _k_. The industry-standard algorithm for deterministic initialization of _k_ is defined in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979[RFC 6979] published by the Internet Engineering Task Force.
 
 If you are implementing an algorithm to sign transactions in bitcoin, you _must_ use RFC6979 or a similarly deterministic-random algorithm to ensure you generate a different _k_ for each transaction.((("", startref="Tdigsig06")))