The example code must be compiled using a C++ compiler and linked against the libbitcoin library (which must be first installed on that system). To run the example, run the +vanity-miner+ executable with no parameters (see <<vanity_miner_run>>) and it will attempt to find a vanity address starting with "1kid".
The example code must be compiled using a C++ compiler and linked against the libbitcoin library (which must be first installed on that system). To run the example, run the ++vanity-miner++ executable with no parameters (see <<vanity_miner_run>>) and it will attempt to find a vanity address starting with "1kid".
[[vanity_miner_run]]
.Compiling and running the vanity-miner example
@ -955,9 +955,9 @@ The example code will take a few seconds to find a match for the three-character
((("security","of vanity addresses")))((("security","vanity addresses and")))((("vanity addresses","security and")))Vanity addresses can be used to enhance _and_ to defeat security measures; they are truly a double-edged sword. Used to improve security, a distinctive address makes it harder for adversaries to substitute their own address and fool your customers into paying them instead of you. Unfortunately, vanity addresses also make it possible for anyone to create an address that _resembles_ any random address, or even another vanity address, thereby fooling your customers.
Eugenia could advertise a randomly generated address (e.g., 1J7mdg5rbQyUHENYdx39WVWK7fsLpEoXZy) to which people can send their donations. Or, she could generate a vanity address that starts with 1Kids, to make it more distinctive.
Eugenia could advertise a randomly generated address (e.g., +1J7mdg5rbQyUHENYdx39WVWK7fsLpEoXZy+) to which people can send their donations. Or, she could generate a vanity address that starts with 1Kids, to make it more distinctive.
In both cases, one of the risks of using a single fixed address (rather than a separate dynamic address per donor) is that a thief might be able to infiltrate your website and replace it with his own address, thereby diverting donations to himself. If you have advertised your donation address in a number of different places, your users may visually inspect the address before making a payment to ensure it is the same one they saw on your website, on your email, and on your flyer. In the case of a random address like 1J7mdg5rbQyUHENYdx39WVWK7fsLpEoXZy, the average user will perhaps inspect the first few characters "1J7mdg" and be satisfied that the address matches. Using a vanity address generator, someone with the intent to steal by substituting a similar-looking address can quickly generate addresses that match the first few characters, as shown in <<table_4-13>>.
In both cases, one of the risks of using a single fixed address (rather than a separate dynamic address per donor) is that a thief might be able to infiltrate your website and replace it with his own address, thereby diverting donations to himself. If you have advertised your donation address in a number of different places, your users may visually inspect the address before making a payment to ensure it is the same one they saw on your website, on your email, and on your flyer. In the case of a random address like +1J7mdg5rbQyUHENYdx39WVWK7fsLpEoXZy+, the average user will perhaps inspect the first few characters "1J7mdg" and be satisfied that the address matches. Using a vanity address generator, someone with the intent to steal by substituting a similar-looking address can quickly generate addresses that match the first few characters, as shown in <<table_4-13>>.
[[table_4-13]]
.Generating vanity addresses to match a random address
@ -968,8 +968,8 @@ In both cases, one of the risks of using a single fixed address (rather than a s
| *Vanity (6 character match)* | 1J7mdg5WxGENmwyJP9xuGhG5KRzu99BBCX
|=======
So does a vanity address increase security? If Eugenia generates the vanity address 1Kids33q44erFfpeXrmDSz7zEqG2FesZEN,
users are likely to look at the vanity pattern word _and a few characters beyond_, for example noticing the "1Kids33" part of the address. That would force an attacker to generate a vanity address matching at least six characters (two more), expending an effort that is 3,364 times (58 x 58) higher than the effort Eugenia expended for her four-character vanity. Essentially, the effort Eugenia expends (or pays a vanity pool for) "pushes" the attacker into having to produce a longer pattern vanity. If Eugenia pays a pool to generate an 8-character vanity address, the attacker would be pushed into the realm of 10 characters, which is infeasible on a personal computer and expensive even with a custom vanity-mining rig or vanity pool. What is affordable for Eugenia becomes unaffordable for the attacker, especially if the potential reward of fraud is not high enough to cover the cost of the vanity address generation.(((range="endofrange", startref="ix_ch04-asciidoc27")))(((range="endofrange", startref="ix_ch04-asciidoc26")))
So does a vanity address increase security? If Eugenia generates the vanity address +1Kids33q44erFfpeXrmDSz7zEqG2FesZEN+,
users are likely to look at the vanity pattern word _and a few characters beyond_, for example noticing the "1Kids33" part of the address. That would force an attacker to generate a vanity address matching at least six characters (two more), expending an effort that is 3,364 times (58 × 58) higher than the effort Eugenia expended for her four-character vanity. Essentially, the effort Eugenia expends (or pays a vanity pool for) "pushes" the attacker into having to produce a longer pattern vanity. If Eugenia pays a pool to generate an 8-character vanity address, the attacker would be pushed into the realm of 10 characters, which is infeasible on a personal computer and expensive even with a custom vanity-mining rig or vanity pool. What is affordable for Eugenia becomes unaffordable for the attacker, especially if the potential reward of fraud is not high enough to cover the cost of the vanity address generation.(((range="endofrange", startref="ix_ch04-asciidoc27")))(((range="endofrange", startref="ix_ch04-asciidoc26")))
myarbrough@oreilly.com
10 years ago