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@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ Aezeed::
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on both the backup and the recovery software supporting the same
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word list.
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[role="less_space pagebreak-before"]
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Muun::
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Used in ((("Muun recovery codes")))the Muun wallet, which defaults to requiring spending
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transactions be signed by multiple keys, this is a nonword code that
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@ -373,7 +374,6 @@ seed for a BIP32 tree of keys, but they won't be the same trees.
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Different passphrases will result in different keys. That can be a
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positive or a negative, depending on your perspective:
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[role="less_space pagebreak-before"]
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- On the positive, if someone obtains your recovery code (but not your
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passphrase), they will see a valid BIP32 tree of keys.
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If you prepared for that contingency and sent some bitcoins to the
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@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ positive or a negative, depending on your perspective:
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you with a warning that your recovery code has been compromised,
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allowing you to investigate and take corrective measures.
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The ability to create multiple passphrases for the same recovery code
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that all look valid is a type of _plausible deniability._
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that all look valid is a type of _plausible deniability_.
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- On the negative, if you're coerced to give an attacker a recovery
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code (with or without a passphrase) and it doesn't yield the amount of
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