Made changes to ch10.asciidoc

ch10.asciidoc

@@ -20,21 +20,21 @@ Bitcoin's decentralized security model puts a lot of power in the hands of the u
 
 ((("bitcoin","system security")))((("security","centralized controls and")))The most important principle for bitcoin developers is decentralization. Most developers will be familiar with centralized security models and might be tempted to apply these models to their bitcoin applications, with disastrous results. 
 
-Bitcoin's security relies on decentralized control over keys and on independent transaction validation by miners. If you want to leverage bitcoin's security, you need to ensure that you remain within the bitcoin security model. In simple terms: don't take control of keys away from users and don't take transactions off the blockchain. 
+Bitcoin's security relies on decentralized control over keys and on independent transaction validation by miners. If you want to leverage Bitcoin's security, you need to ensure that you remain within the Bitcoin security model. In simple terms: don't take control of keys away from users and don't take transactions off the block chain. 
 
-For example, many early bitcoin exchanges concentrated all user funds in a single "hot" wallet with keys stored on a single server. Such a design removes control from users and centralizes control over keys to a single system. Many such systems have been hacked, with disastrous consequences for their customers. 
+For example, many early bitcoin exchanges concentrated all user funds in a single "hot" wallet with keys stored on a single server. Such a design removes control from users and centralizes control over keys in a single system. Many such systems have been hacked, with disastrous consequences for their customers. 
 
-((("transactions","taking off blockchain")))Another common mistake is to take transactions "off blockchain" in a misguided effort to reduce transaction fees or accelerate transaction processing. An "off blockchain" system will record transactions on an internal, centralized ledger and only occasionally synchronize them to the bitcoin blockchain. This practice, again, substitutes de-centralized bitcoin security with a proprietary and centralized approach. When transactions are off blockchain, improperly secured centralized ledgers can be falsified, diverting funds and depleting reserves, unnoticed. 
+((("transactions","taking off blockchain")))Another common mistake is to take transactions "off block chain" in a misguided effort to reduce transaction fees or accelerate transaction processing. An "off block chain" system will record transactions on an internal, centralized ledger and only occasionally synchronize them to the bitcoin block chain. This practice, again, substitutes decentralized bitcoin security with a proprietary and centralized approach. When transactions are off block chain, improperly secured centralized ledgers can be falsified, diverting funds and depleting reserves, unnoticed. 
 
-Unless you are prepared to invest heavily in operational security, multiple layers of access control, and audits (as the traditional banks do) you should think very carefully before taking funds outside of bitcoin's decentralized security context. Even if you have the funds and discipline to implement a robust security model, such a design merely replicates the fragile model of traditional financial networks, plagued by identity theft, corruption, and embezzlement. To take advantage of bitcoin's unique decentralized security model, you have to avoid the temptation of centralized architectures that may feel familiar but ultimately subvert bitcoin's security.
+Unless you are prepared to invest heavily in operational security, multiple layers of access control, and audits (as the traditional banks do) you should think very carefully before taking funds outside of Bitcoin's decentralized security context. Even if you have the funds and discipline to implement a robust security model, such a design merely replicates the fragile model of traditional financial networks, plagued by identity theft, corruption, and embezzlement. To take advantage of Bitcoin's unique decentralized security model, you have to avoid the temptation of centralized architectures that might feel familiar but ultimately subvert Bitcoin's security.
 
 ==== The Root of Trust
 
-((("root of trust")))((("security","root of trust")))Traditional security architecture is based upon a concept called the _root of trust_, which is a trusted core used as the foundation for the security of the overall system or application. Security architecture is developed around the root of trust as a series of concentric circles, like layers in an onion, extending trust outwards from the root. Each layer builds upon the more-trusted inner layer using access controls, digital signatures, encryption, and other security primitives. As software systems become more complex, they are more likely to contain bugs, which make them vulnerable to security compromise. As a result, the more complex a software system becomes, the harder it is to secure. The root of trust concept ensures that most of the trust is placed within the least complex part of the system, and therefore least vulnerable, parts of the system, while more complex software is layered around it. This security architecture is repeated at different scales, first establishing a root of trust within the hardware of a single system, then extending that root of trust through the operating system to higher-level system services, and finally across many servers layered in concentric circles of diminishing trust. 
+((("root of trust")))((("security","root of trust")))Traditional security architecture is based upon a concept called the _root of trust_, which is a trusted core used as the foundation for the security of the overall system or application. Security architecture is developed around the root of trust as a series of concentric circles, like layers in an onion, extending trust outward from the center. Each layer builds upon the more-trusted inner layer using access controls, digital signatures, encryption, and other security primitives. As software systems become more complex, they are more likely to contain bugs, which make them vulnerable to security compromise. As a result, the more complex a software system becomes, the harder it is to secure. The root of trust concept ensures that most of the trust is placed within the least complex part of the system, and therefore least vulnerable, parts of the system, while more complex software is layered around it. This security architecture is repeated at different scales, first establishing a root of trust within the hardware of a single system, then extending that root of trust through the operating system to higher-level system services, and finally across many servers layered in concentric circles of diminishing trust. 
 
-Bitcoin security architecture is different. In bitcoin the consensus system creates a trusted public ledger that is completely decentralized. A correctly validated blockchain uses the genesis block as the root of trust, building a chain of trust up to the current block. Bitcoin systems can and should use the blockchain as their root of trust. When designing a complex bitcoin application that consists of services on many different systems, you should carefully examine the security architecture in order to ascertain where trust is being placed. Ultimately the only thing that should be explicitly trusted is a fully validated blockchain. If your application explicitly or implicitly vests trust in anything but the blockchain, that should be a source of concern because it introduces points of vulnerability. A good method to evaluate the security architecture of your application is to consider each individual component and evaluate a hypothetical scenario where that component is completely compromised and under the control of a malicious actor. Take each component of your application, in turn, and assess the impacts on the overall security if that component is compromised. If your application is no longer secure when components are compromised, that shows that you have implicitly misplaced trust in those components. A bitcoin application without vulnerabilities should be vulnerable only to a compromise of the bitcoin consensus mechanism, meaning that its root of trust is based on the strongest part of the bitcoin security architecture. 
+Bitcoin security architecture is different. In Bitcoin, the consensus system creates a trusted public ledger that is completely decentralized. A correctly validated block chain uses the genesis block as the root of trust, building a chain of trust up to the current block. Bitcoin systems can and should use the block chain as their root of trust. When designing a complex bitcoin application that consists of services on many different systems, you should carefully examine the security architecture in order to ascertain where trust is being placed. Ultimately, the only thing that should be explicitly trusted is a fully validated block chain. If your application explicitly or implicitly vests trust in anything but the block chain, that should be a source of concern because it introduces vulnerability. A good method to evaluate the security architecture of your application is to consider each individual component and evaluate a hypothetical scenario where that component is completely compromised and under the control of a malicious actor. Take each component of your application, in turn, and assess the impacts on the overall security if that component is compromised. If your application is no longer secure when components are compromised, that shows you have misplaced trust in those components. A bitcoin application without vulnerabilities should be vulnerable only to a compromise of the bitcoin consensus mechanism, meaning that its root of trust is based on the strongest part of the bitcoin security architecture. 
 
-The numerous examples of hacked bitcoin exchanges serve to underscore this point because their security architecture and design fails even under the most casual scrutiny. These centralized implementations had invested trust explicitly in numerous components outside the bitcoin blockchain, such as hot wallets, centralized ledger databases, vulnerable encryption keys, etc. 
+The numerous examples of hacked bitcoin exchanges serve to underscore this point because their security architecture and design fails even under the most casual scrutiny. These centralized implementations had invested trust explicitly in numerous components outside the bitcoin block chain, such as hot wallets, centralized ledger databases, vulnerable encryption keys, and similar schemes. 
 
 
 === User Security Best Practices