From d8414d3c157dc1f83e73c17447ba41fe5afa9d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bastian Blank Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 11:34:33 -0500 Subject: xen: Add privcmd device driver Access to arbitrary hypercalls is currently provided via xenfs. This adds a standard character device to handle this. The support in xenfs remains for backward compatibility and uses the device driver code. Signed-off-by: Bastian Blank Acked-by: Ian Campbell Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- drivers/xen/Kconfig | 7 + drivers/xen/Makefile | 2 + drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 437 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/xen/privcmd.h | 3 + drivers/xen/xenfs/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/xen/xenfs/privcmd.c | 400 --------------------------------------- drivers/xen/xenfs/super.c | 3 +- drivers/xen/xenfs/xenfs.h | 1 - 8 files changed, 452 insertions(+), 403 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/xen/privcmd.c create mode 100644 drivers/xen/privcmd.h delete mode 100644 drivers/xen/xenfs/privcmd.c diff --git a/drivers/xen/Kconfig b/drivers/xen/Kconfig index 8795480..a1ced52 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/xen/Kconfig @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ config XEN_BACKEND config XENFS tristate "Xen filesystem" + select XEN_PRIVCMD default y help The xen filesystem provides a way for domains to share @@ -171,4 +172,10 @@ config XEN_PCIDEV_BACKEND xen-pciback.hide=(03:00.0)(04:00.0) If in doubt, say m. + +config XEN_PRIVCMD + tristate + depends on XEN + default m + endmenu diff --git a/drivers/xen/Makefile b/drivers/xen/Makefile index 974fffd..aa31337 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/Makefile +++ b/drivers/xen/Makefile @@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_TMEM) += tmem.o obj-$(CONFIG_SWIOTLB_XEN) += swiotlb-xen.o obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_DOM0) += pci.o obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_PCIDEV_BACKEND) += xen-pciback/ +obj-$(CONFIG_XEN_PRIVCMD) += xen-privcmd.o xen-evtchn-y := evtchn.o xen-gntdev-y := gntdev.o xen-gntalloc-y := gntalloc.o +xen-privcmd-y := privcmd.o diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e8d3da --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c @@ -0,0 +1,437 @@ +/****************************************************************************** + * privcmd.c + * + * Interface to privileged domain-0 commands. + * + * Copyright (c) 2002-2004, K A Fraser, B Dragovic + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "privcmd.h" + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +#ifndef HAVE_ARCH_PRIVCMD_MMAP +static int privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(struct vm_area_struct *vma); +#endif + +static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(void __user *udata) +{ + struct privcmd_hypercall hypercall; + long ret; + + if (copy_from_user(&hypercall, udata, sizeof(hypercall))) + return -EFAULT; + + ret = privcmd_call(hypercall.op, + hypercall.arg[0], hypercall.arg[1], + hypercall.arg[2], hypercall.arg[3], + hypercall.arg[4]); + + return ret; +} + +static void free_page_list(struct list_head *pages) +{ + struct page *p, *n; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, pages, lru) + __free_page(p); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(pages); +} + +/* + * Given an array of items in userspace, return a list of pages + * containing the data. If copying fails, either because of memory + * allocation failure or a problem reading user memory, return an + * error code; its up to the caller to dispose of any partial list. + */ +static int gather_array(struct list_head *pagelist, + unsigned nelem, size_t size, + void __user *data) +{ + unsigned pageidx; + void *pagedata; + int ret; + + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) + return 0; + + pageidx = PAGE_SIZE; + pagedata = NULL; /* quiet, gcc */ + while (nelem--) { + if (pageidx > PAGE_SIZE-size) { + struct page *page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); + + ret = -ENOMEM; + if (page == NULL) + goto fail; + + pagedata = page_address(page); + + list_add_tail(&page->lru, pagelist); + pageidx = 0; + } + + ret = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(pagedata + pageidx, data, size)) + goto fail; + + data += size; + pageidx += size; + } + + ret = 0; + +fail: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Call function "fn" on each element of the array fragmented + * over a list of pages. + */ +static int traverse_pages(unsigned nelem, size_t size, + struct list_head *pos, + int (*fn)(void *data, void *state), + void *state) +{ + void *pagedata; + unsigned pageidx; + int ret = 0; + + BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE); + + pageidx = PAGE_SIZE; + pagedata = NULL; /* hush, gcc */ + + while (nelem--) { + if (pageidx > PAGE_SIZE-size) { + struct page *page; + pos = pos->next; + page = list_entry(pos, struct page, lru); + pagedata = page_address(page); + pageidx = 0; + } + + ret = (*fn)(pagedata + pageidx, state); + if (ret) + break; + pageidx += size; + } + + return ret; +} + +struct mmap_mfn_state { + unsigned long va; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + domid_t domain; +}; + +static int mmap_mfn_range(void *data, void *state) +{ + struct privcmd_mmap_entry *msg = data; + struct mmap_mfn_state *st = state; + struct vm_area_struct *vma = st->vma; + int rc; + + /* Do not allow range to wrap the address space. */ + if ((msg->npages > (LONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT)) || + ((unsigned long)(msg->npages << PAGE_SHIFT) >= -st->va)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Range chunks must be contiguous in va space. */ + if ((msg->va != st->va) || + ((msg->va+(msg->npages< vma->vm_end)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = xen_remap_domain_mfn_range(vma, + msg->va & PAGE_MASK, + msg->mfn, msg->npages, + vma->vm_page_prot, + st->domain); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + st->va += msg->npages << PAGE_SHIFT; + + return 0; +} + +static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata) +{ + struct privcmd_mmap mmapcmd; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int rc; + LIST_HEAD(pagelist); + struct mmap_mfn_state state; + + if (!xen_initial_domain()) + return -EPERM; + + if (copy_from_user(&mmapcmd, udata, sizeof(mmapcmd))) + return -EFAULT; + + rc = gather_array(&pagelist, + mmapcmd.num, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmap_entry), + mmapcmd.entry); + + if (rc || list_empty(&pagelist)) + goto out; + + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + + { + struct page *page = list_first_entry(&pagelist, + struct page, lru); + struct privcmd_mmap_entry *msg = page_address(page); + + vma = find_vma(mm, msg->va); + rc = -EINVAL; + + if (!vma || (msg->va != vma->vm_start) || + !privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(vma)) + goto out_up; + } + + state.va = vma->vm_start; + state.vma = vma; + state.domain = mmapcmd.dom; + + rc = traverse_pages(mmapcmd.num, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmap_entry), + &pagelist, + mmap_mfn_range, &state); + + +out_up: + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + +out: + free_page_list(&pagelist); + + return rc; +} + +struct mmap_batch_state { + domid_t domain; + unsigned long va; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + int err; + + xen_pfn_t __user *user; +}; + +static int mmap_batch_fn(void *data, void *state) +{ + xen_pfn_t *mfnp = data; + struct mmap_batch_state *st = state; + + if (xen_remap_domain_mfn_range(st->vma, st->va & PAGE_MASK, *mfnp, 1, + st->vma->vm_page_prot, st->domain) < 0) { + *mfnp |= 0xf0000000U; + st->err++; + } + st->va += PAGE_SIZE; + + return 0; +} + +static int mmap_return_errors(void *data, void *state) +{ + xen_pfn_t *mfnp = data; + struct mmap_batch_state *st = state; + + return put_user(*mfnp, st->user++); +} + +static struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops; + +static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata) +{ + int ret; + struct privcmd_mmapbatch m; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned long nr_pages; + LIST_HEAD(pagelist); + struct mmap_batch_state state; + + if (!xen_initial_domain()) + return -EPERM; + + if (copy_from_user(&m, udata, sizeof(m))) + return -EFAULT; + + nr_pages = m.num; + if ((m.num <= 0) || (nr_pages > (LONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT))) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = gather_array(&pagelist, m.num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t), + m.arr); + + if (ret || list_empty(&pagelist)) + goto out; + + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + + vma = find_vma(mm, m.addr); + ret = -EINVAL; + if (!vma || + vma->vm_ops != &privcmd_vm_ops || + (m.addr != vma->vm_start) || + ((m.addr + (nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT)) != vma->vm_end) || + !privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(vma)) { + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + goto out; + } + + state.domain = m.dom; + state.vma = vma; + state.va = m.addr; + state.err = 0; + + ret = traverse_pages(m.num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t), + &pagelist, mmap_batch_fn, &state); + + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + + if (state.err > 0) { + state.user = m.arr; + ret = traverse_pages(m.num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t), + &pagelist, + mmap_return_errors, &state); + } + +out: + free_page_list(&pagelist); + + return ret; +} + +static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file, + unsigned int cmd, unsigned long data) +{ + int ret = -ENOSYS; + void __user *udata = (void __user *) data; + + switch (cmd) { + case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL: + ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(udata); + break; + + case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP: + ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(udata); + break; + + case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH: + ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata); + break; + + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +#ifndef HAVE_ARCH_PRIVCMD_MMAP +static int privcmd_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + printk(KERN_DEBUG "privcmd_fault: vma=%p %lx-%lx, pgoff=%lx, uv=%p\n", + vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, + vmf->pgoff, vmf->virtual_address); + + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; +} + +static struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops = { + .fault = privcmd_fault +}; + +static int privcmd_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + /* Unsupported for auto-translate guests. */ + if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) + return -ENOSYS; + + /* DONTCOPY is essential for Xen because copy_page_range doesn't know + * how to recreate these mappings */ + vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED | VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_PFNMAP; + vma->vm_ops = &privcmd_vm_ops; + vma->vm_private_data = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + return (xchg(&vma->vm_private_data, (void *)1) == NULL); +} +#endif + +const struct file_operations xen_privcmd_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .unlocked_ioctl = privcmd_ioctl, + .mmap = privcmd_mmap, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_privcmd_fops); + +static struct miscdevice privcmd_dev = { + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .name = "xen/privcmd", + .fops = &xen_privcmd_fops, +}; + +static int __init privcmd_init(void) +{ + int err; + + if (!xen_domain()) + return -ENODEV; + + err = misc_register(&privcmd_dev); + if (err != 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not register Xen privcmd device\n"); + return err; + } + return 0; +} + +static void __exit privcmd_exit(void) +{ + misc_deregister(&privcmd_dev); +} + +module_init(privcmd_init); +module_exit(privcmd_exit); diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.h b/drivers/xen/privcmd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..14facae --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.h @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +#include + +extern const struct file_operations xen_privcmd_fops; diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenfs/Makefile b/drivers/xen/xenfs/Makefile index 4fde944..5d45ff1 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenfs/Makefile +++ b/drivers/xen/xenfs/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_XENFS) += xenfs.o -xenfs-y = super.o xenbus.o privcmd.o +xenfs-y = super.o xenbus.o xenfs-$(CONFIG_XEN_DOM0) += xenstored.o diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenfs/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/xenfs/privcmd.c deleted file mode 100644 index dbd3b16..0000000 --- a/drivers/xen/xenfs/privcmd.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,400 +0,0 @@ -/****************************************************************************** - * privcmd.c - * - * Interface to privileged domain-0 commands. - * - * Copyright (c) 2002-2004, K A Fraser, B Dragovic - */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#ifndef HAVE_ARCH_PRIVCMD_MMAP -static int privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(struct vm_area_struct *vma); -#endif - -static long privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(void __user *udata) -{ - struct privcmd_hypercall hypercall; - long ret; - - if (copy_from_user(&hypercall, udata, sizeof(hypercall))) - return -EFAULT; - - ret = privcmd_call(hypercall.op, - hypercall.arg[0], hypercall.arg[1], - hypercall.arg[2], hypercall.arg[3], - hypercall.arg[4]); - - return ret; -} - -static void free_page_list(struct list_head *pages) -{ - struct page *p, *n; - - list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, pages, lru) - __free_page(p); - - INIT_LIST_HEAD(pages); -} - -/* - * Given an array of items in userspace, return a list of pages - * containing the data. If copying fails, either because of memory - * allocation failure or a problem reading user memory, return an - * error code; its up to the caller to dispose of any partial list. - */ -static int gather_array(struct list_head *pagelist, - unsigned nelem, size_t size, - void __user *data) -{ - unsigned pageidx; - void *pagedata; - int ret; - - if (size > PAGE_SIZE) - return 0; - - pageidx = PAGE_SIZE; - pagedata = NULL; /* quiet, gcc */ - while (nelem--) { - if (pageidx > PAGE_SIZE-size) { - struct page *page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); - - ret = -ENOMEM; - if (page == NULL) - goto fail; - - pagedata = page_address(page); - - list_add_tail(&page->lru, pagelist); - pageidx = 0; - } - - ret = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(pagedata + pageidx, data, size)) - goto fail; - - data += size; - pageidx += size; - } - - ret = 0; - -fail: - return ret; -} - -/* - * Call function "fn" on each element of the array fragmented - * over a list of pages. - */ -static int traverse_pages(unsigned nelem, size_t size, - struct list_head *pos, - int (*fn)(void *data, void *state), - void *state) -{ - void *pagedata; - unsigned pageidx; - int ret = 0; - - BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE); - - pageidx = PAGE_SIZE; - pagedata = NULL; /* hush, gcc */ - - while (nelem--) { - if (pageidx > PAGE_SIZE-size) { - struct page *page; - pos = pos->next; - page = list_entry(pos, struct page, lru); - pagedata = page_address(page); - pageidx = 0; - } - - ret = (*fn)(pagedata + pageidx, state); - if (ret) - break; - pageidx += size; - } - - return ret; -} - -struct mmap_mfn_state { - unsigned long va; - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - domid_t domain; -}; - -static int mmap_mfn_range(void *data, void *state) -{ - struct privcmd_mmap_entry *msg = data; - struct mmap_mfn_state *st = state; - struct vm_area_struct *vma = st->vma; - int rc; - - /* Do not allow range to wrap the address space. */ - if ((msg->npages > (LONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT)) || - ((unsigned long)(msg->npages << PAGE_SHIFT) >= -st->va)) - return -EINVAL; - - /* Range chunks must be contiguous in va space. */ - if ((msg->va != st->va) || - ((msg->va+(msg->npages< vma->vm_end)) - return -EINVAL; - - rc = xen_remap_domain_mfn_range(vma, - msg->va & PAGE_MASK, - msg->mfn, msg->npages, - vma->vm_page_prot, - st->domain); - if (rc < 0) - return rc; - - st->va += msg->npages << PAGE_SHIFT; - - return 0; -} - -static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap(void __user *udata) -{ - struct privcmd_mmap mmapcmd; - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - int rc; - LIST_HEAD(pagelist); - struct mmap_mfn_state state; - - if (!xen_initial_domain()) - return -EPERM; - - if (copy_from_user(&mmapcmd, udata, sizeof(mmapcmd))) - return -EFAULT; - - rc = gather_array(&pagelist, - mmapcmd.num, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmap_entry), - mmapcmd.entry); - - if (rc || list_empty(&pagelist)) - goto out; - - down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - - { - struct page *page = list_first_entry(&pagelist, - struct page, lru); - struct privcmd_mmap_entry *msg = page_address(page); - - vma = find_vma(mm, msg->va); - rc = -EINVAL; - - if (!vma || (msg->va != vma->vm_start) || - !privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(vma)) - goto out_up; - } - - state.va = vma->vm_start; - state.vma = vma; - state.domain = mmapcmd.dom; - - rc = traverse_pages(mmapcmd.num, sizeof(struct privcmd_mmap_entry), - &pagelist, - mmap_mfn_range, &state); - - -out_up: - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - -out: - free_page_list(&pagelist); - - return rc; -} - -struct mmap_batch_state { - domid_t domain; - unsigned long va; - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - int err; - - xen_pfn_t __user *user; -}; - -static int mmap_batch_fn(void *data, void *state) -{ - xen_pfn_t *mfnp = data; - struct mmap_batch_state *st = state; - - if (xen_remap_domain_mfn_range(st->vma, st->va & PAGE_MASK, *mfnp, 1, - st->vma->vm_page_prot, st->domain) < 0) { - *mfnp |= 0xf0000000U; - st->err++; - } - st->va += PAGE_SIZE; - - return 0; -} - -static int mmap_return_errors(void *data, void *state) -{ - xen_pfn_t *mfnp = data; - struct mmap_batch_state *st = state; - - return put_user(*mfnp, st->user++); -} - -static struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops; - -static long privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(void __user *udata) -{ - int ret; - struct privcmd_mmapbatch m; - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - unsigned long nr_pages; - LIST_HEAD(pagelist); - struct mmap_batch_state state; - - if (!xen_initial_domain()) - return -EPERM; - - if (copy_from_user(&m, udata, sizeof(m))) - return -EFAULT; - - nr_pages = m.num; - if ((m.num <= 0) || (nr_pages > (LONG_MAX >> PAGE_SHIFT))) - return -EINVAL; - - ret = gather_array(&pagelist, m.num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t), - m.arr); - - if (ret || list_empty(&pagelist)) - goto out; - - down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - - vma = find_vma(mm, m.addr); - ret = -EINVAL; - if (!vma || - vma->vm_ops != &privcmd_vm_ops || - (m.addr != vma->vm_start) || - ((m.addr + (nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT)) != vma->vm_end) || - !privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(vma)) { - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - goto out; - } - - state.domain = m.dom; - state.vma = vma; - state.va = m.addr; - state.err = 0; - - ret = traverse_pages(m.num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t), - &pagelist, mmap_batch_fn, &state); - - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - - if (state.err > 0) { - state.user = m.arr; - ret = traverse_pages(m.num, sizeof(xen_pfn_t), - &pagelist, - mmap_return_errors, &state); - } - -out: - free_page_list(&pagelist); - - return ret; -} - -static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file, - unsigned int cmd, unsigned long data) -{ - int ret = -ENOSYS; - void __user *udata = (void __user *) data; - - switch (cmd) { - case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_HYPERCALL: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(udata); - break; - - case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAP: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap(udata); - break; - - case IOCTL_PRIVCMD_MMAPBATCH: - ret = privcmd_ioctl_mmap_batch(udata); - break; - - default: - ret = -EINVAL; - break; - } - - return ret; -} - -#ifndef HAVE_ARCH_PRIVCMD_MMAP -static int privcmd_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf) -{ - printk(KERN_DEBUG "privcmd_fault: vma=%p %lx-%lx, pgoff=%lx, uv=%p\n", - vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, - vmf->pgoff, vmf->virtual_address); - - return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; -} - -static struct vm_operations_struct privcmd_vm_ops = { - .fault = privcmd_fault -}; - -static int privcmd_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) -{ - /* Unsupported for auto-translate guests. */ - if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) - return -ENOSYS; - - /* DONTCOPY is essential for Xen because copy_page_range doesn't know - * how to recreate these mappings */ - vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED | VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_PFNMAP; - vma->vm_ops = &privcmd_vm_ops; - vma->vm_private_data = NULL; - - return 0; -} - -static int privcmd_enforce_singleshot_mapping(struct vm_area_struct *vma) -{ - return (xchg(&vma->vm_private_data, (void *)1) == NULL); -} -#endif - -const struct file_operations privcmd_file_ops = { - .unlocked_ioctl = privcmd_ioctl, - .mmap = privcmd_mmap, -}; diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenfs/super.c b/drivers/xen/xenfs/super.c index 1aa3897..a55fbf9 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenfs/super.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xenfs/super.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include "xenfs.h" +#include "../privcmd.h" #include @@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ static int xenfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) [1] = {}, { "xenbus", &xenbus_file_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR }, { "capabilities", &capabilities_file_ops, S_IRUGO }, - { "privcmd", &privcmd_file_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR }, + { "privcmd", &xen_privcmd_fops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR }, {""}, }; int rc; diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenfs/xenfs.h b/drivers/xen/xenfs/xenfs.h index b68aa62..5056306 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenfs/xenfs.h +++ b/drivers/xen/xenfs/xenfs.h @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ #define _XENFS_XENBUS_H extern const struct file_operations xenbus_file_ops; -extern const struct file_operations privcmd_file_ops; extern const struct file_operations xsd_kva_file_ops; extern const struct file_operations xsd_port_file_ops; -- 1.7.6.4