Merge remote-tracking branch 'qubesos/master'
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commit
3d3724b017
49
patches.xen/xsa270.patch
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49
patches.xen/xsa270.patch
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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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Subject: xen-netback: fix input validation in xenvif_set_hash_mapping()
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Both len and off are frontend specified values, so we need to make
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sure there's no overflow when adding the two for the bounds check. We
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also want to avoid undefined behavior and hence use off to index into
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->hash.mapping[] only after bounds checking. This at the same time
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allows to take care of not applying off twice for the bounds checking
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against vif->num_queues.
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It is also insufficient to bounds check copy_op.len, as this is len
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truncated to 16 bits.
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This is XSA-270.
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
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Tested-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
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--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c
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+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c
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@@ -332,20 +332,22 @@ u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping_size(struct
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u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping(struct xenvif *vif, u32 gref, u32 len,
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u32 off)
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{
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- u32 *mapping = &vif->hash.mapping[off];
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+ u32 *mapping = vif->hash.mapping;
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struct gnttab_copy copy_op = {
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.source.u.ref = gref,
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.source.domid = vif->domid,
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- .dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping),
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.dest.domid = DOMID_SELF,
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- .dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping),
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- .len = len * sizeof(u32),
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+ .len = len * sizeof(*mapping),
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.flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref
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};
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- if ((off + len > vif->hash.size) || copy_op.len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE)
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+ if ((off + len < off) || (off + len > vif->hash.size) ||
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+ len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*mapping))
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return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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+ copy_op.dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping + off);
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+ copy_op.dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping + off);
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+
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while (len-- != 0)
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if (mapping[off++] >= vif->num_queues)
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return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ patches.xen/xsa155-linux44-0010-xen-netfront-do-not-use-data-already-exposed-to-
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patches.xen/xsa155-linux-0011-xen-netfront-add-range-check-for-Tx-response-id.patch
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patches.xen/xsa155-linux-0011-xen-netfront-add-range-check-for-Tx-response-id.patch
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patches.xen/xsa155-linux312-0012-xen-blkfront-make-local-copy-of-response-before-usin.patch
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patches.xen/xsa155-linux312-0012-xen-blkfront-make-local-copy-of-response-before-usin.patch
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patches.xen/xsa155-linux44-0013-xen-blkfront-prepare-request-locally-only-then-put-i.patch
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patches.xen/xsa155-linux44-0013-xen-blkfront-prepare-request-locally-only-then-put-i.patch
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patches.xen/xsa270.patch
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# MSI-X enabled device passthrough fix (#1734)
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# MSI-X enabled device passthrough fix (#1734)
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patches.xen/pci_op-cleanup.patch
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patches.xen/pci_op-cleanup.patch
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